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 Abstract: This study explores Aristotle’s political psychology, focusing on the 
lessons it teaches regarding the character of human reasoning. Contemporary political 
science has largely adopted the behavioral-economic model of political psychology. This 
model offers many insights into the limits of human reasoning, highlighting in particular 
the errors and biases that shape our choices. However, these insights come at the cost of 
an overly narrow view of human reasoning. When such a political psychology is applied 
to public policy and political rhetoric, it offers lessons on how to direct public action by 
taking advantage of unconscious thought processes, but it fails to teach how leaders 
might constructively engage human rationality. I argue that Aristotelian political 
psychology offers a useful corrective, one that can help us better understand both the 
potential and limitations of political guidance.  
 
To gain access to Aristotle’s political psychology, I begin with an overview of several of 
his psychological works: On the Soul, On the Motion of Animals, and the Nicomachean 
Ethics. I focus in particular on the concepts Aristotle uses in his study of human choice, 
and I draw out Aristotle’s unitary understanding of psychology, meaning the interrelated 
nature of thought and desire, which in turn illuminates the constitutive role that thought 
plays in shaping the ends of human action. From this theoretical basis, I turn to a more 
concentrated study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, exploring first the rhetorical concepts Aristotle 
introduces in the work, and then delving into the psychology of persuasion. In this study, 
vii 
I explore the ways that rhetoric necessarily engages the audience’s rationality and 
judgment. A particularly valuable lesson is the way in which rhetoric can draw out 
overlooked concerns and thereby broaden the audience members’ considerations, all in 
order to help them reach conclusions they would not by themselves. Returning to 
contemporary political science, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of political psychology 
offers us a better understanding of human choice, and he offers guidance on how rhetoric 
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Rhetoric, fittingly, is a word with different meanings for different audiences. For 
many people, rhetoric has negative connotations and it is often dismissed as superficial or 
obfuscating, as when a speech is regarded as “mere rhetoric” or when a speaker is told to 
“drop the rhetoric.” In more extreme cases, rhetoric is seen as dangerous, the means for 
manipulating audiences through lies, half-truths, and verbal tricks. Especially when it is 
equated with the art of demagoguery, rhetoric is seen as antithetical to good democracy, 
undercutting the democratic ideal of each citizen freely expressing his own choice 
without distortion or manipulation. Rhetoric, however, need not be seen in such a 
negative light. Instead, it can be regarded more neutrally as persuasive speech. Indeed, 
rhetoric may even be an essential part of democratic politics because it is required for 
presenting the full merits of a position. Rhetoric, in this view, can be an aid to 
deliberation and it can help people make better decisions. One’s view of rhetoric and its 
place in politics depends largely on one’s understanding of how rhetoric works—and the 
understanding of how rhetoric works, I will argue, ultimately depends on one’s 
understanding of human rationality and the psychology of persuasion. 
In general, negative views of rhetoric are based on two lines of criticism. On the 
one hand, rhetoric is seen as overly controlling, offering an arsenal of tools for 
manipulating audiences. These tools include emotional appeals, “spin,” skewed 
presentation, and other stylistic tricks. Audiences are misled, distracted, or otherwise 
overwhelmed by rhetoric, and as a result, they make choices they would not have made 
with a clearer view of matters. On the other hand, rhetoric is seen as mere pandering to 
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the audience. In this case, a rhetorical speaker identifies the immediate preferences of the 
audience members and tells them what they want to hear. This pandering is criticized 
because it is a failure of leadership: rather than challenging an audience with a better 
alternative, the speaker simply adopts the ill-considered aims of his audience. In both 
avenues of critique, there is an implicit belief in the weakness of human rationality. At 
most, the audience’s reason is seen as solely instrumental, looking only for means to 
desired ends. In the case of manipulation, however, human reason is seen as weak and 
ineffective—it is easily distracted or overwhelmed by passions and desires. 
Defending rhetoric does not require asserting a completely opposite view of 
human psychology wherein clear-sighted reason is the source of all action. Indeed, if that 
were the case, there would be no need for rhetoric. One would simply present a proposal 
that should then be appreciated and acted upon according to its logical merits. The only 
matter of concern would be presenting the correct alternative—everything else should be 
left to the rational audience and all other efforts by the speaker would be suspect. 
Rhetoric, however, is not simply a form of rational argumentation; persuasion requires 
speaking to the particular viewpoints of an audience, including their opinions, prejudices, 
and passions. While a speaker may seek to influence this viewpoint, it is not correct to 
see this effort as necessarily manipulative, nor is it right to speak of persuasion as if it 
were solely the result of some external force. Being persuaded is not a passive 
experience. Much of the effort obviously comes from the speaker: he must make his case, 
presenting his position to the audience. But the listeners also play a role: they must reflect 
on the position, evaluate it, and decide whether it makes sense or squares with their own 
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experience. It is this dual character of rhetorical persuasion that makes it an important 
part of democratic government in which citizens, as Aristotle puts it, are meant to both 
“rule and be ruled.”1 Similarly, it is the concern with the audience’s viewpoint that allows 
rhetoric to be part of true political leadership because a speaker must attempt to draw 
listeners from their initial views, guiding them to a position that they would not have 
otherwise adopted. The challenge, then, for defending rhetoric as a legitimate political art 
is to see how the art of persuasion can be used to lead an audience while avoiding, as 
much as possible, the vices of manipulation and pandering. Such a defense requires an 
understanding of human psychology that recognizes the complex interplay of thought, 
desire, and passion that is involved in choice. 
The work that follows is an attempt to understand rhetoric by means of a study of 
Aristotelian political psychology, specifically a study of Aristotle’s view of human 
psychology and its relevance to rhetoric. My primary goal in this study is to offer a better 
understanding of how rhetoric works than is found in contemporary theories of political 
psychology, which embrace—and thereby encourage—the view that rhetoric is an art of 
pandering and manipulating audiences. By drawing on Aristotelian political psychology, 
I also aim to correct a fundamental flaw in contemporary psychological theories, which is 
their overly mechanical view of human reasoning. The narrow, instrumental view of 
psychology leads to the misunderstanding of many political phenomena, including 
                                                 
1 Politics, 1332a11-27. See also Garsten (2006) on the democratic character of rhetoric (pp. 1-10). 
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rhetoric, political passions, and the role of moral concerns in politics. While my focus 
will be political psychology and rhetoric, I hope that this study can serve as an example 
for a broader correction of contemporary political psychology. I will conclude the present 
chapter with an explanation of why I am turning to Aristotle. First, however, I must 
identify more precisely what is lacking in contemporary political psychology and its 
corresponding understanding of rhetoric. 
I. Rational Choice and Bounded Rationality  
i. Psychological Theory 
For the most part, “political psychology” today simply means borrowing 
psychological theories for the purpose of predicting or explaining political phenomena.2 
Accordingly, political psychology is generally a piecemeal approach, using different 
theories and methods to address issues such as voting behavior, policy preferences, and 
political leadership. However, the dominant approach for the scientific study of politics is 
that of “bounded rationality,” a behavioral-economics approach based on the work of 
Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky.3 In the study of political rhetoric, 
                                                 
2 This is the definition given in the Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Sears et al, 2003). 
3 Simon (1978) and Kahneman (2002) were awarded Nobel prizes in economics for their 
pioneering research in this field (Tversky died in 1996). I should note that this general view of 
psychology has many different names, such as “behavioral-cognitivist models,” “information-
processing models,” and “prospect theory” (the last is Kahneman and Tversky’s label). There 
may be subtle differences between these theories, but I am treating them collectively under the 
rubric “bounded rationality” (coined by Simon, 1957b) because this name most clearly identifies 
their common focus on the limitations of human reasoning. 
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bounded rationality provides the psychological basis for such concepts as agenda setting, 
priming, and framing.  
In the current section, I will outline the basic features of bounded rationality and 
explain how the theory is used in political science, especially in regards to political 
rhetoric. While I am ultimately critical of this approach to political psychology, I do not 
mean to dismiss it out of hand. It offers valuable insights, particularly regarding the flaws 
and limits of everyday human reasoning. Nevertheless, I will argue that Aristotelian 
political psychology remains relevant today and can offer a very helpful corrective to the 
assumptions of contemporary political psychology. To make this argument, it is 
necessary to be sure that I am responding to the actual theory and not a simple caricature 
of social science. Accordingly, I will consider the theory of bounded rationality in some 
detail. With that said, what follows is not meant as a comprehensive survey of bounded 
rationality—in particular, I will not dwell on the complex mathematical models used to 
predict behavior. Rather, I am identifying the core theoretical assumptions of the 
approach so as to highlight more clearly the alternative presented by Aristotelian political 
philosophy. 
The theory of bounded rationality emerged from a critique of rational choice 
theory. Specifically, as rational choice theory came to be employed as an empirical rather 
than normative theory, its axioms and assumptions had to be modified for predicting 
human behavior. It is necessary to describe briefly the tenets of rational choice theory 
because bounded rationality is still largely understood in its opposition to the earlier 
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theory. In its most basic form, rational choice theory is a combination of classic 
utilitarianism and modern theories of economics. Within this theory, people are treated as 
self-interested “actors” who seek to satisfy their preferences in the most efficient manner 
possible; this “utility maximization” consists of ranking one’s preferences, calculating 
possible actions, and choosing the course of action that is most likely to satisfy the most 
preferences at the least cost.4 It must be noted from the outset that the “rationality” of 
rational choice theory refers only to instrumental rationality—namely, the calculation of 
means to given ends. The ends themselves are treated as “exogenous” to the theory, 
meaning that the ends of action are not based on “rationality.” Rather, the ends of action 
are seen as coming from other sources, such as biological desires and social norms. Once 
the ends are identified, however, social scientists use economic theory as the guide for 
calculation, offering complex formulae for determining the most efficient means a person 
should follow for optimal utility maximization.5 In its foundational form, rational choice 
theory was explicitly normative, offering an ideal of rationality and a guide for how one 
ought to act to achieve one’s various ends. As an extension, however, rational choice was 
                                                 
4 For seminal texts in rational choice theory, see von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) and Downs 
(1957). For a more recent defense of the theory, see Riker (1995).  
5 Many different economic theories are employed under the rubric of rational choice. The most 
basic “utility theory” addresses individual rational behavior under conditions of certainty, risk, or 
uncertainty. “Game theory” is used to describe “rational” behavior between two or more 
individuals involved in cooperative or competitive bargaining. “Ethical” or “welfare theory” is a 
broader application of rational choice theory for realizing social goals. On these distinctions, see 
Harsanyi (1985).  
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also adopted by social scientists as a model for predicting behavior, based on the 
assumption that people will act in ways that seek to maximize their preferences. 
As rational choice theory developed and grew in popularity, subsequent social 
scientists attacked the theory for ignoring the obvious fact that people do not act 
according to the economic ideal of rationality. The problem is that the basic models of 
rational choice employ an unrealistic conception of human reason, wherein actors are 
treated as all-knowing calculators who are fully aware of their preferences and are 
capable of carrying out the extremely complicated calculations required to rank their 
options and achieve utility maximization. Simon sums up this critique well:  
economists… attribute to economic man a preposterously omniscient 
rationality. Economic man has a complete and consistent system of 
preferences that allows him always to choose among the alternatives open 
to him; he is always completely aware of what these alternatives are; there 
are no limits on the complexity of the computations he can perform in 
order to determine which alternatives are best; probability calculations are 
neither frightening nor mysterious to him” (1957a, p. xxiii).6 
                                                 
6 See Lau (2003) for further critiques of the rational choice model.   
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In opposition to rational choice theory, critics from the social sciences have emphasized 
the constraints on this ideal of rationality, or as Simon originally described it, the limits 
that “bound the area of rationality” (1957b, pp. 40-41). 
Simon’s work focused on the inherent limitations of human reasoning. The basic 
claim is that people are not omniscient calculators: they have limited awareness of the 
world and they have limited computational powers when making decisions.7 
Accordingly, explanations of actions must take into account these human limitations. In 
particular, theories of bounded rationality place special emphasis on attention.8 Given 
their cognitive limits, people can focus on only so much of their external environment 
and their own memories, and so they must be selective in how they devote their limited 
“resources” when making decisions. Attention is used to explain this selection process, 
which means that attention is used to explain why certain information is available for a 
decision while other information is ignored. In turn, bounded rationality theories try to 
explain where attention will be focused in different situations. Another important and 
related concept for bounded rationality is “satisficing” (a portmanteau of “satisfy” and 
                                                 
7 “The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality” 
(Simon, 1957b, p. 198). See Simon (1995), pp. 46-47, and Jones (2003) for more comprehensive 
summaries of the different features of bounded rationality. 
8 “People are endowed with very large long-term memories, but with very narrow capacities for 
simultaneous attention to different pieces of information. At any given moment, only a little 
information, drawn from the senses and from long-term memory, can be held in the focus of 
attention” (Simon, 1985, p.301). 
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“suffice”). Whereas rational choice theory posits actors who seek a solution that best 
satisfies their preferences, bounded rationality grants that people will rarely devote the 
time and energy to finding such an optimum. Instead, people will often consider 
alternatives only to the point where they find a “good enough” solution that they consider 
worth pursuing (namely, one that surpasses a certain “satisficing threshold”).9  
To sum up Simon’s work, one can say that whereas rational choice theory posits 
unlimited rational capacities and optimal problem solving, bounded rationality offers 
models to explain why people make errors and stray from the “rational” optimum. A 
slightly longer summary statement is worth quoting from Simon:  
In short, people almost always have reasons for what they do but seldom 
the “best” reasons. That is to say, consequences of actions are ignored or 
misjudged, either because information is lacking or erroneous or because 
computational power (thinking power) is insufficient for estimating the 
consequences; trade-offs among goals are handled inadequately or not at 
all; and finally, potential effective actions may be unknown (and even 
unknowable) or ignored. As a general label for these departures from the 
                                                 
9 “Human thinking powers are very modest when compared with the complexity of the 
environments in which human beings live. Faced with complexity and uncertainty, lacking the 
wits to optimize, they must be content to satisfice—to find ‘good enough’ solutions to their 
problems and ‘good enough’ courses of action” (1979, p.3). Note, as Miller (1990) explains, 
satisficing can still be understood as rationally seeking an optimum in the sense that the actor is 
forgoing the prospect of better options for the sake of avoiding the costs involved with an 
uncertain search for unknown options. 
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global rationality postulated in economic and public choice theory, we 
speak of human “bounded rationality” (1995, p. 47). 
While Simon offered the initial model of bounded rationality, Kahneman and 
Tversky expanded on his work by exploring the different psychological mechanisms that 
influence choice. A basic idea of bounded rationality is that people simply cannot take in 
all of the information presented by their environment and memories—complete openness 
would lead to paralysis or “information overload.” People have limited awareness, 
attention, and information-processing power, and so they must be selective when 
interpreting the world. In regards to making decisions, people are similarly limited in that 
they are not aware of all potential courses of action and they are rarely capable of 
calculating the most efficient means of pursuing their ends. Given these cognitive 
limitations, people employ mental shortcuts or “heuristics” when making choices.10 
Rather than objectively considering every aspect of a situation, people tend to focus on a 
few salient features over others, simplifying problems and potential alternatives. This use 
of cognitive shortcuts allows for quick decision making, but it also leaves people prone to 
making mistakes in their reasoning.  
Much of Kahneman and Tversky’s research involved identifying specific 
“cognitive biases,” which are systematic errors or deviations from the ideal of rationality 
                                                 
10 Simon was also one of the pioneers of mental “heuristics” research, importing the idea from 




that occur because of overreliance on cognitive heuristics.11 For example, one mental 
shortcut is the “availability heuristic.” When making decisions, people need to determine 
how likely a course of action is to succeed, but they do not consistently calculate 
probability; instead, people often judge probability based on how easily they can think of 
examples. If examples of success are more vivid or available to their memory, they will 
exaggerate the likelihood of success, and vice-versa with examples of failure.12 Similarly, 
the “anchoring effect” involves a skewed sense of value wherein people focus 
inordinately on an initial piece of information, using that “anchor” as a gauge for judging 
subsequent information. If, for instance, a new alternative is more attractive than an 
initial option, a person will judge the second alternative as more desirable in general, 
more desirable than he would have judged it had he not encountered the anchor. The 
overall point regarding the “anchoring effect” is that people do not have an objective 
sense of value; rather, they look for immediate comparisons to establish relative value, 
and so their sense of value can be shifted depending on what one provides as the point of 
comparison.13 
The mental activity involved in cognitive heuristics is largely automatic or 
unconscious. More specifically, models of bounded rationality distinguish thinking in 
                                                 
11 For an accessible and extensive discussion of Kahneman and Tversky’s work as well as a 
survey of the broader field of bounded rationality research, see Kahneman (2011). 
12 See Tversky & Kahneman (1973). 
13 See Tversky & Kahneman (1974) as well as Ariely et al (2006) on anchoring being used for the 
“construction of value.” 
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terms of two processes or systems.14 The first system is the automatic thinking that 
characterizes the everyday activities wherein a person acts on immediate recognition, 
basic recollection, and quick reasoning. The second system involves complex and 
deliberate thinking. These systems are connected, however, and the deliberate thinking 
involved in choice often relies on the information provided by the more immediate 
thought processes—this reliance on immediate thought processes is what makes people 
prone to cognitive biases when making choices. These biases can be resisted through 
deliberate effort and attentiveness, but such an effort is not the norm. For instance, a 
corollary of the bounded rationality concept of “satisficing” (seeking sufficiently 
satisfactory rather than optimal solutions) is that people are regarded as “cognitive 
misers” who are reluctant to expend any more cognitive effort than is necessary.15 Put 
more simply, people on average tend not to overthink situations; instead, they think only 
as much as is necessary to reach a satisfactory solution quickly. However, when people 
act on their immediate impressions, they rely on heuristics and are thus prone to the 
errors inherent in these mental shortcuts.  
In sum, much of the bounded rationality paradigm involves explaining seemingly 
irrational human decisions in terms of the predictable heuristics and biases that 
                                                 
14 On the two systems distinction, see Stanovich & West (2000), Evans (2003), and Kahneman 
(2011).  
15 The term “cognitive miser” was coined by Taylor (1981). 
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characterize normal, everyday thinking.16 That is, flawed (i.e. non-optimal or harmful) 
actions are explained in terms of misdirected attention, skewed information, and other 
cognitive distortions that occur because of the limited, bounded character of human 
rationality.  
While many studies in bounded rationality are simply directed towards explaining 
general human behavior, the theory has more recently been applied to politics and used as 
a guide for influencing public action. I will turn now to discuss this application, 
particularly in regards to public policy and political rhetoric. 
ii. Political Applications 
The theory of bounded rationality has become influential throughout the social 
sciences, and, more recently, it has also become a guide for shaping public choice. Two 
of the more well-known advocates of applied bounded rationality theory are Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein, whose book, Nudge (2008), popularized terms such as 
“paternalistic libertarianism” and “choice architecture.”17 The idea behind this approach 
to public policy is to maintain freedom of choice (libertarianism) while targeting 
                                                 
16 Two popular works in this vein are Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces 
That Shape Our Decisions (2010) and Tim Hartford’s The Logic of Life: The Rational Economics 
of an Irrational World (2009). 
17 Sunstein joined President Obama’s administration as the “regulations czar,” head of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (2009-2012). In the UK, Nudge inspired the creation of the 
Behavioural Insights Team (also known as the “Nudge Unit”) in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
Office, with Thaler serving as a special advisor. 
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cognitive heuristics and biases in such a way that the public is led to act in socially 
beneficial ways (paternalism). A metaphor used throughout Nudge is the way food is put 
on display in a cafeteria. People are prone to select fatty, unhealthy foods, and 
storeowners may take advantage of this by giving prominent place to such foods, 
increasing consumer temptation. A public administrator, however, could more positively 
influence choice by mandating that priority be given to healthy foods, drawing these 
items to consumers’ attention while putting unhealthy foods in less noticeable positions 
in order to reduce temptation and encourage healthy eating. A public policy example of 
this approach is setting defaults for public enrollment programs, such as automatically 
enrolling new employees in a retirement-savings plan or enlisting new drivers as organ 
donors. In each case, participants are free to opt-out of the default plan, but because of a 
propensity to accept defaults (the “status quo bias”), far more people will be enlisted in 
the default policy than would be the case if they had to choose the policy deliberately. 
Another example is the use of anchoring, such as when soliciting donations for public 
programs: if a recommended donation is suggested, donation amounts will on average be 
closer to the recommendation and higher than if no recommendation is given. In these 
and other instances of “choice architecture,” administrators structure choices in a way 
that encourages the public to adopt a desired policy. 
As with choice architecture in public policy, the theory of bounded rationality has 
similarly inspired studies of rhetoric, encouraging researchers to investigate how political 
actors influence public opinion by relying on cognitive biases and heuristics. For 
example, two basic concepts used to explain changes in public opinion are the “agenda-
15 
 
setting” and “priming” effects.18 The agenda-setting effect is the observation that those 
problems that receive the most prominent attention in the media become the problems 
that the public regards as the most politically pressing. For example, if people primarily 
encounter news stories involving the economy, they will believe that the economy is the 
most important issue facing the country. The priming effect is slightly subtler: prominent 
stories shape the public’s criteria of judgment such that voters evaluate candidates 
primarily in terms of the issues that receive the most prominent media attention. If, for 
example, national defense stories receive the most attention, candidates will be judged 
primarily in terms of their security qualifications. Agenda-setting and priming effects are 
theories political scientists to explain mass media effects on public opinion, but 
politicians can apply these theories in their campaigns, using speeches, policy proposals, 
and slogans to focus media attention on the issues that favor their platforms.19 
Both the priming and agenda-setting effects are explained by the bounded 
rationality observation that people are only selectively attentive to the world and tend to 
rely only on the information that is most readily prevalent in their minds. Indeed, Simon 
himself suggested that political rhetoric was primarily an effort to shift the audience’s 
attention to particular issues: 
                                                 
18 These terms were introduced to political psychology by Iyengar & Kinder (1987). 




The narrowness of the span of attention accounts for a great deal of human 
unreason that considers only one facet of a multifaceted matter before a 
decision is reached. For example, it has been hypothesized that the art of 
campaign oratory is much more an art of directing attention (to the issues 
on which the candidate believes himself or herself to have the broadest 
support) than an art of persuading people to change their minds on issues. 
(Simon, 1985, p. 302) 
In fact, political wisdom suggests that a main purpose of campaigning is 
not to change people’s values or beliefs but to turn their attention to those 
issues on which majority views favor the campaigner. (Simon, 1995, p. 
51) 
Subsequent researchers linked Simon’s claims regarding political rhetoric with 
Kahneman and Tversky’s work on cognitive biases, focusing in particular on the 
availability heuristic (the tendency to judge probability or importance based on what most 
readily comes to mind). The theory is that, given limited awareness of political issues, 
news media and campaign rhetoric serve to narrow the realm of consideration, directing 
public attention to particular criteria and making these criteria more likely to be recalled 
when people make political judgments. One study sums this theory up well, saying that in 
the case of presidential elections, 
[priming occurs because] people have neither the ability nor motivation to 
comprehensively incorporate every potentially relevant issue into their 
17 
 
presidential evaluations. As some issues are brought into the foreground of 
people’s thinking… others will be pushed into the cognitive background.20 
The most popular concept employed in the scientific study of political rhetoric is 
the “framing effect.” The research that inspired this focus on framing was another of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s critical studies.21 In this study, Kahneman and Tversky 
demonstrated that actors are highly sensitive to the manner in which a problem is 
presented such that subtle alterations in presentation can shape an actor’s decisions. One 
of their specific examples was regarding medical treatment alternatives: people will much 
more frequently choose a treatment described in terms of survival rate (70%) rather than 
a treatment described in terms of mortality (25%). In this instance, the second option 
actually has a greater chance of success (75%), but because of the “loss frame,” people 
are less likely to choose that option. In political instances of framing, speakers similarly 
evoke frames in order to influence an audience’s decision. For example, a proposal for a 
new power plant might be presented in an economic frame (jobs gained) or an ecological 
frame (damage to the environment), the frame being selected with an eye to influencing 
the audience’s receptivity to the proposal.22 A more recent example is in the debt ceiling 
struggle: Democrats employed a “hostage frame” when criticizing Republican demands 
                                                 
20 Miller & Krosnick (1996), p.82. See Iyengar & Kinder (1987) for a more extended explanation 
of priming. 
21 Tversky & Kahneman (1981). For the application of this research to political science and media 
studies, see Iyengar (1994). 
22 See Chong & Druckman (2007a). 
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for budget cuts, casting Republican efforts as an attempt to hold the economy hostage in 
order to force unilateral cuts. Other cases of framing may concern the use of specific 
labels. Regarding inheritance, for example, one might refer to an “estate tax” (a tax on an 
heir’s new earnings) or a “death tax” (one more tax added onto what the dead person has 
already paid over a lifetime).23 Another recent framing effort is the label partisans use 
when discussing the Federal government’s response to the 2008 financial crisis—a 
“recovery” act (which is an attempt to return to normalcy) or a government “stimulus” 
(yet another expansion of government into the free market).24 In all of these cases, the 
goal is to influence public opinion subtly by encouraging the adoption of a framework 
favorable to a particular policy. 
As with priming and agenda-setting, framing is explained in terms of limited 
cognitive capacity, but the emphasis is more on the contextual nature of evaluation. 
Whereas rational choice theory posits an effectively omniscient actor, fully aware of his 
environment and all potential alternatives in a situation, bounded rationality stresses the 
limited awareness of an actor. The basic idea is that multiple considerations might be 
brought to bear on a situation, but people usually consider only a few salient aspects 
before making a decision. The key to successful framing is to highlight certain elements 
of a situation over others in order to encourage people to adopt a particular perspective. 
                                                 
23 Frank Luntz, a key Republican strategist, recounts the details of the “death tax” and other 
framing efforts in Words That Work: It's Not What You Say, It's What People Hear (2007). 
24 Example from the introduction to Schaffner & Sellers (2009). 
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As one study of framing puts it, “[frames] shape individual understanding and opinion 
concerning an issue by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, 
reducing a usually complex issue down to one or two central aspects.”25 
In terms of what characterizes strong or effective frames, research has identified 
several factors.26 Most notably, effective frames do not create entirely new perspectives; 
rather, they tend to reflect core values of an audience, drawing much of their strength 
from preexisting viewpoints. The initial stage of a framing effort will therefore often 
involve polling public opinion and testing focus groups in order to find a resonating 
viewpoint.27 Frames are not wholly reactive, however, and their strength can be 
augmented. The most common tactic is repetition, wherein a frame is presented multiple 
times throughout a speech and echoed by multiple speakers. Other tactics include using 
emotional appeals as well as vignettes that portray how issues have impacted particular 
individuals. These work because emotional messages garner more attention (the “affect 
heuristic”) and specific examples are more memorable (the “representative heuristic”), 
making a frame more salient to the audience and thus more likely to guide subsequent 
thinking about an issue. 
                                                 
25 Nelson, Clawson & Oxley (1997), p. 568. 
26 See Chong & Druckman (2007b), Druckman (2009), and Aarøe (2011). 
27 See Luntz (2007) for an in-depth look at the focus group process. 
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It should be noted that the focus of all of these effects—agenda-setting, priming, 
and framing—is not the content of an argument itself. This is not to say that the content 
of a message is unimportant: it is the position that a speaker wants the public to adopt. 
However, judging the merits of a position requires conscious thought by voters. By 
contrast, agenda-setting, priming, and framing are efforts to engage unconscious thought-
processes (cognitive biases and heuristics) in order to condition an audience to receive a 
message and then trigger certain responses.28 In this sense, these rhetorical techniques are 
very much akin to the choice architecture and engineering of choice employed by 
paternalistic libertarianism.  
 
This should suffice for an overview of the bounded rationality paradigm and its 
application to politics. To this point, I have attempted to offer a sympathetic account of 
the theory, in part to offer an accurate portrayal of its assumptions and applications, but 
also to highlight some of its legitimate strengths. That is, it should be granted that 
bounded rationality offers some valuable insights—it is an improvement on the earlier 
rational choice theory, and to the extent that our reasoning is actually instrumental, the 
theory is helpful for identifying problems and limitations in human rationality. There are, 
however, some critical flaws with this theory. Having outlined the basic psychological 
                                                 
28 See Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson (1997) regarding the sharp distinction between persuasion, on 
one hand, and framing and priming on the other. “Persuasion” is treated as a matter of introducing 
new beliefs, whereas priming and framing involve shifting the perceived applicability or priority 
of existing beliefs regarding a given issue. 
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concepts of bounded rationality and their application to public policy and political 
rhetoric, I will turn now to consider the difficulties with this view of political psychology. 
II. Criticisms of the Bounded Rationality Approach to Politics 
There are several practical problems with political policies premised on the theory 
of bounded rationality, as has been discussed most clearly in the literature responding to 
paternalistic libertarianism.29 On the one hand, some worry that bounded rationality 
inspired programs will be insufficient for regulating behavior because there will be no 
long-term effects. The argument is that people may act differently as long as the proper 
“choice architecture” is in place, but it if the external pressures are removed, the 
problematic behavior will return. In the cafeteria metaphor, for instance, nutrition may be 
improved as long as unhealthy food is harder to access, but in any other environment, 
people will return to poor nutrition. The problem is that the underlying causes of bad 
behavior such as bad preferences are left unaddressed, and so there will be no long-term 
improvement of the problem without constant external pressures to shape choices. On the 
other hand, some echo Tocqueville’s concerns regarding “soft despotism,” worrying that 
choice engineering will be too effective and that it will have pernicious long-term effects. 
The fear is that, rather than making their own choices and learning from mistakes, people 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Bovens (2008), Hausman & Welch (2010), and White (2013). 
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will be increasingly dependent on external pressures, ultimately becoming ever reliant on 
paternalistic guidance. 
Regarding rhetoric more specifically, critics worry that bounded rationality 
inspired rhetorical techniques are used to subvert the possibility of genuinely deliberative 
discourse in politics.30 The criticisms fall into the familiar forms of criticizing rhetoric, 
namely that it consists of pandering or manipulation. On the one hand, there is the worry 
that politicians seek to reflect public opinion all too quickly. That is, rather than trying to 
challenge or refine flawed opinions—and thus encourage some form of deliberation—
politicians simply rely on “what sells,” by using, for example, narrative frames that 
repackage opinions discovered in polls and focus groups. On the other hand, there is the 
worry that politicians can now more capably manipulate the public, relying on techniques 
that target unconscious thought-processes and cognitive biases, thereby avoiding the need 
for rational persuasion. One study on the increasing distortion of public opinion describes 
this fear well: 
Politicians are not in the business of educating the public. Instead, they use 
rhetoric to trigger the psychological mechanisms that distort judgment. 
They present isolated, unrepresentative facts; they frame issues 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Ginsberg (1988) and Bartels (2003). 
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tendentiously; and they seek to evoke an emotional response rather than 
encourage rational deliberation.31 
These criticisms of applied bounded rationality have merit, but they lack the 
grounding for an alternative. To be sure, the critiques point towards deliberation and 
education, but they do not challenge the fundamental problem with the theory of bounded 
rationality—namely, that it is built upon an impoverished understanding of human 
reasoning. Most specifically, like the models of rational thought that preceded it, the 
theory of bounded rationality treats human reason as solely instrumental: the rationality 
that is “bound” is the same one idealized by rational choice theory.32 While many 
bounded rationality researchers are not explicit on this point, Simon himself is very clear 
on the character of rationality: 
Reason, taken by itself, is instrumental. It can’t select our final goals, nor 
can it mediate for us in pure conflicts over what final goal to pursue—we 
have to settle these issues in some other way. All reason can do is help us 
reach agreed-on goals more efficiently (1983, p. 106, emphasis added). 
                                                 
31 Kuklinksi & Quirk (2000), p. 168, my emphasis. 
32 As discussed in the previous section, bounded rationality is usually defined as a correction of 
the earlier rational choice theory. For a perceptive critique of bounded rationality as being merely 
an applied form of rational choice theory, see Miller (1990). See also Elster (1990) and Riker 
(1995), who, in a more sympathetic fashion, stress the broader compatibility of a bounded 
rationality and rational choice. 
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Thus, whereas reason may provide powerful help in finding means to 
reach our ends, it has very little to say about the ends themselves. […] 
Reason […] goes to work only after it has been supplied with a suitable 
set of inputs, or premises. […] It cannot tell us where to go; at best it can 
tell us how to get there. […] It is a gun for hire that can be employed in 
the service of whatever goals we have, good or bad. (1983, pp. 7-8, 
emphasis added). 
The ends of action thus stand outside the realm of rationality. Ends can only be justified 
by arbitrary commitments—“human fiat,” as Simon puts it (1957a, p.56)—and so these 
ends can be influenced only by non-rational appeals.33 
Along with reducing reason to a computational tool that merely calculates means 
to non-rational ends, the instrumental view of rationality also treats thought as radically 
separate from other aspects of psychology such as the emotions and desires. To the extent 
that an interaction is recognized, it is a one-sided one wherein emotions and desires serve 
as “inputs,” supplying the ends of action. In addition, bounded rationality theorists grant 
that the emotions and desires shape the calculations made by reason by focusing attention 
                                                 
33 I should note that I am only focusing on problems associated with the bounded rationality 
treatment of human choice. There is a much broader set of problems involved with Simon’s 
narrow, positivistic view of science and his commitment to the fact-value distinction. On these 
issues and a more extensive critique of Simon, see Storing (1962). While Storing only addresses 
Simon’s very early work, he accurately anticipates subsequent developments in Simon’s theory 
and the problems associated with it. 
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and shifting awareness of potential alternatives.34 Put more simply, it is granted by 
bounded rationality that the emotions and desires can direct (or misdirect) rational 
calculation, but reason does not have a reciprocal effect. Rather, the emotions and desires 
are treated as being outside of the scope of rationality. 
Human reason is thus reduced to narrow, dry calculation akin to a computer’s. It 
follows that human action is similarly seen as mechanistic, and efforts of influencing 
people are understood solely in mechanical terms, wherein inputs are varied so as to 
trigger desired responses from otherwise passive “actors.” It is thus fitting that practical 
applications of bounded rationality have adopted labels such as “choice architecture” and 
“engineering of choice.”35 
Again, to the extent that reasoning is instrumental, bounded rationality offers 
some valuable insights on the nature and limits of computational reasoning. Otherwise, 
however, bounded rationality ignores the broader character of human rationality. Indeed, 
                                                 
34 See, for example, Simon’s claims (1983) regarding the emotions: “A very strong case can be 
made, and has been made by physiological psychologists, that focusing attention is one of the 
principal functions of the processes we call emotions” (p. 21), and “emotion has particular 
importance because of its function of selecting particular things in our environments as the focus 
of our attention” (p. 29). For more on the role of the emotions as directing attention, see Marcus 
et al (2000). 
35 I have focused on the substantive claims of bounded rationality, but this only hints at the degree 
to which human action is regarded as mechanical. This view is more apparent when one delves 
into the details of the complicated mathematical formulae and other computational concepts, such 
as action being triggered once a pathway has reached a sufficient “activation potential” (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007a). See also Miller & Krosnick’s (1996) discussion of the “grading hypothesis” 
wherein memories are activated according to their “node strength.” 
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it even outright denies what I will be calling the constitutive character of thought. That is, 
by only recognizing the influence of the affects on reasoning, bounded rationality ignores 
the way in which thought influences and shapes the emotions and desires. Furthermore, 
bounded rationality is blind to the crucial role that thought plays in how we conceptualize 
the ends of action, or how we understand what is worth pursuing.  
Proponents of bounded rationality models might reply that the theory is only 
making generalizations for the sake of predicting and it is not meant as a complete 
explanation of human behavior. Furthermore, they might claim that bounded rationality 
has better experimental support and it offers better predictions than other theories of 
behavior.36 It could be pointed out that some critics question the long-term predictive 
value of bounded rationality, as it is largely supported by simple laboratory studies that 
may not generalize to real world situations.37 This may indeed be a problem, but I am 
concerned with a more basic problem regarding generalization. Bounded rationality’s 
empirical support comes from averages, trends, and tendencies, which may reflect much 
of the common, everyday thought that consists of instrumental reasoning. It is 
problematic, however, to generalize these observations to support a theory that makes a 
much broader claim about reasoning, namely, that human reasoning is only instrumental 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Jones’s (2003) support of Simon and bounded rationality as applied to 
political science. More generally regarding prediction rather than explanation, see Simon (1985), 
Elster (1990), Riker (1995), and Lau (2003). 




and that rationality has no relation to the ends that we pursue. It is not correct to say that 
the theory is used only to make predictions rather than to give explanations; in fact, it is 
used to rule out explanations of human action, thereby constricting the sphere of human 
rationality to an extremely narrow realm. For instance, in the instrumental view, there is 
no room for ends to be affected by contemplation and clarification of what is truly worth 
pursuing—contemplation and clarity being key parts of what we normally associate with 
a rational way of life. 
It is also inadequate and inaccurate to claim that bounded rationality is simply 
predictive, as if it did not have normative implications. This distinction cannot be 
maintained because bounded rationality does have normative commitments. Most 
obviously, the theory of bounded rationality still adheres to the ideal posited by rational 
choice theory: the cognitive flaws described by bounded rationality are the ways that 
people stray from the ideal of utility maximization. By identifying these flaws, bounded 
rationality readily serves as a guide for correcting cognitive errors and improving 
calculation. The only reflection required, however, is for identifying one’s preferences 
and guarding against the cognitive biases that may mislead proper calculation. Other 
forms of reflection are implicitly ruled out. Indeed, by treating the ends of action as 
outside the scope of reasoning, by speaking of ends as though they were simply arbitrary 
tastes, bounded rationality encourages a relativism regarding our ends, precluding 
rational reflection and deliberation over what ends a person should pursue. Bounded 
rationality thus confines rationality to instrumental calculation, and in doing so, it 
restricts reason, discouraging the cultivation of human rationality. 
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 Similarly, bounded rationality dismisses ways of engaging non-instrumental 
rationality, and in doing so, it diminishes the possibilities for political leadership. When 
seeking to serve the public good, it may be enough for a leader to identify people’s aims 
and offer clear ways of achieving these. If, however, these aims are ill-considered and 
harmful, the only recourse bounded rationality leaves to a leader is to manipulate the 
public, redirecting attention and drawing on flawed reasoning so as to shape choices and 
make people pursue other ends. There is no room for challenging preferences, 
encouraging deliberation, and more openly guiding people towards better alternatives. 
There are limits to leadership, of course, and in particular the possibilities of rhetoric are 
limited, but bounded rationality imposes these limits in advance by confining rationality 
to instrumental reasoning. Lacking a broader conception of rationality, bounded 
rationality is unable to defend any form of rhetoric or explore the full possibilities of 
political leadership. Furthermore, as the dominant model for explaining political action, 
bounded rationality has a powerful influence on political actors because the theory serves 
as the basis for advising current leaders and educating future leaders. The overall result is 
a political science that encourages politicians to follow their inclinations to manipulate 
public opinion cynically and discourages any aspirations to guide people towards better 
alternatives.  
It is not enough, however, to criticize the theory of bounded rationality and dwell 
on its limitations. If its notion of rationality is flawed, it is necessary to show that there is 
an alternative and establish that there is, in fact, more to human rationality than 
instrumental reasoning. Furthermore, to demonstrate the limitations of bounded 
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rationality as a political psychology, it is also necessary to explore the role that non-
instrumental rationality can have in political life. These are my goals in the following 
study, and to accomplish them, I will be turning to a study of Aristotelian political 
psychology, for reasons I will now explain. 
III. A Study of Aristotelian Political Psychology 
Let me turn now to outline the scope of my study by briefly describing the 
chapters that will follow. First, however, I will explain why I am turning from 
contemporary political psychology to Aristotelian political philosophy.  
i. Why Aristotle? 
The simplest answer as to why I turn to Aristotle is that he most directly answers 
the pressing questions concerning political psychology. Most notably, he offers a rich 
account of how human rationality has more than just an instrumental character, and he 
presents this rationality throughout his psychological and political works. Of course, the 
merit of this account is what needs to be proven over the course of this study. For the 
moment, however, I can offer other reasons in advance as to why Aristotelian philosophy 
is particularly well suited to responding to contemporary political psychology and 
investigating the nature of rhetoric. 
One reason for turning back to Aristotle has to do with finding an alternative view 
of human rationality. The idea that rationality is simply instrumental is not new. As 
mentioned, the core psychology of rational choice theory (and by extension, bounded 
rationality) is based upon utilitarian philosophy, which in turn drew on earlier British 
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Empiricists. For instance, David Hume argued that reasoning is a matter of discovering 
causes and effects in order to satisfy desires. Along these lines, he offered the most 
famous statement on the instrumental view of reason: “Reason is, and ought only to be 
the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them.”38 Hume echoes here an earlier view articulated by Thomas Hobbes, who referred 
to thoughts as “scouts and spies” that “range abroad and find the way to the things 
desired.”39 Hobbes further argued that thoughts emerge from the desires: 
From Desire, arises the Thought of some means we have seen produce the 
like of that which we aim at; and from the thought of that, the thought of 
means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning 
within our own power.40 
Thinkers such as Hume and Hobbes offer more thoughtful accounts of instrumental 
reasoning than those offered by theories of bounded rationality. By contrast, in Aristotle 
we find a substantially alternative view of human rationality. 
It should be noted, however, that while Aristotle would disagree with Hobbes and 
Hume on several key points, he is not radically opposed to their views concerning 
rationality. That is, there are actually quite a few points of agreement, which makes the 
                                                 
38 A Treatise on Human Nature, Book II, part 3, section 3 
39 Leviathan, Part 1, ch. 8, par. 16. 
40 Leviathan, Part 1, ch. 3, par. 4. 
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disagreements more instructive. For example, Aristotle grants in his discussions on 
human action that thought is largely instrumental, its primary role in choice being the 
deliberation of means to given ends. Aristotle is also emphatic in stating that “thinking 
alone moves nothing” (NE 1139a36), meaning that he does not treat thought or reason as 
an independent, spontaneous controller of desire and motivation. Nevertheless, Aristotle 
does not treat thought as a slave or simple scout for the passions. Rather, he describes 
thought and desire as having a mutual influence on each other: on the one hand, practical 
thought is motivated thought, but on the other hand, thought plays a crucial role in 
shaping desire and passion. In drawing out this mutual relationship, Aristotle shows us 
the connection between rationality and the rest of human experience, thereby helping us 
understand the non-instrumental character of thought. 
 The Aristotelian view of rationality has been ignored by contemporary political 
psychology and the cost of this oversight is particularly evident in the continuing 
adherence to a dualism between thought, on one hand, and desires and emotions, on the 
other. There has been some recent development in regards to this dualism; in particular, 
researchers have noted that the emotions have a rational component that contributes to 
the judgments we make.41 However, this development has been one-sided: it offers a 
more complex understanding of the affects, but reasoning itself is still seen as purely 
instrumental, with no influence on the affects. Moreover, the scholars challenging the 
                                                 
41 See especially the neurologist Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain (1994), which is the most frequently cited work on this subject. 
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thought-affect dualism do not limit their criticism to dualistic theories from early modern 
philosophy; rather, they claim that from Plato to Kant, this dualism has been endemic 
throughout the Western tradition.42 Turning to Aristotle provides a useful challenge to 
this myopic view of the history of philosophy. More generally, Aristotle offers a 
thorough and thoughtful account of human rationality, an account which could introduce 
concepts that have been overlooked by modern scholars who too quickly dismiss the 
history of political philosophy. 
Another reason that Aristotle is especially helpful for responding to contemporary 
political psychology is that there are some striking parallels between Aristotle’s context 
and our own in regards to disparaging views of human rationality, particularly concerning 
rhetoric. Though the formal study of rhetoric was invented in ancient Greece, rhetoric 
nevertheless acquired a very bad name. Indeed, rhetoric was linked with the subversion 
of justice and democracy, and rhetoricians were believed to manipulate audiences and 
“make the weaker speech stronger.”43 The sophists who embraced the subversive view of 
rhetoric had a correspondingly low regard for human rationality, believing that thought 
easily succumbed to the emotions and that people could thus be controlled by artful 
                                                 
42 See Damasio (1994) as well as Marcus’s discussion of how emotions have been 
“conventionally understood” in the history of philosophy (2002, ch. 2). 
43 Aristotle identifies this phrase as a statement by Protagoras on his rhetorical art (Rhetoric 




rhetoric.44 For example, in his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias describes the power of 
rhetoric by reference to the weakness of the human mind. In particular, he claims that a 
speaker can control people by manipulating their emotions, and he calls rhetorical speech 
an “incantation,” likening it to “witchcraft and magic” (§10). Gorgias also refers to 
rhetoric as a drug because of its ability to take control of people: 
The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as 
the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs 
dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but 
others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some 
fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of 
evil persuasion (§14).45 
Another famous rhetorician, Thrasymachus, similarly described rhetoric as consisting of 
“charms” that control people by manipulating the emotions.46 While certainly less lyrical, 
accounts of bounded rationality also describe rhetorical techniques as exploiting limited 
                                                 
44 In the context of discussing ancient views of the emotions, I should note that I am referring to 
the term πάθος, which can be translated as passion or emotion. I will generally refer to the 
“emotions” rather than the “passions,” as the latter term connotes a narrower subset of powerful 
feelings, such as rage and erotic love, whereas “emotion” seems to be a more neutral term that 
better encompasses milder feelings such as benevolence, compassion, and friendliness (which are 
discussed in Aristotle’s analysis of the emotions). For similar reasons, I will generally refer to 
emotional rather than passionate appeals. 
45 Translation from Kennedy (2007). 
46 This is reported in Plato’s Phaedrus 267c7-d1. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle refers to 
Thrasymachus’s lost work, the Eleoi, as a (limited) study of emotional appeals (1404a15).  
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rationality and taking advantage of cognitive biases (such as the “affect heuristic”). Given 
that Aristotle criticizes these early rhetoricians for neglecting the role of reason in 
rhetoric and politics more generally, his critique can also serve as a valuable corrective to 
contemporary political psychology, which similarly disregards meaningful rationality.   
At the same time, Aristotle’s study of politics can also help us guard against an 
opposite extreme, namely that of exaggerating the role of reason and believing that 
political guidance should consist only of rational discourse. Regarding rhetoric, Aristotle 
grants that even well-used rhetoric may involve elements of manipulation and pandering. 
For instance, an orator may need to need to make emotional appeals and use stylistic 
devices rather than merely presenting a logical argument. He may also need to appeal to 
popular prejudices and opinions he knows to be false. The difference between the well-
intentioned case and the sophistic use of rhetoric is that in the former, rhetoric is not used 
to obfuscate matters or mislead the thought of the audience. Rather, the speaker is trying 
to direct the audience’s attention and build off of familiar notions in order to guide the 
audience to a better understanding of an issue. 
Even though Aristotle grants that there is a degree of manipulation or pandering 
in rhetoric, it is important to emphasize that he does not reduce rhetoric to manipulation 
and pandering. Unlike Gorgias, for instance, Aristotle does not treat rhetorical appeals as 
an effort to undermine or overwhelm rational thought. Rather, he shows that to guide an 
audience and convince listeners to accept a position, it is necessary to engage their 
rational judgment. Even in the case of emotional appeals—which seem to be attempts to 
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harness irrational forces in the soul—Aristotle argues that a speaker must appeal to the 
thoughts and judgments underlying an emotion. Similarly, he shows that there is an 
underlying logic even in false opinions, a logic that must be adhered to in rhetorical 
appeals. In the best cases, a speaker can identify and build on the kernels of truth in these 
opinions in an effort to improve the audience’s opinions. 
In contrast to contemporary political psychology and its narrow, instrumental 
view of reason, Aristotle offers a more expansive account of the character of human 
rationality. His richer understanding of human psychology in turn offers us a more 
complete understanding of how rhetoric works and its potential for politics. However, 
before turning to Aristotle on rhetoric and political psychology, I will first offer an 
outline of the study that will follow. 
ii. Chapter Outline 
The following study will consist of four chapters. In Chapter One, I offer an in-
depth discussion of the core concepts of Aristotelian psychology, drawing from several of 
Aristotle’s works, including On the Soul, On the Motion of Animals, and the 
Nicomachean Ethics.47 The focus of this chapter will be on the psychology of choice and 
action. Subsequent chapters will address how choice is influenced by rhetoric, but it is 
                                                 
47 On the Soul is commonly referred to as De Anima and On the Motion of Animals is also 
typically given the Latin title, De Motu Animalium. Much of Aristotelian scholarship follows the 
Scholastic tradition of imposing complicated terminology and jargon over the much more 
straightforward language Aristotle uses in the original Greek. This risks corrupting the original 
meaning and thought of Aristotle. To avoid this risk, I will be translating directly from the Greek, 
an effort that begins with avoiding Latin titles.  
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first important to be clear on the nature of choice itself. In particular, I will be considering 
the mutual influence of thought and desire on choice, as well as the role of thought in 
shaping the ends of action. This chapter will thus serve as an initial attempt at explaining 
the broader, constitutive role that thought plays in human action. 
Chapter Two offers an overview of the Rhetoric as a whole. Just as it is important 
to be familiar with the terms and concepts of Aristotelian psychology, it is also necessary 
to understand Aristotle’s approach to the study of rhetoric. In this chapter, I focus on the 
structure of the Rhetoric and explain the concepts Aristotle employs. A key part of this 
chapter will be an interpretation of Aristotle’s enthymeme, a rhetorical device that helps 
reveal how rhetoric appeals to different aspects of the soul rather than to separate rational 
and non-rational parts. 
Whereas the earlier chapters alternatively consider psychology and rhetoric, I 
combine these concerns in Chapter Three, exploring Aristotle’s teaching on the 
psychology of persuasion. My analysis roughly follows the structure of the Rhetoric. 
First, I discuss the common end underlying rhetorical appeals, as explored in Book I’s 
analysis of rational appeal; I then discuss the rational basis of the emotions, as presented 
in the Book II analysis of emotional appeal; and finally, in regards to the Book III 
analysis of style, I discuss how rhetoric attempts to guide thought through artful 
presentation. This last point regarding style is particularly important for comparing 




Chapter Four is the concluding chapter. In this chapter, I return to the issues 
discussed in this introduction. In particular, I explain how Aristotle offers a more 
complete account of human rationality and how this can serve as a corrective to the 
theory of bounded rationality, particularly with regards to its limited understanding of 
rhetoric. More broadly, I will discuss how Aristotle defends rhetoric’s potential for 
guiding political deliberation. 
 
I am casting a wide net in this study: first, in identifying and challenging the 
major presuppositions of the dominant paradigm in political psychology, and then in 
what follows, bringing together several of Aristotle’s major works to offer a broader 
interpretation of Aristotelian political psychology. This cannot by itself be a 
comprehensive or complete study. However, one of the most valuable things I have 
learned studying Aristotle is to see past rigid dichotomies that are found in traditional 
debates. Free will vs. determinism, thought vs. desire, mind vs. body—these kinds of 
strict conceptual divisions limit our thinking. But with patience, we can find in Aristotle 
new ways of thinking about old problems. I believe that is also the case with political 
psychology. Regarding rationality, it is absolutely right to say it is bound, constrained by 
our human limitations, but we must be sure to consider the full character of rationality to 
understand both its limits and its potential. Regarding rhetoric, it is true that rhetoric is 
prone to the vices of pandering and manipulation, but we must consider whether it can 
also engage rather than simply exploit rationality. In what follows, I hope to show that 
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CHAPTER 1: CORE CONCEPTS OF ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY 
In the introduction, I presented the major concepts of bounded rationality theory, 
but also argued that it has severe limitations, particularly its narrow conception of 
instrumental rationality and its rigid separation of psychological concepts such as thought 
and desire. In this chapter I begin offering an alternative, turning to Aristotle’s 
psychological works to explore a broader notion of rationality and how thought interacts 
with other aspects of the soul. I also begin laying the foundations for examining rhetoric. 
I will not be discussing rhetoric until subsequent chapters, but identifying the broader 
character of rationality is a necessary step for exploring how rhetoric can engage rather 
than only exploit limited rationality. That said, the subsequent chapters will not simply be 
an application of the theoretical concepts discussed in this chapter. The relationship will 
be more reciprocal. Gaining clarity on the concepts of Aristotelian psychology will allow 
for a better understanding of the psychology at work in the Rhetoric. The Rhetoric will in 
turn prove important for understanding Aristotelian psychology more fully. This is 
because the extended study of persuasion within the Rhetoric exemplifies and helps 
clarify the central concepts of Aristotelian psychology.  
What follows is an overview of the core concepts of Aristotelian psychology. I 
begin by addressing Aristotle’s thoughts on the structure of the soul. This is a necessary 
step, first, for correcting the mistake of making rigid distinctions between different 
aspects of the soul, and second, for understanding the common end underlying human 
action. I then turn to Aristotle’s discussions of human choice and action to help explain 




Aristotle’s account of “lack of restraint” (akrasia). This last investigation will allow for 
important clarifications regarding the role of thought and desire in action, and it will also 
help us understand the shifting character of the ends of human action. Taken together, the 
lessons found in Aristotle’s works on psychology will prepare us to appreciate the rich 
psychology of persuasion found in the Rhetoric. 
I. A Unitary Conception of the Soul 
To address questions regarding the interconnectivity of the parts of the soul, as 
well as the deliberative character of thought, we must first see the manner in which 
Aristotle understands the different parts of the soul. I will argue that Aristotle ultimately 
holds a unitary conception of the soul wherein the ‘parts’ are not separate, but are rather 
different aspects or functions of a fundamentally singular soul. This unitary conception is 
far from self-evident, however. In common sense terms, we often speak of different parts 
of the soul acting in opposition to each other, most notably in the case of desire resisting 
and even overwhelming reason. Furthermore, Aristotle himself often employs a bipartite 
psychology. In the Nicomachean Ethics, for example, he frequently refers to a rational 
and a non-rational part of the soul.48 Aristotle even further subdivides these parts, saying 
that the non-rational part is twofold: while one subpart, the “nutritive” (responsible for 
basic life functions) is wholly non-rational, there is another part, the “appetitive” 
(ἐπιθυμητικὸν) or “desiring” (ὀρεκτικὸν) part, that “somehow shares in reason” in that it 
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can “obey” or “be persuaded by reason” (NE 1102b28-1103a1).49 Following this 
identification of a part that is open to reason, moral virtue is described as the state of soul 
(ἕξις) acquired when the non-rational part of the soul is trained to act in accordance with 
the rational part of the soul. Much of the structure of the Nicomachean Ethics follows this 
bipartite psychology: in Books II-V, Aristotle investigates the moral virtues of the non-
rational part of the soul, and in Book VI, he discusses the intellectual virtues of the 
rational part of the soul.  
We should be careful, however, not to accept too readily this bipartite psychology 
as Aristotle’s ultimate view of the soul. Indeed, in the Ethics itself, it is important to note 
the very cautious language he uses in his psychological presentation. The bipartite 
psychological account is introduced in the context of discussing the need for a statesman 
“to know in some way (πως) the things that concern the soul” (NE 1102a19, emphasis 
added). The statesman needs to understand psychology, but only to the extent that it 
“adequately” speaks to his political concerns, and so Aristotle says that he will use only a 
certain degree of precision in the discussion. As Aristotle puts it, going into a more 
detailed investigation would be “perhaps too laborious” (1102a25). Accordingly, 
Aristotle says that it is “sufficient” to rely on “popular accounts (ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις)” 
that refer to a rational and non-rational part of the soul (1102a27). In adopting this 
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translations: Nicomachean Ethics: Sachs (2002), Bartlett & Collins (2011); On the Motion of 





“popular” psychology, Aristotle notes that he is putting aside the question of whether the 
parts of the soul are separated like the parts of the body or whether the “parts” refer to 
only a conceptual distinction between different aspects of the same thing, like two sides 
of a coin. As he puts it, the parts of the soul may be “two in speech but naturally 
inseparable, like the convex and the concave in the circumference of a circle” (1102a30-
31). This statement on the parts being “naturally inseparable” offers a brief glimpse of 
what Aristotle might mean by a more complex psychology. Regarding the simpler, 
bipartite psychology, Aristotle gives some indications that it is overly simplistic, but for 
the most part, he leaves its adequacy ambiguous in the Ethics.50 
In On the Soul, by contrast, Aristotle discusses the structure of the soul at much 
greater length and he is openly critical of partite models. His critique is partly directed at 
the Platonic tripartite model (dividing the soul into reasoning, spirited, and appetitive 
parts), but Aristotle also explicitly criticizes the bipartite model used by unnamed 
“others” who divide the soul into a rational and irrational part (432a26). Aristotle first 
criticizes partite models for being arbitrary in their divisions: he says that it is difficult to 
stop at two or three parts because one could further distinguish other parts that are 
sufficiently distinct in their functions, such as nutritive, perceptive, and imaginative parts 
                                                 
50 Aristotle’s cautionary language in presenting his bipartite model of psychology is similar to the 
discussion introducing psychology in Plato’s Republic wherein Socrates warns that the tripartite 
model is imprecise and that “a longer road” would be required to give a more adequate account of 
the soul (435c9-d3, cf. 504b1-7). For an account of the limits of the Republic’s tripartite 




of the soul (432a26-b4). The more significant argument is that partite models “tear the 
soul apart” (432b5). Aristotle explains using the example of desiring. One can speak of a 
separate desiring ‘part’ of the soul, but one can also identify desires in different ‘parts’ of 
the soul. In a simple case, one might locate curiosity (the desire to know) in the rational 
‘part’ of the soul, a longing for vengeance in the spirited ‘part’ of the soul, and hunger in 
the appetitive ‘part.’ Beyond specific desires, Aristotle also refers to general categories of 
desire, speaking of “wishing” (βούλησις) in the rational ‘part’ of the soul, and 
spiritedness (θυμός) and appetite (ἐπιθυμία) in the non-rational ‘part’ (432b5-6). If desire 
is spread throughout the soul, then there cannot be a desiring ‘part’ that exists separately 
from the other ‘parts,’ overwhelming them at times or obeying them at others. To relate 
this point back to the Ethics, it is not quite right to say that there is a desiring ‘part’ of the 
soul that is distinct yet somehow open to guidance from the rational ‘part’ of the soul—
because, at least in some cases, desire is present in the rational ‘part’ of the soul. When 
one speaks of a desiring ‘part,’ one “tears the soul apart” in the sense that the ‘part’ is an 
abstraction that is formed by taking particular desires out of their psychological contexts. 
Referring to such an abstracted form as a ‘part’ then creates the impression that it is 
distinct and that there is a necessary division between the different ‘parts’ of the soul, 
such as between reason and desire. While a partite model can be helpful for initially 
identifying different psychological aspects or functions—hence it is appropriate for 





These difficulties with partite psychological models cast serious doubt on the 
bipartite psychology Aristotle uses in the Ethics, and so we should consider more 
seriously the possibility he raises that the parts of the soul are only conceptual divisions, 
separate “in speech but naturally inseparable” (NE 1102a30-31).51 The question then 
arises, however, as to how we are to understand the soul in terms of “naturally 
inseparable” parts. To begin answering this question, it is helpful to note that in his 
discussions of action and choice, Aristotle speaks of a combination of thought and desire 
acting as one, which suggests that these parts of the soul may not ultimately be separate. 
The clearest statement in the Ethics on the unitary conception of the soul comes in Book 
VI, in a passage regarding choice (6.2). Aristotle says that “the origin (ἀρχὴ) […] of 
choice is desire and a rational understanding (λόγος) that is for the sake of something” 
(1139a31-33). The combination of thought and desire is required, because as Aristotle 
notes, “thinking by itself moves nothing” (1139a36). Aristotle goes on: “good action is an 
end, and desire aims at this. For this reason, choice is either desireful thought (ὀρεκτικὸς 
νοῦς) or thoughtful desire (ὄρεξις διανοητική), and such a source is a human being” 
                                                 
51 Some commentators take the differences between the psychological teachings of the Ethics and 
On the Soul as a sign that the psychological sections of the Ethics were written by a younger 
Aristotle, before he wrote On the Soul. See, for example, Ostwald (1962), p. 30 note 47, and his 
reliance on Nuyen’s L’Evolution de la Psychologie d’Aristote (1948). As with other biographical 
readings of Aristotle’s work, this interpretation ignores the careful language of the text—in this 
case the major qualifications Aristotle makes in the Ethics regarding bipartite psychology. For a 
conjectural account of the development of Aristotle’s bipartite psychology, see Fortenbaugh 
(1975) and Rist (1989). On Aristotle’s careful language qualifying the simplistic psychology, see 
Joachim (1951), p. 63. For an extended criticism of the biographical approach to interpreting 




(1139b3-5, my emphasis). There are several points to note in this description of choice. 
First, Aristotle identifies the source of choice as the human being as a whole: he does not 
speak of parts of the soul, but rather of a fusion of thought and desire.52 Secondly, 
Aristotle describes this fusion of thought and desire as aimed at an end; that is, there is 
always a “for the sake of something” underlying choice. Finally, this direction is not 
wholly open-ended. Rather, Aristotle says that the end is “good action.” More generally, 
the end of action is identified at the beginning of the Ethics as the good. Aristotle opens 
the Ethics saying “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, 
seems to aim at some good” (1094a1-2). A few chapters later, he also says that “all 
knowledge and every choice reach toward some good” (1095a15).53 
These passages on choice are dense, but, put most simply, they point towards a 
conception of the soul understood as an inseparable combination of thought and desire 
that acts according to a conception of what is good. This “simple” formulation still 
requires a great deal of explanation. In order to unpack this unitary conception of the 
                                                 
52 In this discussion of the unitary conception of the soul, I am only referring to how the so-called 
‘parts’ of the soul are interrelated and combined into a unitary whole. A deeper argument can be 
made as to the inseparability of body and soul, which is what I think Aristotle means when 
referring to the “human being” rather than “the soul” as the source of choice. Discussing 
Aristotle’s rejection of dualism would require a more in-depth discussion of On the Soul and 
Aristotle’s description of the soul as an activity (specifically, an ἐντελέχεια) of the body (see 
especially S 2.1). For a concise account of the unity of the soul in terms of physiology, see 
Joachim (1951), pp. 64-66. See also Charles (2011) for a detailed discussion of how Aristotle’s 
view differs from Cartesian and Post-Cartesian dualistic views of psychology. 
53 Aristotle makes similar claims about action aiming at an idea of the good in the Rhetoric 




soul, I will look more closely at Aristotle’s analysis of action. This focus has the 
advantage of offering a more concrete consideration of psychology than does a structural 
account of the soul. Moreover, focusing on action is particularly conducive to relating 
psychology to rhetoric because rhetoric is concerned with contingent affairs (the realm of 
action) and persuasion is ultimately directed towards influencing the choices and actions 
of an audience. A more thorough understanding of the psychology of action will thus 
prepare us to understand better how persuasion works. 
II. The Psychology of Action 
In this section I consider several passages from other works of Aristotle where he 
offers detailed examinations of the psychology of action. These passages are found in On 
the Soul (S), On the Motion of Animals (MA), and the Nicomachean Ethics (NE). In these 
works, Aristotle discusses the sources and ends of action. More importantly, he offers a 
model for explaining action. That is, Aristotle does not only identify the separate causes 
of action, but he brings them together to offer a more complete account of how they lead 
to action. I should note at the outset that while I am considering the ends of action, I am 
not discussing how one gets proper guidance to these ends or what ends one should seek. 
Rather, I am asking more analytic questions: How does one choose how to act? By what 
process do people make choices in light of different ends? What does the process of 
choice reveal about psychology and the role of reason? In the present section, I will focus 




study of action. In the next section, I will discuss at greater length the more complicated 
issue of acting when confronted by conflicting ends. 
In several works, Aristotle explains action in terms of “sources” and “ends.” 
While the two general “sources” of action ultimately overlap, Aristotle initially identifies 
these sources as desire (ὄρεξις) and thought (νοῦς) (S 433a9, MA 700b19). Orexis is a 
broad term in which Aristotle includes more specific types of desire: wish (rational 
desire), thumos (spirited desire), and appetite (bodily desire). Thought, in this context, 
refers to practical thought: whereas contemplative (or theoretical) thought is directed at 
abstract or eternal matters, practical thought focuses on contingent things that one could 
change through action (S 433a13-15, NE 1139a35-b3). Like orexis, thought is a general 
category that encompasses more specific capacities such as reasoning (διάνοια), 
imagination, and even sense-perception. It may seem odd to treat perception as a form of 
“thought,” but it must be noted that perception, as Aristotle describes it, is not a passive 
reception of sensory data. Rather, perception is an active process wherein sense data are 
taken in and organized into a coherent whole (see S 425a14-429a9).54 The common 
element in reasoning, imagination, and sense-perception is that they all involve actively 
“making distinctions” (MA 700b19-24). Together, thought and desire are “sources” of 
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action in that they are the psychological means by which a person conceives the “end” of 
action.  
Again, Aristotle describes the ultimate end of action as “the good.” As with 
thought and desire, Aristotle uses “the good” as a broad category. The good is constituted 
by a sense of one’s conscious needs and, ultimately, by a desire for happiness 
(eudaimonia). More particularly, the good refers to anything a person might think is good 
and worth acting for, so it includes “the apparent good” as well as “the pleasant (since it 
is an apparent good)” (MA 700b28-29). In the Ethics, Aristotle offers a further 
distinction, identifying different general conceptions of the good as “the advantageous, 
the noble (or beautiful), 55 and the pleasant” (NE 1104b30-31). In making this division, 
Aristotle suggests that more particular goods could be understood in terms of these three 
broad categories of what is good. 
The major theme of Aristotle’s writings on action is that self-motion has an 
intentional character, and so the most essential feature of an explanation of action is its 
end, the thing “for the sake of which” a person moves (MA 700b16).56 There are, of 
                                                 
55 τὸ καλόν is an ambiguous word that can be translated as “the noble” or “the beautiful,” but it 
connotes both moral and aesthetic excellence. This combination can be seen in instances such as 
praising a courageous action as “a beautiful deed.” Aristotle identifies τὸ καλόν as the end pursed 
by virtuous action (NE 1115b12). 
56 Aristotle notes that what particularly indicates an intentional cause of motion is not just the 
movement itself (which one might see in non-living things such as fire), but the cessation of 
action, which indicates that a person or animal acted on perception and a now-fulfilled desire (See 




course, other aspects of an action on which one could focus. For example, Aristotle is 
very interested in the role of physiology in action and he devotes several chapters of On 
the Motion of Animals to the subject. However, physiology explains only the how of an 
action, how it is that the body of a person or animal moves from one place to another. A 
full explanation must bring out why an action was performed, and this requires reference 
to the end as something the actor desires and thinks is good. Socrates makes a similar 
argument in Plato’s Phaedo. Earlier philosophers, he says, offered different accounts of 
physiology, explaining how one moved by detailing the motions of the body, but they 
could not explain why one moved. Using his own condition at the time as an example, 
Socrates notes that if one wanted to explain why he remained in his jail cell rather than 
escaping as his friends urged, one would have to say that it was because this course of 
action seemed best to him. As Socrates jokes:  
I think these sinews and bones of mine would long ago have been in 
Megara or Boeotia, swept off by an opinion of what is best, if I didn’t 
think it more just and more beautiful to endure whatever penalty the city 
should order, rather than fleeing and being a runaway. (98e5-a4, my 
emphases) 
The physiology is important because the material cause allows the intentional cause to 





Taking the “sources” and “ends” together, Aristotle describes all voluntary action 
as coming from a combination of thought and desire aimed at some conception of the 
good. In the broadest sense, one can say that a person desired something, believing it to 
be good, and so he acted to attain it. To provide more detailed explanation of action, 
Aristotle uses a form of the syllogism, the practical syllogism. A theoretical syllogism is 
a series of premises leading to a necessary conclusion: there is a major (or universal) 
premise, a minor (or particular) premise, and a conclusion that necessarily follows. The 
basic syllogistic form is: All As are Cs, B is an A, therefore B is a C. A classic example 
of this form is: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal. The 
practical syllogism differs in that it maps out the different elements of an action, 
highlighting the end of the action, the means to that end, and the action itself. Aristotle 
describes the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism as “the good” (end) and 
“the possible” (means) (MA 700b24-25). The conclusion refers to the decision to act, or 
it might be used to describe the act itself.57 In the simplest cases, the practical syllogism 
can be understood as a model of instrumental reasoning: desire supplies the end and 
thought determines the means to that end. Aristotle uses the example of thirst: “‘I must 
drink,’ says appetite. ‘Here’s drink,’ says sense-perception or imagination or thought. At 
                                                 
57 There is an interesting ambiguity between the decision to act and the act itself, but as will be 
explained below, Aristotle does not suggest that there is an additional step or gap between 
decisions and actions (such as a free will that must affirm decisions before they lead to action). 
Rather, Aristotle claims that a decision necessarily leads to action. In terms of the practical 
syllogism, Aristotle seems to refer to the immediate action itself in the case of simplistic actions 
that require little calculation (e.g. I am hungry, here is food, I will eat), but for more complicated 




once he drinks” (701a31-33). Another example that Aristotle uses is that of a person 
seeking a cloak:  
‘I need cover, a cloak is cover: I need a cloak. What I need, I have to 
make. I need a cloak: I have to make a cloak.’ And the conclusion, the ‘I 
have to make a cloak,’ is [what leads to] action. And he acts from [this] 
starting point. (701a17-21)  
These examples involve only simple deliberations of means to ends, but they are 
helpful for identifying the features of the practical syllogism. It must be noted that the 
syllogistic model is used only figuratively to identify the essential psychological causes 
of action. This conceptual framework need not imply actual language or a complex, 
drawn out calculation, and so it can readily be applied to basic, animal actions such as in 
the thirst example. Human action generally requires a more complicated explanation, 
however, which in turn introduces complexities into the syllogistic model of action. 
The first complication is that the syllogistic model needs to be extended beyond a 
simple two-premise description in order to include more steps towards a decision. For 
instance, human action may be based on increasingly general or more universal opinions. 
Aristotle offers an example of this type of deliberation in the Metaphysics (in a discussion 
of causality and art), describing how a doctor might decide to heal someone:  
Since health is this [A], it is necessary if there is to be health that this [B] 
be present—for example, an equilibrium [of humors]. And if this [B], then 




at the first thing that he himself is capable of doing […] [namely] heat, 
which he produces by rubbing [D] (1032b6-9, 25-26). 
The final goal of this action (health) requires a series of means-ends deliberations, with 
the action proceeding only when the person reaches a conclusion as to what he can do to 
bring about the goal. This example illustrates how a more complex action could be 
mapped out in a syllogistic format. More importantly, the example also helps reveal that 
the terms “means” and “ends” are relative distinctions dependent on how broadly one 
looks at an action. That is, there is not only a final end to an action (in this instance, 
health is the good being sought); when one draws out the fuller thought process behind an 
action, one can identify several intermediate ends (equilibrium of humors, heat), with 
each of these ends being a means to the broader end (health).  
Along with extending the number of premises in the syllogistic model, it is also 
necessary to understand more fully the interaction of thought and desire that takes place 
in human action. So far, action has been described in solely instrumental terms, with 
thought being only a matter of determining the possible means to a set end. Thought may 
thus seem to be wholly subservient to desire. Aristotle’s analysis of action reveals a more 
complicated relationship, however, with thought playing a constitutive role, meaning that 
thought helps determine not only the means but also the end of action. The broader role 
of thought in action is not immediately evident, and the notion even seems to be 




We deliberate not about ends but about the things related to the ends, for a 
doctor does not deliberate whether he will cure someone […] nor does 
anyone else deliberate about ends, but having set down the end, they 
consider in what way and by what means it would be the case (1112b11-
16, my emphases).58 
At first glance, this passage suggests a wholly instrumental view of thought, but several 
qualifications must be made. Most immediately, it must be noted that this description of 
choice is in the context of someone who has already “set down” an end and decided to 
act. In such a context, all of one’s deliberation would take place in reference to the settled 
upon goal. It must also be kept in mind, however, that “means” and “ends” are relative 
distinctions, and immediate ends can serve as means to broader or more distant ends. 
There is thus room for clarifying what an end actually is or what purpose it serves. 
Regarding health, for example, even if it is simply accepted and “set down” as the desired 
end, there is still room to ask what health is. This can be seen in the Metaphysics example 
above concerning medical deliberation: before determining how to restore health, the 
doctor must decide what health is, affirming that it includes “an equilibrium [of 
                                                 
58 Deliberation “about the things related to the ends” is a translation of περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. 
The πρὸς is an ambiguous preposition in this case as it could mean “towards” (as in, “we 
deliberate about the things [conducive] towards the ends”) or it could be used to mark the relation 
between objects as I am reading it. I am interpreting the phrase in light of Aristotle’s broader 
account of action which is not narrowly instrumental. For extended arguments on translating this 
passage and why it should not be read as simply instrumental, see J.M. Cooper (1975), pp. 11-22, 




humors],” and only then does he decide that applying heat is the best means to that end. 
One could imagine other situations, however, in which the immediate end is not yet 
settled. For example, one might first need to decide to become a doctor, of if already a 
doctor, one might need to decide whether one should act as a doctor in a given case and 
provide health. In these more open-ended cases, one would have to consider the end of 
health in light of broader ends.  
 Another qualification on the instrumental view of choice is that it is necessary to 
understand how the end of action is “set down.” In a completely instrumental view, desire 
sets down the end and thought calculates the means to that end. As Aristotle describes it, 
however, thought and desire are not wholly separate. The relationship between the two 
can best be seen by looking more closely at Aristotle’s complex view of “desire” 
(ὄρεξις). As mentioned above, Aristotle uses the word orexis as a general category that 
includes more specific types of desire: wish (rational desire), thumos (spirited desire), and 
appetite (bodily desire). Aristotle invented the word ὄρεξις, making a noun from the verb 
ὀρέγω, which means “to stretch” or “reach out.”59 The word wonderfully captures the 
sense in which all desires focus on and are directed towards an object. As Aristotle says 
in On the Soul, “every desire is for the sake of something” (433a15). In calling desire 
orexis, Aristotle is indicating that desire is active—it is not merely a passive lack or 
absence, but rather it is an active “reaching out.” Moreover, desire is intentional—it is a 
                                                 




“reaching out” for something. This intentional conception of desire is similar to 
Aristotle’s understanding of perception, which he similarly describes as an active process 
(see S 425a14-429a9). As with perception, there may be a passive element to desire, 
which might be a sensation of a need or a lack; however, for desire to become anything 
more than a vague, indefinite feeling of pain or need, it must be given shape as a need for 
something. Desire in the full sense of ὄρεξις only comes into being with some form of 
interpretation such that the basic sensation of a lack becomes a longing for and a reaching 
out for that which is needed. For this reason, Aristotle stresses that imagination plays a 
critical role in desire: “the capacity of desiring [ὀρεκτικὸν] does not exist without 
imagination” (S 433b28-29).  
The intentional character of desire and the role played by imagination help reveal 
that there is an essential cognitive element in desire, which in turn points to the broader 
constitutive role thought plays in action. Desire does not exist as an entirely separate 
entity or force that commands thought, nor is thought simply subservient, playing a 
merely instrumental role in determining how to satisfy desires. Rather, desire contains 
thought and is partly constituted by thought. In On the Motion of Animals, Aristotle 
describes this broader role of thought, saying:  
This, then, is the way that animals begin to move and act: the immediate 
cause of movement is desire, and this [i.e. desire] comes to be through 




Aristotle thus describes all desires, no matter how simple, as having some basic element 
of thought. Speaking of thought as an element of desire still treats the two as overly 
separate; this may simply be an artifact of language as we use separate words for 
referring to the two concepts. However, in a crucial passage in On the Soul, Aristotle 
suggests that thought and desire are truly united in the sense that desire is a unique form 
of perception or imagination (which are forms of thought): 
Perception is similar to speech or thought by itself. But when [the thing 
perceived] is pleasant or painful, [the soul] pursues or flees it, as if one 
were affirming or denying it. ... Aversion and desire are the same in 
regards to their activity, and [further], the capacities for desiring and 
aversion are not different from each other, nor are they different from 
perception, though their being is different. In regards to the thinking soul, 
the things of the imagination (τὰ φαντάσματα)60 hold the place of 
perceptions. And whenever [the soul] affirms or denies that something is 
good or bad, it pursues or flees that thing. (431a8-16, my emphases) 
This is a difficult passage, but put most simply, it suggests that desire is a form of thought 
wherein one not only recognizes something (“thought by itself”), but one recognizes it as 
                                                 
60 “Things of the imagination” is often translated as "images," but that falsely suggests that 
imagination only consists of visual images (which might be misunderstood in the passive sense of 





desirable for oneself. Once one believes that something is pleasant or good, the soul is 
drawn towards that thing, desiring or “reaching” for it. This difference in activity may be 
what Aristotle means when saying that, although desire is in some way a form of thought, 
it has a different “being.”61 More broadly, I believe this is ultimately what Aristotle 
means when he says that the thinking and desiring “parts” of the soul are “naturally 
inseparable” (NE 1102a30).  
A caveat must be made here regarding the constitutive role that “thought” plays in 
desire. Aristotle includes perception, imagination, and reasoning (διάνοια) in the general 
category of “thought” (νοῦς; see S 433a9, MA 700b19). And while he clearly says that 
desire does not exist without imagination (S 433b28-29), this does not imply that 
conscious thought is involved in the formation of desire. In the case of animals, their 
“thought” consists mainly of perception and what Aristotle calls “sensory imagination” 
(S 433b30, 434a5). Animals focus only on immediate, particular concerns (cf. NE 
1147b3-5), and as Aristotle describes it in On the Soul, they simply live by their desires, 
acting on whichever desire is strongest: “at one time this desire wins out and knocks 
away that one, and at another time, that one wins out and knocks away this one like a 
ball” (434a12-14). Human beings, by contrast, have greater rational capacities and a 
“deliberative imagination” (433b30): they have greater memory, a sense of time, the 
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ability to compare and to think things through, and so humans can weigh different 
possibilities against each other. Humans are thus able to distinguish immediate from 
long-term goods and apparent from actual goods.62 This human capacity to deliberate and 
distinguish goods serves as the basis for deliberate choice. 
Regarding the distinction between choice and action, Aristotle treats choice as a 
subset of voluntary action: whereas choice entails a significant degree of deliberation, 
“voluntary” (ἑκών) action is all action that comes “from oneself” (δι’ αὑτοὺ). Voluntary 
action thus includes any simple action towards a desired end, and so it can include the 
action of animals, (quasi-rational) children, and fully-developed adults (cf. NE 1111b6-
10, R 1368b10-12). Choice refers more specifically to action based on deliberation; it 
involves weighing alternative courses of action and considering the end one is pursuing. 
To understand how choice is made between competing alternatives, it is necessary to 
recall that Aristotle describes all voluntary action (including choice) as aimed at “the 
good,” which includes the apparent good, the advantageous, the beautiful, and the 
pleasant. This orientation towards the good is not very important when considering 
animals because they do not engage in complex deliberation regarding different possible 
goods; instead, they act in light of basic pleasure and pain, which one can understand as 
the immediate apparent good and bad. Humans, by contrast, have a “deliberative 
                                                 
62 In his biological works, Aristotle notes that there might not be an absolute divide between 
humans and animals regarding reasoning. While animals have lesser rational capacities, Aristotle 
grants that some animals have a degree of memory, opinion, and intelligence: see On Memory 




imagination”: rather than always acting on the immediately perceived good, they can 
think through different possibilities and weigh their alternatives in light of a broader idea 
of what is good. As Aristotle puts it in On the Soul, “whether one acts this way or that is a 
task for reason, and this must be measured by one criterion, for one looks towards the 
greater good” (434a7-9, my emphasis). When the end of an action is already settled, the 
“greater good” is simply the best possible means to the end. When the end is not clear, 
however, and one is confronted by different possible courses of action, one can 
understand the different ends as intermediate or subordinate ends, which are means to a 
higher or more general good. Choice in these circumstances involves determining which 
particular end is conducive to a greater good. Using the health example from above, if 
one has “set down” health as the end of action, accepting health as the good to be 
pursued, one will calculate the best possible means of providing health. However, one 
could also try to decide whether health actually is the best end to pursue. For instance, 
one might consider the quality of the patient’s life (he might be old and suffering, not 
wanting to be kept alive); or the patient might be a criminal whom one does not think 
deserves healing; or the patient might have an infectious disease that would put the doctor 
at risk.63 In each case, one must weigh health against other alternative goods such as 
nobility (‘human dignity’), justice, and safety, trying to decide which is the greater good 
in the given context. 
                                                 




I will discuss choice further in the next section, but first it may be helpful to 
summarize the discussion of action to this point. Aristotle explains action by reference to 
the end being sought. The end of action might be anything, but it is not entirely neutral or 
open-ended; rather, it has some positive content in that it is held by thought and desire to 
be something good. Aristotle brings thought, desire, and the good together in a syllogistic 
model, describing an action in terms of the good end sought and the means to that end; 
the practical syllogism can be drawn out to include several intermediate ‘ends’ which are 
in turn the means to a higher or broader end. It is tempting to think of the syllogistic 
model solely in instrumental terms, with desire setting the end (major premise) and 
thought only determining the means (minor premise[s]) to that end, but Aristotle 
describes thought and desire as an intricate fusion, with thought and desire together 
forming the “premises” of an action. Desire is constituted in part by thought, and so 
thought also helps inform the end of action. Similarly, practical thought—“intellect that 
reasons for the sake of something and is concerned with action” (S 433a13-15)—is 
motivated thought, which means it is connected to and partly informed by desire. The 
essential connection of thought and desire is that they together aim at a conception of the 
good. If a person thinks something is good, he will desire it, and desires contain the 
implicit thought that something is in some way good.  
An obvious challenge to the conception of choice above is what Aristotle calls 
akrasia (“lack of self-control” or “incontinence,” sometimes misleadingly translated as 
“weakness of the will”). Akrasia refers to the common experience of a person seeming to 




pleasure) but nevertheless choosing the worse end. After making such a choice, the 
person might say that he was overwhelmed in the heat of the moment, acting on desire or 
passion against his better judgment. This common experience offers a serious challenge 
to Aristotle’s explanation of choice because it clearly highlights the potential conflict 
between (and hence separation of) thought and desire. Furthermore, it challenges 
Aristotle’s claim that people act according to their conception of the good: in akrasia, it 
seems that the person is choosing what he knows to be bad. Given the seriousness of this 
challenge, it is particularly worthwhile to consider Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia 
because it will help clarify several aspects of his account of choice and action.  
One aspect of Aristotle’s account of action that I have not yet discussed has to do 
with the notion that there is a separate psychological faculty of the will. To address this 
challenge, a brief aside is necessary. Aristotle explains voluntary action in terms of 
thought and desire, describing the process of finding the best means to particular ends; at 
no point, however, does he say that there is a separate decision process following 
deliberation in which a person subsequently chooses to pursue the best means to an end. 
Indeed, Aristotle says that action follows immediately upon a completed deliberation 
(e.g. MA 701a33-35, NE 1147a26-28). Even more significantly, Aristotle says that the 
action necessarily follows a completed deliberation and he uses the strongest Greek word 
for necessity, ἀνάγκη. Aristotle describes this necessity using an analogy to the 
syllogism: as a conclusion necessarily follows from certain premises, so too does an 
action follow from the premises of a practical syllogism. For example, when describing a 




action], it is necessary (ἀνάγκη) then for the soul to affirm it, and in reasoning about 
doing something, [it is necessary] for one to perform the action at once.” He further adds 
that upon finding the means to an end, “it is necessary for someone, who is able to and is 
not prevented, to do this at the same time he recognizes it” (1147a26-31, cf. MA 700b15-
16, my emphases). 
This is not the place to enter into the full debate between free will and 
determinism. Aristotle does not discuss the will, and indeed, it is an alien concept to his 
account of action. To construct a debate, it would be necessary to introduce a framework 
from other philosophical accounts of action that rely on the will. For the moment it is 
sufficient to note that Aristotle offers a coherent account of action that largely avoids the 
familiar positions found in modern arguments. One might see Aristotle as a “determinist” 
given that he discusses action in terms of necessity, but this position usually describes 
humans as passive subjects that are compelled by external causes (e.g. a reductionist 
account that looks only to matter in motion).64 Aristotle, by contrast, puts an emphasis on 
the active psychological role of thought, desire, and the conception of what is good; he 
thus describes voluntary action in terms of internal causes in active subjects. Yet, on the 
other hand, one could not classify Aristotle’s account of action as one of “free will” 
because he does not see choice as wholly free or spontaneous; choice does not stand 
radically apart from all the other sorts of causes that might move a person. Aristotle thus 
                                                 
64 In On the Soul, Aristotle criticizes mechanistic accounts of action offered by materialists such 




offers an explanation of action that stands outside of the dichotomy of free will and 
determinism familiar to us, and for this reason it is all the more important to try to 
appreciate the account on Aristotle’s own terms. In explaining the active role of thought 
even in akrasia, Aristotle offers a critique of the notion that action is simply based on 
blind compulsion. At the same time, he also offers an implicit critique of the will by 
offering an alternative account of voluntary action that does not require reliance on a 
mysterious separate faculty. Given the importance of gaining further clarity on Aristotle’s 
account of action, it is thus worth considering in depth his explanation of akrasia. 
III. Akrasia and the Conflict of Competing Ends 
Within the context of the Nicomachean Ethics, the account of akrasia in Book VII 
expands on Aristotle’s discussion of virtue and vice, but for present purposes, I am 
turning to the account to clarify Aristotle’s understanding of choice and action. Up to this 
point, I considered relatively easy choices of deciding the best means to an end. I focused 
on these simple cases to explain Aristotle’s syllogistic account of action and the mutual 
role of thought and desire in determining both the means and ends of action. Hard 
choices, however, involve a conflict between desired ends. Such choices require looking 
beyond the immediate ends and determining which possible end offers the greater good. 
At times, however, there seems to be an internal conflict wherein a person believes that 
one end is better but nevertheless desires and acts for the other end. This experience 
challenges Aristotle’s claims that thought and desire are ultimately united, and in doing 




Before offering my own interpretation of akrasia as presented in Book VII, 
chapter 3 (7.3) of the Ethics, I must note that this is an extremely disputed section of the 
Ethics. Interpreters disagree regarding Aristotle’s understanding of akrasia and they 
come to wholly opposite conclusions as to whether Aristotle ultimately believes that 
akrasia exists as it is commonly understood (namely, as desire overwhelming reason). 
Put most concisely, the dispute ultimately centers on Aristotle’s relation to Plato and 
Socrates. At the end of 7.3, Aristotle clearly states that Socrates was at least in some 
sense correct, saying, “it seems that what Socrates was seeking turns out to be the case” 
(1147b14-15). The scholarly disagreement concerns the way in which Aristotle agrees 
with Socrates. In several Platonic dialogues, Socrates claims that akrasia does not exist: 
he says that when people act badly, they do so out of ignorance—that is, they erroneously 
believe they are doing what is best.65 Socrates thus seems to present akrasia as simply a 
cognitive problem: if one knows what is good, one will do what is good, and one will 
never be conflicted or overcome by desire. Many interpreters accept this direct reading of 
Socrates’s claims and believe that Aristotle similarly regards akrasia as a cognitive 
problem.66 Other interpreters completely disagree with the so-called Socratic stance; they 
                                                 
65 Socrates discusses akrasia in Plato’s Protagoras (352a8ff.), asking whether knowledge is 
dragged around like a slave or whether “if in fact someone knows the goods things and the bad, 
he won’t be overpowered by anything so as to do anything other than what knowledge bids him 
to do” (352c4-6). Plato’s Meno (77c1-78a8) presents Socrates’ argument for the primacy of the 
good, that everybody desires the good and those who act for what is bad do so out of ignorance.  
66 Destrée (2007) offers a survey of “intellectualist” interpreters who accept this view of akrasia. 
See Charles (2007), pp. 194-199, for a similar survey. Wiggins (1980), p. 248, criticizes Aristotle 
for being “strangely Socratic” in 7.3 and accuses him of being inconsistent with his more nuanced 




argue that akrasia is a problem of bad character and desires. Indeed, many go so far as to 
say that Aristotle fully agrees with common opinion against Socrates, concluding that 
desire does in fact overwhelm reason. In this case, Aristotle’s agreement with Socrates is 
ironic, or it is only offered to the degree that Aristotle can “hand a sop” to Socrates.67  
I disagree with both of these general approaches. They are too dualistic, treating 
thought and desire as overly separate, and these interpretations focus only on thought or 
bad desire as the sole cause of akrasia. Understanding Aristotle’s position requires 
appreciating how thought and desire are “naturally inseparable.” Furthermore, while this 
is not the place for Platonic exegesis, I will simply note that neither interpretation 
adequately understands the Socratic position. In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates offers 
provocative paradoxes that are meant to challenge his listeners. While the conclusion 
itself might ultimately be serious, the position is not as simplistic as it initially seems. 
Aristotle offers a very sophisticated analysis of the phenomenon of akrasia, and when he 
says that Socrates was correct, I believe he is offering guidance on how one can 
understand a paradoxical Socratic position that may otherwise seem “patently 
                                                 
67 The “sop” line comes from Brodie’s commentary (p. 393), who argues that Socrates failed to 
understand akrasia because he lacked Aristotle’s “developed psychology” (p. 386) (in Rowe & 
Brodie, 2002). Rorty (1980) similarly views Aristotle as agreeing with common opinion. For 




outlandish.”68 With that said, in what follows, I will focus solely on Aristotle’s 
interpretation of akrasia. 
To turn now to the Ethics, Aristotle takes up the discussion of akrasia in Book 
VII. In earlier books, Aristotle discussed the different moral and intellectual virtues, and 
now he addresses other related character states, focusing in particular on the distinction 
between self-restraint and lack of restraint (akrasia). He begins by considering the 
common opinions (ἔνδοξα) regarding these matters, noting that they usually identify a 
conflict between thought and desire: self-restrained people resist their base desires, 
standing by their reasoning, whereas those who lack self-restraint depart from their 
reasoning, acting out of passion despite knowing that their desires are base (1145b10-14). 
After considering the common view, Aristotle raises a puzzle or perplexity (ἀπορία): 
How could someone with proper convictions lack self-restraint? It is at this point that 
Aristotle introduces the contrary position held by Socrates, who denied that something 
could “overpower [knowledge] and drag it around like a slave” (1145b23-24). The 
Socratic position suggests that akratics (unrestrained people) are not overcome, but rather 
they act out of ignorance. Rather than immediately endorsing or rejecting Socrates’s 
position, Aristotle points out that it is far from obvious: it “disputes the phenomena that 
                                                 
68 In this regard, I wholly agree with Tessitore (1996) whom I quote. His claim is worth citing in 
full: “The particular arguments that Aristotle makes in this section address the question of moral 
goodness from the perspective of both dialectic and natural philosophy. Within this broader 
horizon of inquiry, Aristotle attempts to move his readers from an initial frustration with the 
patently outlandish character of Socratic inquiry to some appreciation for the less than obvious 




come plainly to sight” (1145b27-28). Everybody has at some point experienced akrasia, 
wherein they seemed to succumb to passion or desire. Socrates claimed that knowledge is 
enough to guide action, but experience suggests that something more is required. Indeed, 
elsewhere in the Ethics, Aristotle ridicules those who quickly adopt something like 
Socrates’s position, those who think that virtue is not a matter of training the soul and 
instead think that “by taking refuge in speeches they are philosophizing and in that way 
they will be serious people” (1105b13-14, cf. 1147a19-20). Nevertheless, despite these 
criticisms and warnings not to accept Socrates’s position too readily, Aristotle does not 
dismiss the Socratic claim against common experience.69 Instead, he says it is necessary 
to examine the issue and consider in what way akratics might be ignorant of their actions. 
Akrasia is viewed as an act that is taken despite a person knowing it is bad. To 
address this common view, Aristotle looks more closely at the knowledge claim, asking if 
the unrestrained person truly had knowledge when he acted. Aristotle begins by refining 
the challenge posed by common experience, trying to identify an instance of action truly 
going against knowledge. There are several ways of possessing knowledge that do not 
                                                 
69 Many of the interpreters who reject the Socratic interpretation of akrasia do so on the grounds 
that Aristotle’s interpretive effort seeks to “save the phenomena” of common experience. See 
especially Nussbaum (1986), pp. 240-263. This position misrepresents Aristotle’s dialectical 
“method” (described at NE 1145b1-7). Aristotle gives great weight to common experience and he 
treats it as a serious authority that must be considered, but he also says that common opinion must 
be examined (just as one also must examine the opinions of other authorities such as the wise). 
Only what stands up to dialectical examination will be accepted as an adequate explanation. 
Aristotle’s statement in 7.2 that Socrates’s claim goes against the phenomena of common 
experience is thus only a preliminary remark and it can only be assessed after the examination 




present a challenge to the Socratic position. For example, for knowledge to guide a 
person, it is not enough that the person has the potential ability to answer a question when 
called upon, but rather he must be “actively contemplating” the relevant knowledge and 
keeping it in mind when he acts (1146b34). In other words, it is possible that the person 
has forgotten what he used to know or perhaps he is tired or absent-minded; in these 
cases, the person is not truly or strictly acting contrary to what he knows. Similarly, it is 
also possible that a person simply makes a mistake in applying his knowledge. As 
Aristotle says, the person might have the appropriate “universal premise” regarding the 
right thing to do, but he may misperceive the situation, applying the wrong “particular 
premise” (1147a1-8). Again, there is nothing strange about making mistakes and this lack 
of knowledge does not capture the claims of akrasia. The problematic case, however, 
would be if someone actively considered and properly applied his knowledge of what is 
good but nevertheless acted contrary to his knowledge. This would mean that even the 
most solid knowledge could be overcome. Having identified the real challenge, Aristotle 
echoes Socrates, claiming that such an act against true knowledge would be “terrible” 
(1146b35) and “a cause for wonder” (1147a9). 
As terrible or wondrous as it may be, the phenomenon does seem to exist and it 
must be explained. Aristotle begins his explanation of akrasia by referring to a third way 
of possessing knowledge, namely, when someone “both has it in a certain way and does 
not have it” (1147a13-14). The person has knowledge in the sense that he is able to recite 
words and arguments, but these seem to have no real meaning to the person, suggesting 




to those who are drunk, insane, or asleep, and he also points to students who can rehearse 
a lesson but do not truly understand it; these are instances of people who are able to say 
hollow phrases that lack meaning. Real knowledge, by contrast, is acquired slowly: “one 
must grow into (συμφυῆναι) the knowledge, and this requires time” (1147a22). In 
likening akrasia to these cases, Aristotle suggests that the unrestrained lack knowledge in 
some crucial sense. Further, he indicates that real knowledge is not mere words or 
arguments, but that there is something to knowledge beyond thought by itself.  
While these examples provide analogies for describing akrasia, they do not offer 
an actual explanation of the phenomenon, nor does the comment that one must “grow 
into” knowledge. Aristotle’s real explanation of akrasia comes in his next argument, 
when he shifts to consider lack of restraint “from the standpoint of nature” (φυσικῶς). 
This “naturalist” section is very difficult because it is here that Aristotle most clearly 
moves beyond the simplistic, bipartite psychology he introduced in Book I of the Ethics. 
This is not to say that the section is inconsistent with what comes before it, but rather 
Aristotle uses much greater precision in his attempt to draw out a causal explanation of 
akrasia. Interpreting this “naturalist” section is somewhat easier if we follow Aristotle’s 
lead and consider it in light of his more naturalistic works such as On the Motion of 
Animals and On the Soul.70  
                                                 
70 See Destrée (2007) and Charles (2007) who offer similar justifications for considering 7.3 in 




The “naturalist” explanation of akrasia offers an account of how thought and 
desire lead to action. As in On the Motion of Animals and On the Soul, Aristotle uses 
practical syllogisms to explain the action. He focuses first on the thought process, 
describing the practical syllogism in terms of a “universal” (or major) premise that is a 
general opinion (X’s are good, I want X), and a “particular” (or minor) premise that is 
informed by sense-perception (here is an X). When the universal and the particular 
premise lead to a conclusion, the person acts. Again, it is noteworthy that Aristotle does 
not posit an independent will, but instead says that the person acts once the syllogism of 
the opinion and sense-perception is complete: “when a conclusion comes from them [the 
universal and particular premises], it is necessary (ἀνάγκη) then for the soul to affirm it 
[the conclusion], and in the case of a conclusion regarding doing something, [it is 
necessary] for one to act at once” (NE 1147a26-28). To clarify this explanation of action, 
Aristotle provides a simplified example of someone fond of sweets: the general opinion 
(or premise) in this case is that “one ought to taste everything that is sweet” (1147a29). 
The particular premise is satisfied when the person sees a sweet. If there are no other 
relevant opinions or concerns, a calculation is made as to how to attain the sweet, and 
when the person has decided on the best available means, he acts to achieve the end. 
While this is a simplistic example, it is useful to pause on it and point out that the 
opinion regarding sweet things relies on a chain of increasingly general premises that 
ultimately point back to an idea of what is good. That is, as discussed above, Aristotle 
claims that all acts in some way aim at the good, and so he is not describing here a free-




sweetness is understood to be in some way good. While the connection might be obvious, 
Aristotle makes it clear in the next example: whereas in the first example Aristotle uses 
the opinion that “one ought to taste everything that is sweet,” in the next example he uses 
a more general premise that “every sweet thing is pleasant” (1147a32). When one recalls 
that Aristotle includes the pleasant among the different conceptions of the good or 
apparent good (NE 1104b30-31, cf. MA 700b28-29), one can identify the full chain of 
thought.71 This is not to say that the person consciously draws out all of these premises, 
but it is helpful to see the implicitly held beliefs in order to understand the motivation 
behind the action.72 Looking at the sweets example, then, one can map out the premises 
as follows (bracketed premises are implicit):  
Action:  
Major Premises: [(1) One ought to seek what is good,]  
 [(2) pleasure is good,]  
 (3) “every sweet thing is pleasant,” 
 (4) “one ought to taste everything that is sweet.” 
Minor Premise: (perception) This is a sweet thing 
Conclusion: I shall taste the sweet thing. 
 [Deliberation of means leads to action] 
                                                 
71 In connecting the pleasant with the good, I am diverging from commentators who make a radical division 
between the two. For example, Irwin (1980) says that akrasia is “a conflict between a desire based on an 
overall assessment of an object as good or bad and a desire not based on such an assessment” (p. 127). 
While rational desire may include a more clear-sighted assessment of what is good, my argument is that 
even simple desires include an implicit overall premise: namely, that the pleasant as such is good (cf. 
Destrée (2007), p.150-151). 
72 Burger (2008) regards the syllogistic opinions in 7.3 as bare statements (commands or prohibitions), 
saying that they do not connect to a view of the agent’s good (pp. 142-144). By contrast, I am arguing that 
the desire for the sweet is connected to a broader view of one’s ultimate good—namely, the idea that 




To make the example a more realistic presentation of choice, one would have to 
draw out a more complicated series of different ends, relating and ranking the ends into a 
coherent whole linked back to a broader conception of the good. The problematic case of 
akrasia emerges only when there are contradictory opinions or premises that prevent such 
a coherent ordering. Aristotle offers an example of this conflict, supposing in addition to 
the opinion favoring sweets that there is also present “a universal premise that forbids 
tasting [sweet things]” (1147a31-32). This premise could take the form of: ‘one ought to 
avoid sweet things.’ Aristotle does not explain why the sweets are forbidden in this case, 
but if health or dignified restraint is the general concern behind the prohibition, one could 
map out a potential conflict as follows (presenting a simple, immediate desire for 
pleasure versus a more complex commitment to moderation): 
Major Premises: [(1) One ought to seek what is good] 
 [(2) pleasure is good] [(2′) nobility is good] 
  (3′) to be noble is to be moderate  
 (3) “every sweet thing is pleasant” (4′) moderation requires limiting 
indulgence in bodily pleasures not 
necessary for health 
  (5′) the pleasure of eating sweets is an 
unnecessary bodily pleasure 
 (4) “one ought to taste everything that 
is sweet” 
(6′) Therefore, one ought not eat 
sweets  
Minor Premise: (Perception) This is a sweet thing 





There is not a necessary contradiction between these competing premises, as they 
could be combined in an ordered synthesis. When making a choice, one must confront the 
different possible ends and rank the possibilities in terms of a greater good. In this 
instance, one could admit that the sweet would be a good, but nevertheless decide that 
moderation or physical health is more important than momentary pleasure. On the other 
hand, one could limit one’s indulgence to certain occasions, granting a place for the 
pleasure of sweets while still generally pursuing a healthy, moderate life. In the case of 
akrasia, however, there is a failure to make such a deliberation effective. The person 
might give an argument for the importance of restraint, but he nevertheless acts for the 
sake of pleasure. The question is why? Why does the person act on one practical 
syllogism rather than the other? 
Aristotle explains the akrasia by focusing on the role of desire and how it affects 
the practical syllogisms. In the abstract, the two practical syllogisms stand in balance, but 
what seems to differ is the immediacy of the desires associated with the opinions 
concerning pleasure and restraint. Specifically, after describing the competing major 
premises—one forbidding sweets, the other leading to sweets—Aristotle links the 
particular premise (‘this is sweet’) with the premises regarding pleasure, saying that in 
this case, the minor premise is “active” (ἐνεργεῖ), and he notes that an appetitive desire 
(ἐπιθυμία) is present (1147a33). In this case of an “active” premise and a desire, the 
person pursues the sweet: “while the one premise says to avoid this, the appetite takes the 
lead, since it is able to set in motion each part of the body” (1147a34-35). While it not yet 




not isolated from and acting against one’s thoughts and opinions, which is the claim of 
common experience. Instead, Aristotle points out that akrasia comes from “a proposition 
(λόγος), in a way, and opinion” (1147b1). What he means is that, while the desire for the 
sweet stands in opposition to an opinion forbidding sweets, the desire itself is linked with 
a whole series of opinions or premises regarding what is pleasant. Furthermore, that the 
desire ultimately connects with a conception of the good (namely, pleasure) means that 
the person is not simply acting on the basis of desire against a view of the good. The 
question still stands, however, as to why exactly the person acts on the one conception of 
what is good over the other. It is also not completely clear how desire affects the 
decision. 
Many interpreters argue that desire acts independently, introducing a competing 
syllogism against what is otherwise “known” to be good (such as health or moderation).73 
The general problem with this line of interpretation is that it treats thought and desire as 
                                                 
73 Most notably, in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas of Aquinas treats desire 
(“concupiscence”) as acting independently of reason, both proposing and accepting the premises 
to pursue the pleasant thing (§1345-8). Note that Thomas also claims that reason is at fault as it 
fails to “resist” the activity of desire. Other commentators who see desire as proposing syllogisms 
include Sachs (2002), who says that desire “substitutes” a missing premise (p. 124, FN 187). 
Similarly, Burger (2008) says that desire, “having clothed itself as a contrary universal rule, 
becomes a major premise in his reasoning,” which then combines with the particular premise to 
move the person (p. 142). In fairness to these positions, it must be noted that Aristotle does say in 
MA 701a31 that “the activity of desire” can take the place of thought in very automatic responses 
such as the thirst example he uses in the context. My argument, however, is that desire can 
“substitute” for thought in a practical syllogism because desire is itself a form of thought (see the 




more separate than they actually are, not recognizing their essential connection.74 More 
immediately, it needs to be stressed that Aristotle first describes the syllogism regarding 
what is pleasant before introducing desire; this suggests that the thought or belief that 
“sweets are pleasant” is already present before the immediate desire exerts its force. The 
immediate desire does not by itself create the competing syllogism; rather, it in some 
way determines or tilts the balance between the competing opinions and desires oriented 
toward the ultimate notion of what is good. 
Another line of interpretation more properly focuses on the “particular” premise 
of the competing syllogisms, addressing how desire makes the one premise “active.” The 
thing to note about the competing syllogisms is that they share the same particular 
premise, namely, the perception that ‘this is a sweet thing.’ Many interpreters argue that 
desire ‘pulls’ or ‘shifts’ the particular premise away from the restraint syllogism, causing 
the unrestrained person to perceive the sweet only as pleasant rather than unhealthy.75 
                                                 
74 Like Sachs (2002) and Burger (2008) previously noted, Burnet (1901) claims that desire in 
some way introduces a competing syllogism, but he suggests that thought plays a role in desire’s 
activity. Specifically, he argues that thought generalizes the particular end of a desire, meaning 
that the end is extended to a universal proposition. In this way, he says, thought makes explicit 
the “universal implicit in particular desires” (p. 302). This is a strong argument, but it still treats 
desire and thought as overly separate. As discussed above regarding S 431a8-16, Aristotle notes 
that desires already contain thought and a notion that what is desired is pleasant.  
75 There are many different accounts of how desire affects perception, but the common conclusion 
is that there is a temporary blindness or ignorance such that the person sees the sweet as pleasant, 
but does not see it as unhealthy. See, for example, Joachim (1951), pp. 224-228, Santas (1969), p. 
185, Cooper (1975), p. 50, and Rowe & Brodie (2002), pp. 390-393. Destrée (2007) is 
particularly worth consulting as he has the most nuanced account of the role of desire, drawing 




This interpretation is generally consistent with Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia. Towards 
the end of 7.3, Aristotle focuses on the “last premise” (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις), by which 
he means the most particular major premise: he calls it “an opinion regarding the object 
of perception” (1147b9-10), which is the opinion that the sweet is a pleasant or an 
unhealthy thing. In akrasia, Aristotle explains, the person is in some way ignorant of the 
particular premise: “either he does not have this [last premise] or he has it in such a way 
that his having it does not amount to his knowing it; instead he merely speaks, as a drunk 
man states the sayings of Empedocles” (1147b10-12, my emphasis). The ‘temporary 
blindness’ interpretation can explain the first part of this description: while the 
unrestrained person generally knows what is bad, he is momentarily so moved by his 
immediate desire that he fails to see the particular object before him as bad; instead, he 
only sees the object as pleasant. This interpretation understands akrasia as similar to that 
of a person failing to link a particular with a universal (see 1147a1-8), and it might 
explain the impetuous or rash sort of akrasia (see 1150b19-22). However, this 
interpretation does not account for the more problematic case of when a person claims to 
act despite actively knowing that the act is bad. It is not quite right to say, then, that the 
person was blind or unaware that the sweet was actually unhealthy. It is thus still 
necessary to explain how the person can hold a premise without really knowing it. 
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Commentators correctly see that two potential syllogisms are at work in akrasia, 
but I think they are too quick to focus on only one syllogism as complete. Burnet (1901), 
for example, raises the right question regarding akrasia:  “The problem of akrasia 
therefore assumes this form: ‘Is it possible for a syllogism, the conclusion of which is a 
bad act, to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premiss or practical 
principle which that violates?’” (pp. 302-3). He concludes, however, that a person cannot 
have two contradictory propositions coexisting in his soul (p. 303). Similarly, Wiggins 
(1980) says that “the two syllogisms cannot struggle, because they cannot coexist—even 
for one moment” (p. 250). By contrast, I believe that akrasia relies precisely on the fact 
that people can in some way hold contradictory opinions. The inconsistency in akrasia is 
present because the person is confused as to which end is truly good—or rather, the 
confusion is regarding which end is the better end to pursue in a given moment. A person 
judges particulars in light of universals, and in the struggle of akrasia, the unrestrained 
person is judging the particular premise (the sweet) in light of two competing ends: he is 
seeing the sweet as both a pleasant thing and an ignoble or unhealthy thing.76 In pursuing 
the sweet, the person is revealing that he believes that the immediate pleasure is more 
important than nobility or long term health. Another way of saying this is that the person 
                                                 
76 While I disagree with her explanation of akrasia (desire clothing itself as a universal rule), I 
nevertheless think that Burger (2008) makes a very important observation: in akrasia, “perhaps 
… there is no possibility of registering a neutral judgment of fact not already colored by one 
opinion or another about the crucial property of the object as choiceworthy or not. The ‘final 
premise,’ in that case, would be a judgment of the particular that incorporates one universal 
predicate or the other…. The person in whom a struggle is going on might move from one 




does actually believe that health or moderation is good (he does not wholly reject these 
ends), but in choosing the sweet, he is revealing that, for the moment at least, he believes 
that pleasure is a greater good. The general problem is that there is a tension between the 
competing syllogisms, and in the present context, the balance is determined by the 
appetitive desire. In other contexts when the desire is not present or as strong, the person 
will choose health and abstain from sweets.  I think this role of desire is what Aristotle 
means when he says that the particular premise of the pleasure syllogism is “active” 
(1147a33): immediate desire gives more weight or presence to the potential pleasure of 
the sweet, which makes its unhealthiness seem less important.  
Aristotle’s brief discussion of akrasia in On the Soul supports this interpretation. 
In the On the Soul passage, Aristotle clarifies the decision that is made in akrasia. When 
a person acts for the sake of an immediate desire rather than for another end, he is 
choosing an immediate good over a distant and possibly abstract good because the 
immediate good seems more real. As Aristotle puts it, “what is immediately pleasant 
appears to be both simply pleasant and simply good on account of not looking to the 
future” (S 433b8-10, my emphasis). In the Ethics, Aristotle likens akrasia to 
drunkenness. When drunk, a person has less foresight such that he will not sufficiently 
appreciate a distant good and he will instead give much more credence to an immediate 
or apparent good. Similarly, under the influence of a strong desire, the unrestrained 




distant good.77 He may be able to give an argument regarding the importance of 
moderation—and he may generally believe that it is an important thing—but his actions 
reveal that pleasure is more immediately important to him. 
So, regarding the “apparent phenomena” or the akratic’s claim to knowledge (e.g. 
‘I know moderation is better, but I was overcome by desire, acting against my 
judgment’), Aristotle calls into question the status of this “knowledge.” Earlier in 7.3, 
Aristotle said that the person “both has [knowledge] in a way and does not have it” 
(1147a13-14), and at the end he suggests that the akratic “has it in such a way that his 
having it does not amount to his knowing it” (1147b11-12). The “knowledge,” then, 
seems to be a proposition that the person believes but does not fully believe. In the 
akratic, this weak form of ‘knowledge’ is susceptible to being “dragged around by 
passion” (1147b16-17). By contrast, Aristotle highlights another kind of knowledge, 
“knowledge in the authoritative sense” (1147b15). Commentators take this “authoritative 
knowledge” merely to be the knowledge of universals that is untouched by akrasia,78 but 
                                                 
77 Joachim (1951) makes a valuable observation along these lines. After making his major 
argument that the unrestrained person does not see the particular premise of health, he briefly 
grants another possibility: “or, if he does know that this is a case of the [universal] principle, this 
knowledge is a vague memory of what he once fully realized, not the vivid consciousness made 
operative by an actual perception.” And he later adds, “his knowledge of the universal 
[pleasure]—his major premiss—is not merely particularized into ‘This is sweet and therefore 
pleasant’ in the sense of a vague memory. It is made vivid and operative by the activity of his 
ἐπιθυμία, his present appetite for this pleasant thing” (p. 228, my emphases). Destrée (2007) 
makes a similarly brief concession that the difference in akrasia may be the vividness of 
competing perceptions (pp. 160-161). 




I believe Aristotle is referring to a stable form of knowledge that is held by one who does 
not give in to akrasia. This is the knowledge he referred to earlier after claiming that 
akratics do not fully possess knowledge: “one must grow into the knowledge and that 
requires time” (1147a22). 
Fully interpreting what Aristotle means by “authoritative” knowledge or how one 
“grows” into it would require a much broader discussion of the Ethics, but I will offer a 
few remarks. What is most immediately problematic in the person possessing this hollow, 
shifting “knowledge” that gives way to akrasia is the lack of stable desire. This stability 
requires the character formation discussed in Book II of the Ethics: one needs to learn 
how to make deliberate choices rather than simply pursuing any pleasure or immediate 
good that one perceives. At first this character training will involve simple habituation, 
doing what is expected and enforced by others, but over time, one will internalize the 
rules and learn to act by oneself.79 However, this basic form of training is not enough—
by itself it leads to a stubborn, even dogmatic, steadfastness in which a person might 
pursue a proper end, not because of a reasoned account of his good, but because of the 
                                                 
79 In this regard, I agree with Burnyeat (1980) and Charles (2007) who argue that character 
formation is essential to overcoming akrasia. Both of these authors, like many commentators, use 
this point to distance Aristotle from Socrates, who they interpret as saying intellect alone is all 
that is required. As I mentioned above, Socrates’s comments in the Protagoras and Meno are 
meant as provocative challenges. It should suffice to note that in other contexts, Socrates does 
stress something very akin to character formation. See, for example, the discussion of education 
reform in the Republic: the goal of these reforms is to inculcate a sense of what is noble and a 




conventional opinions instilled in him. Lacking a clear view of his good, this person 
would also be prone to some form of akrasia.80  
My interpretation of 7.3 suggests that the inconsistency in desire is related to 
inconsistency in thought, meaning that the akratic has conflicting, contradictory opinions 
regarding the good. Because of the conflict in his opinions, the person is inconsistent and 
has unstable ends: when inflamed by the senses, the desire for the immediate good is 
strongest, but at other times, the person will act in accordance to a more long term idea of 
the good that includes such concerns as health and moderation. Acquiring “authoritative” 
knowledge requires examining one’s opinions and rooting out the contradictions, trying 
to order one’s thoughts into a more coherent whole. This is to say that truly 
“authoritative” knowledge would ultimately require a dialectical study of what is good.81 
Furthermore, it is not enough merely to learn arguments like a student reciting 
“demonstrations and verses” (see NE 1147a20, b12). Rather, one must engage in the 
activity of making choices based on this knowledge. Aristotle’s description of choice 
                                                 
80 While Aristotle focuses on lack of restraint regarding pleasure in 7.3, he considers other forms 
of akrasia in 7.4-6, focusing on those who lack restraint regarding spirited desires. Such people 
resist giving in to desires for pleasure because they are instead moved by their desire for honor 
and reputation. Aristotle defends this latter form of akrasia. However, he does so only by 
reverting to a simpler, bipartite psychology (see 1149b1-2: “spiritedness follows reason in a way, 
but desire does not”) and by noting that, whereas akrasia is usually condemned, people do not 
blame thumotic akrasia to the same extent (1148a2-4, 1149b4-6). This tempered defense of 
thumotic akrasia suggests that Aristotle accepts that it is a politically preferable form of akrasia, 
but it does not rise to the level of actual virtue. 
81 On Aristotle’s notion of dialectics as an examination of opinions meant to root out 




suggests that a person’s desires will become more stable as he makes deliberate choices. 
The person must consider his opinions, actively deliberating about what he believes is 
good, and he must make choices based on these deliberations. The On the Soul passage 
(S 433b8-10) regarding akrasia discussed above suggests that the gradual effect of 
deliberate choice is that broader goods will no longer seem so distant or abstract; instead, 
the person will better appreciate the reality of these goods and so they will not be so 
readily eclipsed by immediate goods that are otherwise taken to be “simply good.” In this 
context, it should also be noted that while Aristotle presents an ideal of desire perfectly 
harmonizing with reason (1119b15-18), there might always be some struggle or lack of 
harmony because of desires for immediate goods or pleasures that conflict with a longer 
term good. Presumably part of good character is the repeated experience of resisting rash 
decisions and being aware of the danger of the ‘temporary blindness’ mentioned above, 
wherein one focuses too much on an immediate good, ignoring more distant goods. 
More could be said about character formation, but for present purposes, the major 
point is that to avoid akrasia, a person needs to have a knowledge that is reflected in his 
thoughts and desires. That is, the knowledge that something is good does not consist in 
abstract thought alone: as Aristotle says, “speaking the words that come from knowledge 
signifies nothing” (1147a18-19). Rather, the “authoritative” knowledge Aristotle refers to 




is good and longs for it. This seems to be what Aristotle means when he says “one must 
grow into the knowledge, and this requires time” (1147a22).82 
In light of this analysis of akrasia, I believe that Aristotle’s agreement with 
Socrates is much closer than is usually granted. Specifically, Aristotle concludes that 
Socrates was correct in a fundamental sense: the weakness or unrestraint of akrasia is not 
truly an instance of one acting contrary to knowledge in the fullest sense. Rather, the 
unrestrained person is acting on a certain idea of the good and he is following a set of 
premises, flawed though they may be. I have been considering very difficult passages, but 
the basic claim supporting the Socratic position is that people always act according to 
their conception of the good; in instances where they seem to do otherwise, it is because 
they have conflicting opinions based on competing conceptions of the good. Put even 
more simply, it can be said that people act in inconsistent ways because they have 
confused, contradictory opinions, which are reflected in their confused, contradictory 
desires. It is in these instances that people “both possess and do not possess knowledge” 
(1147a13). 
To return to the broader issue of action and choice, this explanation of akrasia is 
important for drawing out aspects of Aristotelian psychology. In particular, the account of 
                                                 
82 A confirmation of this interpretation of knowledge that one “grows into” can be found in On 
the Soul when Aristotle distinguishes between two types of knower. One is only a knower “in 
potency,” whereas the other is an active knower. Aristotle describes the latter sort of knowledge 
as an activity (ἐνέργεια) that is achieved when a person “has been altered by learning and has 
changed often from the contrary condition” (see S 417a21–b2, my emphasis). On the need of 




akrasia helps demonstrate the syllogistic character of decision-making and it also makes 
sense of what Aristotle means when he says that all choices aim at some conception of 
the good. The discussion of the akratic choice indicates why ends can be unstable, but it 
also suggests how choice is made as one decides between competing ends. In addition to 
the present discussion of akrasia, what needs to be kept in mind from the sections above 
is that in the syllogistic process of action, each premise consists of thought and desire 
together. Thought is not simply instrumental, following the ends posed by desire; rather, 
thought is also constitutive of the ends of action. Taken together, these points help draw 
out both the deeper rationality of action and the potential for irrational or confused action. 
Having discussed the core concepts in Aristotle’s psychological account of action, we can 
now turn to consider the relevance of Aristotelian psychology to rhetoric. 
IV.  Towards a Psychology of Persuasion 
The overview offered in this chapter was meant to serve as a detailed introduction 
of the major concepts in Aristotelian psychology, especially in Aristotle’s discussion of 
the psychology of choice and action. While the issues discussed are theoretically 
interesting in their own right—and they already go some way towards correcting the 
notion that rationality is solely instrumental—these psychological concepts will also be 
very helpful for understanding how rhetoric works and its place in politics. For instance, 
the mutual role of thought and desire in action is very relevant to understanding the 
potential for persuasion. When we understand the broader, constitutive role of thought in 




how the ends of action can be informed by persuasive appeal. There is thus greater room 
for understanding how rhetoric can be a part of actual guidance and leadership rather than 
mere pandering or manipulation. Furthermore, while Aristotle’s account of action will be 
especially relevant to understanding the content of rhetoric, it will also help us understand 
the role of style in rhetoric or how that content is presented. In particular, the analysis of 
akrasia highlights how competing ends may be at work in action and the reason why 
these ends may be unstable; this lesson will in turn allow us to understand how rhetoric 
can focus the audience on, and give special weight to, one end over another. 
With all of that said, before turning to the underlying psychology and potential of 
rhetoric in Chapter 3, it is necessary to be clear first as to what rhetoric actually is. 
Accordingly, I will offer in the next chapter an overview of the Rhetoric and the concepts 




CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC 
In this chapter I begin my investigation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I will start with 
the most basic question: What is rhetoric? In a neutral sense, rhetoric is simply persuasive 
speech, or more specifically, it is speech aimed at influencing judgment. Rhetoric, 
however, is more often seen as a matter of pandering or manipulating an audience. In this 
negative case, rhetoric is contrasted with the direct statement of truth, which leads to the 
question: Why doesn’t the speaker simply rely on rational argument to demonstrate the 
truth? This negative view of rhetoric reflects suspicions that reach back to antiquity, 
when rhetoric was sometimes associated with “unjust speech” and “making the weaker 
speech stronger.” Interestingly, even though Aristotle is known as a defender of rhetoric, 
he echoes these suspicions in the Rhetoric. Indeed, it must be noted that he only offers a 
qualified defense of rhetoric. That is, Aristotle is also very critical of many forms of 
rhetoric, but in describing his own conception of how rhetoric works, Aristotle offers a 
publically defensible form of rhetoric. 
To address the primary question of what rhetoric is, I present in this chapter an 
overview of Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the terms it introduces for understanding persuasive 
speech. In particular, I must give an extended explanation of Aristotle’s concept of the 
enthymeme. Aristotle frequently emphasizes the importance of the enthymeme in 
rhetoric, but the traditional interpretation of the enthymeme as an incomplete syllogism is 
entirely inadequate for understanding what Aristotle actually means by the term and why 
he sees it as so important for rhetoric. My argument is that, rather than being a mere 




including emotional and ethical appeals. For this reason, Aristotle uses the concept to 
describe the way in which rhetoric can speak to and move the whole soul rather than 
rational understanding alone.  
Gaining clarity on the enthymeme is also helpful for understanding the broader 
character of human rationality and the interrelation of thought and desire.  In rhetoric, 
emotional appeals offer one of the more powerful means of persuasion. Indeed, 
rhetoricians before Aristotle treated emotional appeals as the primary component of 
effective rhetoric, and because of the power of these appeals, they described rhetoric as 
operating like a drug or magic charm that takes over the listener. The problem with 
likening speech to drugs and charms is that these sorts of metaphor fail to indicate how 
speech can have such a powerful influence over the seemingly irrational emotions. An 
important insight of Aristotle’s analysis of the emotions (which will be discussed in the 
next chapter) is the constitutive role of thought in the emotions—Aristotle describes the 
emotions as being based in part on certain premises of thought. This analysis helps 
explain how the emotions are open to being influenced by speech. The enthymeme, in 
turn, is Aristotle’s way of explaining how rhetoric is structured to influence the emotions 
and other aspects of the soul. A clear understanding of the enthymeme is thus crucial to a 
consideration of the relationship between Aristotelian psychology and rhetoric, which I 
take up further in the next chapter. 
As I address Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric, I must also confront a common 




philological readings, but to capture more clearly the nature of this interpretive approach, 
I will refer to it as the “biographical reading” of Aristotle’s work. This reading claims 
that the Rhetoric is not a coherent text. Rather, according to this view, the Rhetoric is a 
poorly edited pastiche consisting of segments written at different points in Aristotle’s 
life—segments which ultimately reveal contradictory views of rhetoric. I will begin by 
confronting this reading—not only because it challenges my understanding of the 
coherence of the text, but also because the biographical reading has led to several 
pervasive misunderstandings of the Rhetoric, especially regarding the enthymeme.  
I. The Biographical Reading of the Rhetoric  
The biographical reading is a common approach to studying Aristotle’s works that 
involves interpreting individual texts in light of theories regarding Aristotle’s intellectual 
development. These theories attempt to trace the development of ideas across Aristotle’s 
existing works in order to construct a timeline in which one might then date the 
individual texts. To aid this effort, the timeline is constructed with reference to a similar 
attempt to date Plato’s intellectual development: the argument is that, as Plato’s student, 
Aristotle originally adhered to Plato’s teachings, but over time Aristotle became 
increasingly independent in his own thinking, distancing himself from Plato’s thought. 
Within the Rhetoric, it is argued that one can see three distinct stages in 
Aristotle’s outlook. In the first stage, he was very critical of traditional rhetoric and 
accepted only rational, logical forms of argumentation. This narrow view of rhetoric 




Gorgias. Many scholars argue that Plato’s Phaedrus marks a shift in Plato’s stance 
towards rhetoric—that in endorsing an ideal art of rhetoric conceived as a “leading of the 
soul” (see 270b ff.) in the dialogue, Plato demonstrates a limited acceptance of rhetoric. It 
is argued that Aristotle followed this turn in Plato’s thought, coming, in this second stage, 
to see the need to speak to all aspects of the soul, and so he accepted the legitimacy of 
non-rational arguments such as emotional appeals. The third stage corresponds to what is 
seen as Aristotle’s turning away from Platonic idealism to the empiricism one finds in his 
later biological works. In this stage, Aristotle looked to the actual practice of rhetoricians 
and came to accept the need for stylistic arrangement and delivery in rhetoric.83 
The textual basis within the Rhetoric used to support this biographical reading 
derives, first of all, from the seemingly contradictory stances adopted in the work’s 
introductory chapters. In the first chapter, Aristotle condemns previous rhetoricians for 
their focus on non-rational techniques, and he instead focuses exclusively on the need for 
a rational basis to persuasion. Immediately afterwards, however, in the second chapter 
Aristotle gives equal status to non-rational appeals, thereby accepting the practices he just 
rejected. This second chapter is seen as a representation of a later, more mature view of 
rhetoric, whereas the first chapter reflects Aristotle’s younger, more idealistic 
understanding. Beyond the opening chapters, it is also argued that the overall chapter 
structure of the work reveals contradictory views of rhetoric. After the problematic 
                                                 
83 On theories regarding the development of Aristotle’s thought on rhetoric, see Kennedy (1963) 




introductory chapters, the rest of Book I and the final chapters of Book II (2.18-2.25) 
focus on rational appeals, but these chapters are interrupted by a discussion of emotional 
and character appeals (2.1-2.17). Because they seem to break the flow of the discussion 
of rational appeal, these latter chapters are seen as additions clumsily inserted into an 
earlier work. Furthermore, because these chapters do not offer examples of rhetorical 
speeches, it is thought that they were imported from a different work on psychology and 
inserted into the Rhetoric without being sufficiently tailored to the text. Finally, Book III, 
which focuses on style and delivery of speeches, is viewed as an afterthought not directly 
relating to the Books I and II, and so it too is thought to have been appended to the text at 
a later date.84 
Because of the conflicting stances regarding rational and non-rational forms of 
appeal, and also because of the work’s seemingly incoherent structure, many scholars 
view the Rhetoric as a mere compilation of various lectures that Aristotle composed at 
different points in his life. Some think that Aristotle himself brought the lectures together, 
hastily making only a few revisions and cross-references to give a semblance of order.85 
Other scholars go further, claiming that the Rhetoric was compiled by later editors. For 
                                                 
84 Apart from structural interpretation, there is one piece of external evidence of the claim that 
Book III was written separately: In his Lives of Eminent Philosophers (5.24), Diogenes Laertius 
says that the Rhetoric consisted of two books, suggesting that Book III was originally a separate 
work. However, even if this is correct (Diogenes was writing several centuries after Aristotle), 
this evidence does not necessarily imply that there is a conflict between Book III and the earlier 
parts of the Rhetoric. 




example, McAdon (2004) argues that the Rhetoric is “a compilation of originally separate 
texts that have been (confusedly) reworked into what we now have” (p. 322).86  
A major problem with this biographical approach to interpretation is that there is 
very little evidence available for verifying conjectural accounts of intellectual 
development. We simply lack sufficient biographical information on most ancient 
thinkers, which means that the only real access we have to their thought is through their 
writings. Reliance on a speculative biographical timeline runs the risk of misrepresenting 
the primary texts, as the interpreter imposes his own views as to what constitutes mature 
or complex thought. That said, even if some works were accurately identified as more 
complex—or, for that matter, even if we had an accurate dating of every work—the 
timeline approach ignores the question of the author’s intention. It is entirely possible that 
the author chose to present simpler concepts in a particular context, or that he had 
deliberate reasons for, say, presenting tensions within an account that would need to be 
resolved through subsequent interpretation. Of course, inferring intent is also speculative. 
The ultimate standard for an interpretation is whether it actually squares with the text of 
the work, and it is here that the biographical reading fails: the developmental timeline of 
Aristotle’s thought is constructed by faulty readings of individual texts. The key, then, to 
                                                 
86 McAdon goes still further in a later paper (2006), conjecturing that the Rhetoric was not 
completely written by Aristotle. Rather, it is likely a “cut-and-paste” compilation of many 
separate works by Aristotle and Theophrastus (Aristotle’s student and eventual successor in the 
Lyceum). This compilation was subsequently corrupted by poor manuscript care until it was 





disproving the biographical reading is to demonstrate how the text has been 
misconstrued. 
In the previous chapter, for example, I discussed Aristotelian psychology. As 
noted, some scholars attribute a bipartite psychology to Aristotle, and they divide 
Aristotle’s work according to the complexity of his psychological views, arguing that On 
the Soul contains his mature thought, whereas the Nicomachean Ethics has an earlier, 
cruder view of psychology.87 The critical flaw with this interpretation is that it simply 
ignores the cautionary language Aristotle uses in his presentation, especially in his claim 
that he is relying on simpler notions from “popular accounts” (ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις, 
1102a27) because they are adequate for the immediate purpose of speaking to practically 
minded statesmen. Moreover, if one carefully attends to the discussion of psychology 
throughout the Ethics, instead of dismissing it as crude and undeveloped, one can see that 
the discussions of psychology in the Ethics and On the Soul actually complement each 
other. My discussion of akrasia in the previous chapter serves as an example of how 
Aristotle ultimately presents a consistent understanding of psychology across his different 
works. 
The biographical reading of the Rhetoric is similarly flawed. To the extent that 
such a reading is built upon an interpretation of Plato’s intellectual development, it must 
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first be noted that this latter theory relies on a poor understanding of Plato’s works. 
Regarding Plato’s view of rhetoric, if one pays sufficient attention to the dialogic 
discussion in the Gorgias, one can see that Plato is not actually entirely critical of 
rhetoric; this observation in turn calls into question the idea that the Phaedrus necessarily 
expresses a later, more mature understanding of rhetoric.88 In turn, when one sees that 
Plato accepted certain forms of rhetoric, one can see that Aristotle’s treatment is not as 
radically different from Plato’s as it is often made out to be.89 To the extent, however, 
that a biographical reading of the Rhetoric is based upon textual evidence, an adequate 
response requires delving into the text itself. Given that the major evidence used for the 
biographical reading is the seeming contradictions and inconsistencies in the work, it is 
necessary to demonstrate the coherence of Aristotle’s arguments. If one can see the 
underlying unity of the text and explain the coherence of the alleged contradictions, then 
there is little reason to dismiss the work as a confused mixture of incomplete lectures. I 
will therefore turn now to the text itself, offering an interpretation of the work that 
challenges the biographical reading of the Rhetoric. 
                                                 
88 On Socrates’s (and Plato’s) complicated criticism and acceptance of rhetoric, see Stauffer 
(2006). 
89 For discussions of the relation of the Gorgias and Phaedrus to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Lord 




II. Aristotle’s Introduction to Rhetoric: The Limits of Logical Argument 
The opening chapters of the Rhetoric offer an introduction to Aristotle’s treatment 
of rhetoric, but they are marked by the sharp contrast noted above: in the first chapter, 
Aristotle seems to equate proper rhetoric with logical argument alone, rejecting all other 
ways of influencing judgment, but in the next chapter, he endorses the use of the non-
rational appeals he just condemned. This divergence is used to argue that the Rhetoric is 
incoherent, though it is odd that few commentators have tried to explain how Aristotle—
or any editor for that matter—could miss such a glaring contradiction. In what follows, I 
argue that Aristotle was aware of the contrast between these chapters. This is the reason 
that Aristotle ends the first chapter calling for a new introduction in which he will start 
again, “as if from the beginning” (1355b24). I believe there is a development over the 
course of the introduction in which Aristotle first presents an ideal or exaggerated form of 
rhetoric and then tempers this idealization, preparing the way for a more realistic 
conception of rhetoric in the second chapter.90  
Aristotle opens the Rhetoric with the sentence, “Rhetoric is the ἀντίστροφος of 
dialectic” (1354a1).91 Antistrophe is a dramatic term referring to the chorus in a Greek 
play: in the strophe, the chorus moves in one direction, dancing and singing in a 
                                                 
90 In this regard, I agree with Brunschwig (1996, p.45) who calls 1.1 a “false start” that prepares 
the way for the “true start” in 1.2. 
91 This famous phrase has been the subject of an enormous variety of interpretations. See Green 




particular meter, and in the antistrophe, the chorus moves back in the opposite direction, 
mirroring the dance and meter of the strophe. Antistrophe implies a complementary 
relationship and so it is usually translated as “counterpart” or “analogue.” Much of the 
substance of chapters one and two involves a clarification—as well as a qualification—of 
the sense in which rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic.92  
Because of the ambiguity of “antistrophe,” it is helpful to consider first what 
Aristotle means by “dialectic.” In the Topics, Aristotle describes dialectic as “a method 
by which we can reason about any problem posed by reputable opinions (ἔνδοξα) while 
also avoiding saying anything self-contradictory when we ourselves make arguments” 
(100a19-21). Endoxa are the common or reputable opinions held by everyone, by a 
majority, or by some other credible source, such as the famous or the wise (100b21-23). 
Because these opinions have been convincing to others, it is assumed that there is some 
degree of truth in them that merits investigation. Dialectic involves testing the opinions, 
trying to root out what is false in order to find sound, non-contradictory premises.93 In 
focusing on opinions, dialectic is subordinate to the sciences (because the sciences look 
directly to nature to discover what is primary and true), but in another sense, dialectic is 
                                                 
92 In the Gorgias, Socrates criticizes rhetoric and calls it the “antistrophe of cookery” on the 
grounds that it is akin to flattery (see Gorgias, 465b-466a). By his choice of words, Aristotle is 
responding to Socrates’ provocative challenge, announcing that he will show how rhetoric can be 
a rational art open to systematic study. For more on Aristotle’s response to, and ultimate 
agreement with, the Socratic challenge to rhetoric, see Lord (1981). 
93 Aristotle’s “naturalistic” analysis of akrasia in 7.3 of the Ethics could be considered a 
dialectical investigation and refinement of common and reputable opinions on the phenomenon of 




more foundational because it can investigate the assumptions and premises underlying 
the various sciences. Accordingly, Aristotle says that by testing and purifying opinions of 
their contradictions, dialectic can draw out the “first principles of all disciplines” (T 
101b3-4). 
Regarding Aristotle’s claim that rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic, most 
interpreters think that by antistrophe Aristotle only means that rhetoric is roughly 
analogous to dialectic.94 There are many points of equivalence: they both involve basic 
logic (induction and deduction), they are general arts in that they can be applied to the 
specific subject matter of other arts, and they give guidance for making effective 
arguments. A particularly important likeness is that both rhetoric and dialectic both rely 
on endoxa. However, whereas dialectic uses reputable opinions as a starting point for 
critical investigation, rhetoric generally accepts and works within these opinions. That is, 
rhetoric must appeal to common opinions and draw on their premises as something that 
the audience accepts as true. There are thus several points of rough analogy, but I believe 
that Aristotle goes further in the opening of the Rhetoric, suggesting that rhetoric should 
be a counterpart that follows the lead of dialectic just as the antistrophe follows the 
strophe. In dialectic, one focuses solely on the argument, offering proofs and refutations 
in order to arrive at the best argument. As strophe, then, dialectic investigates and 
purifies common opinions, and as antistrophe, rhetoric should return to the audience, 
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justifying refined opinions in light of already accepted opinions. Such an effort would be 
an attempt to guide the audience towards truer opinions. When understood in light of the 
Topics and Aristotle’s other philosophic writings, the opening antistrophe statement 
offers a brief glimpse of the highest form of rhetoric, namely what rhetoric can and 
should be when it is guided by philosophy. I will return to discuss this notion of rhetoric 
in the concluding chapter. In the immediate context of chapter one of the Rhetoric, 
however, the antistrophe analogy takes on a high-minded, even moralistic connotation, 
the suggestion being that rhetoric should only be a matter of presenting truth. 
There are many examples in the Rhetoric of this initial, high-minded view. 
Aristotle says early on that rhetoric should focus only on truth in that it should be used 
only to try to show that something “is or is not so, or has or has not happened” (1354a28-
29). Rhetoric should only be about proving facts, and in the first chapter Aristotle 
frequently dismisses other concerns as “extraneous” or “outside the subject” (1354a19, 
a25, b19, 1355a1, a20). For instance, he says that one should not use emotional appeals, 
as they involve “warping” the audience (1354a24), and he similarly criticizes the concern 
with stylistic delivery on the grounds that this is again a matter of influencing the 
audience’s disposition rather than offering proof (1354b19). Finally, in support of an 
ideal form of rhetoric, Aristotle endorses laws that would prohibit orators from speaking 





Over the course of the opening chapter, however, Aristotle begins to treat rhetoric 
differently. Initially, rhetoric is presented as being properly concerned only with rational 
speech and all other means of persuasion are treated as illegitimate or “outside” the art, 
but towards the end of the chapter, Aristotle adopts a broader conception of rhetoric. 
Indeed, at the end of the chapter, Aristotle no longer links rhetoric with logical argument 
or dialectic alone, but he instead includes all forms of persuasion, saying more neutrally 
that the task (ἔργον) of rhetoric is “to see the available means of persuasion for each 
subject” (1355b10-11). What accounts for this dramatic shift, which occurs so very early 
in the text?95 
The major reason for this shift is a substantive one: Aristotle has turned to discuss 
another key dimension of rhetoric, namely, the nature of the audience. Speeches will 
often be directed at large, general audiences, and there will likely be few in the audience 
who will be able to follow complex arguments. As Aristotle warns in the second chapter, 
one may often need to speak “to the kind of listeners who are not capable of bringing 
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real conflict at all between the opening chapters of the Rhetoric. Their argument is that 
throughout the rest of the Rhetoric, Aristotle does not make a radical distinction between rational 
and emotional appeal, but instead shows how the different appeals can be combined. In light of 
this, they argue that in chapter one, Aristotle is not condemning all emotional appeal, but only 
those appeals that are completely divorced from rational appeal. While I am generally in 
agreement with Grimaldi and Arnhart, their arguments on this matter do not sufficiently attend to 
the rhetorical character of Aristotle’s opening chapter. In particular, they do not adequately reflect 
the initial impression created by Aristotle’s strong condemnations and exclusive focus on logical 
argumentation. Regarding the relation of the opening chapters, I am in closest agreement with 
Sprute (1994), who also claims that chapter one presents an ideal version of rhetoric directed 





many things together at once or of reasoning from a distant starting point” (1357a3-4). 
For such audiences, logical argument alone will not be sufficient. However, even if the 
listeners are reasonably intelligent, one would still be required to understand their 
potential biases and preconceptions. On this point, Aristotle later stresses that it is 
imperative to take note of the regime (1.8). Democracies offer the most opportunity for 
public speech and debate, but rhetoric in some form is required in all regimes—whether 
one is addressing an oligarchic council, an aristocratic court, or acting as an advisor to a 
king. In each case, Aristotle explains, one needs to understand the ends of those 
committed to the regime, and one will have to pay heed to biases in favor of ends such as 
freedom, wealth, tradition, or security (1366a2-6). The lofty rhetoric presented at the 
beginning of chapter one would require an ideal audience whose members are intelligent, 
experienced in public affairs, and entirely open-minded. In all other cases, however, the 
audience imposes limits on the speaker and he will have to attend to the audience 
accordingly. For these reasons, Aristotle grants that even if one had “the most precise 
knowledge” (1355a25), one would not necessarily be able to persuade an audience with 
knowledge alone.  
This focus on the audience is an important development, because with it, Aristotle 
is highlighting the fact that there are limits on the degree to which rhetoric can rely on 
rational speech alone. Because of these limitations, it is necessary to use other means of 
persuasion as well. Aristotle makes this point several times in the Rhetoric, but a 
statement in the first chapter of Book III regarding stylistic arrangement particularly 




[A concern with style] is thought to be something vulgar, which captures it 
nobly, but since the whole business of rhetoric is directed at opinion, one 
has to make it [style] a matter of concern, not because it is just but because 
it is necessary. The just thing would be to aim at nothing more in a speech 
than that it not cause pain, but not cause pleasure either, since it is just to 
argue one’s side by means of the facts themselves so that the other things 
extraneous to the demonstration are superfluous. But all the same, as has 
been said, these [other things] have a greater power owing to the corrupt 
condition of the listener” (1403b36-1404a8). 
If the opening presentation of rhetoric is indeed idealized, we begin here to see 
the reason for Aristotle’s approach. He begins with an emphasis on the rational (and not 
emotional or stylistic) dimensions of rhetoric in order to present an unambiguously 
defensible goal for rhetoric. As Aristotle grants later in chapter one, rhetoric as an art is 
neutral: it could be used to guide people to what is true, but it could also be used to 
mislead (1355b2-7). By presenting an idealized, rational goal for rhetoric, Aristotle is 
encouraging a civic use for rhetoric, suggesting that other means of persuasion should be 
used in service of rational speech, which by itself is limited in its persuasive power. With 
the support of other means of persuasion, however, rhetoric can be used to guide the 
audience members towards a truth that they might not otherwise accept. For instance, 
Aristotle initially dismisses emotional appeal on the grounds that it “warps” the audience 
and is thus akin to “making a straight-edged ruler crooked before using it” (1354a25-26). 




listener’s disposition and one may need to “prepare” the listener’s judgment by means of 
non-rational appeals (1377b24). This suggests that if one is not speaking to an ideal 
audience, if the audience is already ‘warped’ such that it is ill-disposed or otherwise 
unable to follow an argument, it may be necessary to use other means of persuasion to 
prepare or ‘straighten’ the audience, making listeners more akin to the ideal audience 
who would be able and willing to follow the rational argument.   
The effort to link rhetoric with dialectic and thereby present a defensible form of 
rhetoric is related to one of the broader purposes of the Rhetoric as a whole. As chapter 
one makes clear, Aristotle is critical of previous rhetoricians, especially their emphasis on 
emotional appeals. One of the major problems of earlier rhetoric is that it became 
associated with the unjust use of speech. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle seeks to defend 
rhetoric, showing that it need not be pernicious but can actually be an art that is beneficial 
to the political community. With this goal in mind, I believe that Aristotle opens the 
Rhetoric in a rhetorical fashion, offering an exaggerated conception of rhetoric in order to 
distance himself from previous rhetoricians: at first he presents a lofty form of rhetoric, 
stressing its justness and respectability, but as the Rhetoric proceeds, he relaxes his 
conception of rhetoric, gradually accepting and rehabilitating rhetorical devices that had 
been given a bad name by earlier, sophistic forms of rhetoric.96 
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It should not be surprising that the Rhetoric has a rhetorical character, but it is 
difficult to offer concrete proof. However, regarding the claim that the introduction is 
rhetorical, it is worth noting that such an opening is consistent with Aristotle’s advice in 
3.14 on introductions (prooemia) for defense speeches. Specifically, Aristotle says that it 
may be necessary for an introduction to serve a remedial purpose, clearing away 
prejudice before moving on to one’s own speech (see 1415a25-39). Aristotle also notes 
that the introduction is especially helpful for establishing a suitable self-presentation, an 
important concern because the audience will be more receptive if one comes across as a 
“decent” (ἐπιεικῆ) person (1415a39). The opening chapter of the Rhetoric serves these 
defensive purposes quite well: in stressing justice and rationality, Aristotle presents 
himself as a decent, trustworthy person, and further, he distances his own presentation of 
rhetoric from the prejudice acquired by previous forms of rhetoric. With this 
accomplished, Aristotle starts chapter two “as if from the beginning,” offering a new 
introduction with a more balanced conception of rhetoric. 
While there is an obvious contrast between the opening two chapters of the 
Rhetoric, they need not be dismissed as contradictory because these dual-introductions 
serve a broader purpose: the exaggerated, idealized opening offers a view of the civic 
goal of rhetoric and it serves as an argument regarding the respectability of rhetoric as an 
art. However, to see the deeper consistency of the work, and to understand better 
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Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric, it is necessary to turn to the “new beginning” offered 
in chapter two and consider how it relates to the rest of the text.  
III. The Enthymeme and Other Concepts of Rhetoric 
Aristotle opens the second chapter by defining rhetoric as “the ability to see 
(θεωρῆσαι) what is capable of being persuasive for each particular subject” (1355b25-
26). This definition treats rhetoric as a theoretical art: rhetoric is characterized not by its 
successful use in persuasion, but rather by its capacity to see how an argument can be 
persuasive. In particular, the primary concern for rhetoric is the concept of pistis (pl. 
pisteis), a term that has a broad set of meanings related to persuasion: it can refer to the 
psychological state of belief or trust (having been persuaded); it can refer to the means of 
persuasion; and it can also mean more strongly a proof that is offered in order to persuade 
someone. Chapter two introduces quite a few technical concepts related to the pisteis, but 
these can be divided into two general categories: the means of persuasion that one might 
employ and the inferential form of reasoning that provides the basis of persuasive speech. 
Aristotle first discusses the different means of persuasion, or the ways by which 
one attempts to persuade someone. There is a brief mention of the “unartful” (ἄτεχνοί) 
pisteis, meaning external evidence or facts that one might present in support of an 
argument (e.g. contracts, witness testimony), but Aristotle focuses on the “artful” 
(ἔντεχνοι) pisteis, those that are inherent to the art of speech or can only come through 
speech. The artful pisteis consist of rational appeal, emotional appeal, and character 




pathos, and ethos. Rational appeal is the most direct means of persuasion as it focuses on 
the subject matter itself, attempting to show that something is true or at least more likely 
to be true than any alternative. Emotional appeal involves putting the listener in a 
favorable disposition towards an argument. This is important because, as Aristotle notes, 
the emotions have a powerful effect on judgment (1356a15-16, 1377b24-28). Finally, 
character appeal involves presenting oneself in such a way that the audience is swayed by 
one’s trustworthiness; this artful appeal does not come from a pre-established reputation, 
but rather through the speech itself, which should demonstrate the speaker’s virtue, 
knowledge, and good will towards the audience (1377a6-8). These three artful pisteis 
describe the different ways by which a speech can move a listener to accept a certain 
position. 
In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle begins a more technical discussion 
focusing on what he later calls the “common means of persuasion” (κοιναὶ πίστεις, 
1393a24). As opposed to the artful pisteis, the common pisteis more generally concern 
the ways by which one demonstrates or establishes a particular point through speech 
(1356a36). The most significant point is that Aristotle says that there is an inferential 
basis to the pisteis: in the case of rhetorical induction, there is the “paradigm” (or 
“example,” παράδειγμα), and in the more common case of rhetorical deduction, there is 
the “enthymeme.”97 Aristotle thus introduces the enthymeme as having a logical, 
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deductive basis. However, one of the more debated questions concerning the Rhetoric is 
whether the enthymeme is solely a logical form of argument (and thereby a subset of 
logos) or whether it can be present in all three forms of persuasion (logos, pathos, and 
ethos).98 This question might seem at first to be a trivial definitional debate, but it 
becomes extremely important because of the major role Aristotle gives to the enthymeme 
in the Rhetoric. Unfortunately, while one can quickly see the inadequacy of the standard 
definition of “enthymeme” as an incomplete syllogism, it is very difficult to find an 
adequate replacement. Indeed, one 19th century scholar of rhetoric warned that because of 
its difficulty, it may even seem “mad” to ask what an enthymeme is.99 It is not quite 
impossible, but it is difficult because in order to understand the enthymeme, one must 
look not only at how Aristotle uses the term throughout the Rhetoric, but also at what the 
word meant before Aristotle adopted and put the concept to his own use. To explain the 
                                                 
even goes on to subsume paradigms into enthymemes (meaning that examples and induction are 
used to establish a particular premise that in turn will be part of a broader deductive argument; 
see 1402b14-19). Following Aristotle’s lead, I will also focus on enthymemes and occasionally 
refer to enthymemes as the broader category of inferential reasoning underlying rhetorical 
arguments. 
98 Grimaldi (1972, 1980) is the major commentator on the Rhetoric who has expressed this 
broader view of the enthymeme. Arnhart (1981) expands on Grimaldi’s points in his own 
commentary, and forms of this view are accepted by others such as Conley (1984) and Walker 
(1994, 2000). Most scholars adhere to a conventional view of the enthymeme as solely a device 
of logos. See, for example, Kennedy (1968, 2007), Wisse (1989), Gaines (2000), and McAdon 
(2004). 
99 Thomas de Quincy: “What then was an Enthymeme? Oxford! Thou wilt think us mad to ask.” 
Discussed in Seaton (1914) and Conley (1984), the original essay was published in Blackwood’s 




enthymeme and the other rhetorical concepts Aristotle introduces, I will thus have to 
expand the discussion beyond chapter two of the Rhetoric. 
The standard definition of “enthymeme” is that it is a truncated or incomplete 
syllogism in which a premise is suppressed. The classical example is “Socrates is a man, 
so he is mortal”; one need not include the major premise (“All men are mortal”) because 
this is readily understood. The enthymeme is defined as an incomplete syllogism in 
modern formal logic, but this is not Aristotle’s meaning. Aristotle does say that to be 
effective and avoid being tedious, enthymemes should avoid spelling out all the premises 
of an argument (e.g. 1395b25-27), but he does not include this as a necessary criterion. 
That said, while Aristotle himself does not reduce enthymemes to imperfect syllogisms, 
there is a very long history of misinterpreting Aristotle on this point, and this history 
makes it difficult to think of the enthymeme in any way other than in terms of formal 
syllogisms.100 
                                                 
100 This history goes back to classical times and the development of Stoic philosophy, which co-
opted and formalized Aristotelian logic. For example, Aristotelian logic explores valid reasoning, 
considering how premises deductively lead to conclusions, but in Stoic thought syllogisms were 
formalized and treated as only having two premises and a conclusion. Enthymemes were then 
defined as simplified syllogisms having only one stated premise and a conclusion. In Medieval 
times, Stoic and Peripatetic (Aristotelian) logic were conflated, and when the Rhetoric was 
rediscovered in Europe, the enthymeme was interpreted in light of this conflation. While modern 
scholars no longer conflate the formalized, Stoic view of logic with Aristotelian logic, the 
connection with the enthymeme still has influence and it was endorsed by Cope in his widely-
cited commentary (1867, pp. 102-104). As a result of this long historical influence, enthymemes 
have been understood in the analytic terms of formal logic. On the history of the interpretation of 




To understand what Aristotle means by enthymeme, it is necessary to consider 
first his use of the term in the opening chapters of the Rhetoric, though ultimately these 
chapters are inconclusive. In chapter one, Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body 
(σῶμα) of the pisteis” (1354a15), but it is unclear how to take this metaphor: some think 
it means the enthymeme can include all of the pisteis, providing a common basis for 
different means of persuasion, while others think that it means logos is the basic form and 
other means of persuasion are clothes or accessories (similar to how Aristotle describes 
style as an accessory that aids argumentation). In chapter one, Aristotle also says that 
“persuasion is a sort of demonstration,” an enthymeme is a “rhetorical demonstration,” 
and the enthymeme is “a sort of syllogism” (or a syllogism of a sort, συλλογισμός τις; 
1355a3-8).101 Because of the similarity between enthymemes and syllogisms, Aristotle 
suggests that dialecticians will also be skilled with enthymemes—but he importantly adds 
that such skill requires that one also understands “what sort of things an enthymeme is 
concerned with and what differences it has from logical syllogisms” (1355a12-14, 
emphasis added). It is clear from the statements in chapter one that enthymemes are 
similar to syllogisms in that they involve some form of deductive inference, but it is not 
yet clear how enthymemes are different from syllogisms. 
In chapter two, Aristotle gives a sense of what distinguishes enthymemes from 
logical syllogisms. After reintroducing the concept, Aristotle begins a technical 
                                                 




discussion of the features of enthymemes, addressing first the particular character of an 
enthymeme’s premises. Because rhetoric is concerned with endoxa (reputable opinions) 
regarding practical affairs, and it draws its premises from these opinions, rhetoric is 
usually concerned with contingent matters rather than strict necessities. This is a reason 
why rhetoric is not simply a matter of presenting the truth: in many cases, the truth of a 
matter cannot be known with complete certainty. That said, even lacking complete 
certainty, one can still give reasons for favoring some positions over others because one 
can appeal to probabilities and likelihoods. The premises of rhetorical logic will usually 
be based on probabilities, and so the conclusions one reaches will often only be probable 
rather than indubitable (see 1357a22-34). For example, a common political argument is 
that “we need to lower taxes to improve the economy.” The underlying logic is: the 
economy will improve if there is more spending and investment; there will be more 
spending and investing if people have more money; people will have more money if there 
are lower taxes; therefore we should lower taxes to improve the economy. These 
premises and conclusion have a probabilistic logic to them and so they may be 
persuasive, but they also might be disputed at the different steps. One feature that 
distinguishes enthymemes from demonstrative syllogisms, then, is the probabilistic logic 
used in enthymemes. 
Along with the character of an enthymeme’s premises, Aristotle introduces in 
chapter two another concept, what he calls the topoi. This term is usually translated as 
“topics,” but it should be noted that the word topoi literally means “places.” 




call the topoi “rhetorical resources.” The topics provide resources for creating 
enthymemes. In chapter two, Aristotle only introduces the two general categories of the 
topics: first, there are the “common topics” (κοινοὶ τόποι), which are general forms of 
argument that one might employ in any field of argument. The common topics offer 
different forms or patterns of reasoning that an enthymeme might follow and so they 
might also be called “formal topics.” Aristotle discusses these topics late in Book II, one 
example being the topic “from the more and the less.” This topic is a line of reasoning 
that if something applies to the greater case, it will certainly apply to the lesser. A 
rhetorical example of this topic is Martin Luther King Jr.’s claim: “If the inexpressible 
cruelties of slavery could not stop us, the opposition we now face will surely fail.”102 The 
other category of topics is the “particular topics” (ἴδια τόποι). These topics offer content 
or specific premises that one might employ in argument. Most of Book I consists of a 
survey of “particular topics,” such as in 1.9 where Aristotle surveys the topics of praise, 
considering the different ideas of what is noble and virtuous that one might draw on in 
praising someone. Similarly, in the first half of Book II, Aristotle surveys particular 
topics that might be employed in emotional appeals. In offering the building blocks for 
enthymemes, the particular topics can be thought of as ‘material topics.’103  
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Taking together what Aristotle says about endoxa, probabilistic premises, and 
topics for enthymemes, one can offer a more refined, albeit still flawed, definition of the 
enthymeme—it is a probabilistic syllogism drawn from common or reputable opinions. 
Along these lines, Bitzer (1959) offered a commonly accepted definition: “The 
enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and examples whose function is 
rhetorical persuasion. Its successful construction is accomplished through the joint efforts 
of speaker and audience, and this is its essential character” (p. 59). One problem with this 
definition is that it does not account for the common or formal topics (i.e. the 
argumentative forms that enthymemes might follow). In 2.23, Aristotle offers a survey of 
thirty common topics that one might employ in a speech, but it is striking that very few of 
these topics take the traditional form of a syllogism. The topic of “the more and the less” 
mentioned above, for instance, has an underlying logic to it, but it does not follow the 
standard syllogistic form. Similarly, the other common topics have an inferential basis, 
moving from generalities to particulars, but given the variety of their forms, one should 
not reduce the enthymeme to a formal, probabilistic syllogism. This is to say that the 
enthymeme might be a “syllogism of a sort” in that it features (probabilistic) deductive 
reasoning, but it is not necessarily confined to a subset of the formal category of 
syllogism. 
Another problem with viewing enthymemes simply as probabilistic syllogisms is 
that such a conclusion considers only what Aristotle says in a single chapter regarding the 
character of the enthymeme’s premises. The discussion in chapter two helps refine the 




enthymemes are solely part of the logos pistis. As Aristotle said in chapter one, it is 
necessary to see “what sort of things an enthymeme is concerned with and what 
differences it has from logical syllogisms.” However, by delaying the substantive 
discussion of the different topics used for enthymemes, Aristotle delays the discussion of 
the actual content of enthymemes. It is thus not clear that chapter two actually 
distinguishes enthymemes from logical syllogisms or whether it only further describes 
the similarity between the two. That is, Aristotle presents in chapter two the logical basis 
of enthymemes and he describes how even non-necessary premises can be understood in 
terms of syllogistic logic. It is possible, however, that enthymemes mean something more 
than syllogisms based on probabilistic logic. On this point, it is worth noting that in the 
Topics, Aristotle says that dialectic is also based on reputable opinions, and there he calls 
a syllogism concerning endoxa an “epicheireme” (“an attempt,” 162a16), so the question 
rises as to why in the Rhetoric Aristotle chooses a different word, enthymeme. To answer 
this, it is necessary to consider uses of the word that predate Aristotle. 
Etymologically, the word enthymeme is based on thumos, which was seen by the 
Greeks as the seat of the passions. Thumos can be translated as “heart,” so enthymeme 
literally means something like “in the heart,” and the verb form, ἐνθυμέομαι, means “to 
take to heart.”104 There is thus an affective element to the word, and to bring this out, one 
might translate enthymeme as an appeal to a passionate impulse. However, there is also a 
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cognitive sense to the word, as it does not refer to a blind impulse, but rather to 
something with an intentional direction. Accordingly, enthymeme might be thought of as 
“a passionate consideration.”105 Pre-Aristotelian, non-rhetorical use reflects the cognitive-
affective sense of the word. For example, in the Anabasis, Xenophon recounts his 
“considerations” (enthymemes) when he was offered command of the stranded Greek 
army. Xenophon first notes that he wished for the command because it would lead to 
honor for himself and benefit for the army, and he then says: “Now such considerations 
(ἐνθυμήματα) stirred him to desire […] but when, on the other hand, he considered 
(ἐνθυμοῖτο) that it was unclear to every human being how the future would turn out, he 
was at a loss.”106 Rhetoricians prior to and contemporary with Aristotle (such as 
Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Alcidamas) also refer to enthymemes, and they speak of them 
in more general terms than Aristotle, treating enthymemes either as something like 
“striking thoughts” that one might employ in argument or as the final capstone used to 
adorn or complete an extended argument.107 In all of these cases, enthymemes do not 
imply syllogisms, nor do they refer to strictly logical concepts. 
                                                 
105 See Miller and Bee’s (1972) etymological study of the enthymeme. 
106 Anabasis, 6.1.21. Burnyeat (1994) uses this example and he also refers to the term enthymeme 
being used similarly by Sophocles in Oedipus at Colonus (“The considerations you urge, old 
man, must move dread”; 292-3). 
107 On the pre-Aristotelian use of enthymeme in rhetoric, see Conley (1984), Burnyeat (1994), 




In light of this history and etymology, we can see that Aristotle’s major 
innovation regarding the enthymeme is the application of his understanding of logic and 
inference to the earlier, more affective understanding of enthymemes. I call this an 
innovation because in modifying the meaning of enthymeme, Aristotle offers a better, 
more complete account of how persuasion works. While Aristotle criticizes earlier 
rhetoricians for overemphasizing the emotional aspect of rhetoric, he does not completely 
dismiss the persuasive power of the emotions. Rather, he adds to this earlier view of 
persuasion, bringing out the underlying rationality of persuasive speech, showing how 
persuasion relies not only on the emotions but also on the basic human capacity to draw 
logical inferences. When Aristotle first calls the enthymeme “a syllogism of a sort” in 
chapter one (1355a8), he is introducing the idea that enthymemes have a deductive-
inferential character and he is suggesting that enthymemes work by spurring inferential 
thought. These inferences may be solely rational—i.e. relating only to the argument—but 
they might also spur an emotional response. This point on the emotions will be expanded 
on in the next chapter, but for the moment I will only note that in Book II, Aristotle 
discusses the different “premises” of the emotions, indicating how these premises might 
be used in enthymemes. For example, Aristotle explains that anger is usually based on 
some idea of an outrage, and he implies that a speaker can offer a “consideration” 
(enthymeme) that evokes anger by presenting indications or signs that something is 
outrageous. By adding his understanding of syllogistic thought to the earlier, affective 




how persuasion speaks to the whole soul, moving a person by speaking to thought and 
desire together.108 
With a few notable exceptions (such as Grimaldi, Arnhart, and Walker), most 
readings of the Rhetoric do not grant the broader, cognitive-affective notion of the 
enthymeme; instead, they confine enthymemes to the terms of formal logic. The 
syllogistic form is useful for understanding the implicit thought structure of an 
enthymeme, but in actual delivery, enthymemes rarely follow the strict formula of two 
premises and a conclusion. As mentioned, this can be seen in Aristotle’s discussion of the 
“common topics” as the different forms of argument one might employ in an enthymeme: 
very few of the common topics have a form that matches the formal syllogism (see 2.23). 
Similarly, in Book III, Aristotle warns against the use of “superficial” (ἐπιπόλαιος) 
enthymemes, which are overly spelled out syllogisms. As Aristotle puts it, enthymemes 
should “create quick learning in our minds,” but they should not be “altogether clear” lest 
they create “no need to ponder” (1410b21-28). Superficial enthymemes are tedious and 
they lose their power because they do not leave the inference to the audience.109 
                                                 
108 On suggestions that Aristotle transformed the notion of enthymeme, see the citations in the 
previous note, especially Walker (1994), p. 54, as well as Grimaldi (1972) pp. 1-18, 68-82.  
109 I should note in this context that there is one passage in Book III that seems to explicitly rule 
out my claim that enthymemes can have a broader, cognitive-affective character (see Wisse, 
1989, p.24-25). In 3.17, Aristotle warns not to use enthymemes to arouse passions: “for it will 
either drive out the passion or it will be spoken in vain” (1418a12-14). The broader context of the 
passage, however, reveals that Aristotle is warning against superficial, overly spelled out 
enthymemes. For example, he immediately goes on to say that “maxims” (γνώμη) can be used 




In limiting Aristotle’s notion of the enthymeme to the terms of the logical 
syllogism, conventional readings reduce the enthymeme to the superficial enthymeme. 
Other than the historical misinterpretation of enthymemes as strictly logical 
argumentation, a reason for the resistance to the claim that enthymemes can embody 
logos, pathos, and ethos is simply that it is a difficult notion to understand—how can 
emotional and character appeals contain inferential reasoning? This is difficult to answer 
as Aristotle does not provide many examples of enthymemes in speech.110 I will soon 
return to consider Aristotle’s discussion of enthymemes more fully, but in order to 
convey the broader meaning of the term, I will first explain how enthymemes can be seen 
at work in actual speeches. Given the number of technical terms that have been 
introduced—endoxa, pisteis, topoi, and enthymemes—some applied examples are in 
order. 
IV. Examples of Enthymemes in Speech 
Rhetoric relies on endoxa, the respected opinions that provide the premises for 
rhetorical appeals. In America, the most honored endoxa are the “self-evident truths” put 
forward in the Declaration of Independence: all men are created equal, they are endowed 
                                                 
“maxims are more or less the conclusions of enthymemes or the premises with the syllogistic 
form removed” (1394a25-28). For more on these passages, see Arhart (1981), pp. 180-181. 
110 For that matter, many interpreters of the Rhetoric also avoid offering specific examples of 
enthymemes. Grimaldi (1972, 1980) and Arnhart (1981), for instance, offer cogent textual 
analyses of the Rhetoric in order to demonstrate that Aristotle thinks that enthymemes can include 
emotional and character appeals, but these scholars rarely if ever offer examples of enthymemes 




with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and governments are 
instituted to protect these rights. Many of the most influential speeches in American 
history are based on appeals to these foundational beliefs, the most famous such speech 
being Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. Much of the rhetorical power of the Gettysburg 
Address comes from its rhythm and simple style. More substantively, what makes the 
speech so impressive is Lincoln’s ability to focus the audience on a particular aspect of 
the Declaration, namely, the “proposition that all men are created equal.” Lincoln 
appeals to this proposition not only to elevate the sacrifice of the fallen soldiers at 
Gettysburg, but he broadens the scope of the civil war itself, presenting it not as a mere 
“war between the states,” but a struggle to defend the fundamental idea of the American 
Founding. Even more broadly, in focusing on equality as the central proposition, Lincoln 
offers a purified vision to correct the flaws of the historical founding. I will return to this 
reinterpretative aspect of the Gettysburg Address in the concluding chapter when I 
discuss how rhetoric can be used to refine common opinion. For the moment, however, I 
only mean to draw on a well-known speech to help demonstrate how less well-known 
rhetorical concepts function in effective speech.111  
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is a very short speech, evoking many thoughts and 
emotions with very few words. For this reason, it is an excellent example of how 
enthymemes can embody several forms of appeal at once. As a funeral speech, it is meant 
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to honor the dead. However, Lincoln also uses the occasion to rally the nation, 
recommitting the people to the cause of the war. Lincoln accomplishes the broader task 
by linking it with the immediate task: to honor the dead, we as a nation must carry on 
their unfinished work. This argument is the basis of the stirring conclusion: 
It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work 
which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather 
for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that 
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for 
which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly 
resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under 
God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the 
people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth. 
If one were to look only at what is explicitly said, one might reduce the speech to 
two quasi-syllogistic arguments: ‘We are here to dedicate this battlefield, but those who 
fought here already did so, so we cannot,’ and ‘the task of the living is to carry out the 
unfinished work of the dead, and their work was to ensure that this nation will not 
perish.’ These statements lead to the implicit conclusion: ‘as the living, we must ensure 
this nation will not perish.’ Moving past this basic structure, Aristotle’s discussion of 
particular topics (topoi) and the implicit premises of enthymemes helps identify the more 




As a funeral speech, the Address employs “topics of praise” (1.9), meaning that it 
draws on common views of what is praiseworthy: specifically, the nobility and virtue of 
the fallen. Among the topics Aristotle considers, he mentions that one might praise the 
dead for their sacrifice for their country and for “things that are good simply” (1367b36-
a3). These topics are endoxa in that everyone believes that such actions are praiseworthy, 
so one need not state the general premise (‘sacrifice is noble and praiseworthy’). Rather, 
it is enough to speak of the particular instances, as Lincoln does: these men “gave their 
lives that that nation might live.” Aristotle also advises that to emphasize the virtue of 
those praised, a speaker should stress that their actions were freely chosen (1367b22-26). 
Lincoln does so, highlighting the heroism of the soldiers who “gave the last full measure 
of devotion” to the nation. Furthermore, Lincoln speaks not only of sacrifice for country; 
he heightens the honor by connecting the sacrifice to what Aristotle calls “things that are 
good simply.” Lincoln does this by appealing to fundamental American beliefs about 
natural rights and just government. Indeed, Lincoln frames the whole Address with 
appeals to these beliefs: he opens by reminding the audience that the nation was 
“conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are equal,” he 
describes the Civil War in terms of a struggle to decide whether “that nation, or any 
nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure,” and he closes by describing the 
work of the fallen and the living as fighting to ensure that “government of the people, by 
the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.” 
Much of the funeral speech thus consists of a logos of praise, but at the same time, 




and gratitude for the dead. In Aristotle’s topics on friendship (i.e. arguments used to 
evoke feelings of friendship [2.4]), he explains that people feel attachment with “those to 
whom the same things are good” (1381a8) and love for “those who have given [us] great 
benefit” (1381a11-12). Similarly, in the topics on gratitude (2.7), Aristotle echoes this 
latter point, highlighting “service done for someone in need with nothing in return” 
(1385a17-19). Again, these arguments rely on endoxa, common opinions on what 
constitutes friendship and gratitude; they are generally understood and need not be 
explicitly mentioned. As will be discussed in the next chapter, emotional appeals work by 
appealing to the thoughts or premises associated with particular emotions. In the 
Gettysburg Address, Lincoln encourages the audience to mourn their fellow citizens, 
reminding them of shared commitments, and, by mentioning the life of the Nation that 
the dead fought to preserve for the living, he evokes feelings of love and gratitude. 
Lincoln uses these emotional appeals to encourage the audience to be committed to the 
noble cause of the war. 
One could describe Lincoln’s speech in terms of separate appeals of logos 
(describing praiseworthy actions) and pathos (evoking love and gratitude), but it is 
important to note that these appeals are carried out at the same time, and more than that: 
they are woven together in such a way that they are inseparable. That is, the appeals have 
the same enthymemic structure, appealing to the same premises (of sacrifice and what is 
good) and pointing to the same signs (the particular actions) for both praise and pathos. 
The funeral speech thus has as its core a combined logos/pathos enthymeme. Lincoln 




the living to continue the work of the fallen and to ensure that they “have not died in 
vain.” 
Another famous American ‘speech’ appealing to the foundational beliefs of the 
Declaration of Independence is Martin Luther King Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” 
(1963). This is a letter rather than a spoken speech, but it is important to note that rhetoric 
is not limited to oral speech. As Aristotle discusses in 3.12, oral speech allows for more 
influence by means of stylistic delivery and performance, but written speech allows for 
greater precision in argument. The “Letter from Birmingham Jail” is a helpful example 
for present purposes because King generally uses conventional enthymemes that consist 
separately of logos, ethos, or pathos appeals, but the letter also culminates in an 
enthymeme that combines all three forms of appeal.  
The immediate context of the letter is that it is a response to statement made by 
several Alabama clergymen condemning King’s protest methods: in their “Call to Unity,” 
the clergymen granted that segregation constituted social injustice but argued that change 
should be pursued through courts rather than civil protests. While King’s letter is 
ostensibly addressed to these clergymen, it was written (and subsequently published) for 
a national audience. In particular, King sought to evoke sympathy and support from 
Northern whites for the civil rights movement. The letter itself can be classified as a 
defense speech, meaning that King is attempting to defend his actions and those of his 
fellow protestors. As Aristotle explains in the chapters on defense speech (1.10-14), these 




those held by everyone or the majority, the term more generally applies to any opinions 
that are held in esteem. King frequently draws on the reputable opinions of the wise, 
citing different philosophers and theologians to support his argument. Appealing to the 
views of Augustine and Aquinas, King says that “one has a moral responsibility to 
disobey unjust laws” (¶12). While this Christian argument goes substantively beyond 
Aristotle’s particular topics on just laws (1.13), King employs a classical form of 
rhetorical syllogism in his argument: one should not obey unjust laws; discriminatory 
laws are unjust; therefore they should not be obeyed. One is thus led to conclude that the 
disobedience is defensible because it is not unjust.  
Along with this logos argument, King also employs character appeals (ethos) in 
the form of reasoning, “just as X, so too Y.” This argument form is an example of what 
Aristotle calls the common topic “from analogy” (see 1397b23-29).  To establish his 
decent character, King likens his actions to those of Paul and Socrates: 
Just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of 
Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman world, so am I 
compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own town. (¶3)  
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so 
that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to 
the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must 




society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and 
racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. (¶9) 
These enthymemes of logos and ethos are effective for establishing King’s 
general defense, but the most powerful enthymeme comes at the end of the speech: it is 
an enthymeme that embodies rational, character, and emotional appeal all at once. In his 
discussion of the emotions, Aristotle describes sympathy as the feeling of pain at the 
undeserved suffering of others, and he adds that this suffering is something “that a person 
might expect himself or one of his own to suffer” (1385b15). This is to say that, at some 
level, one must identify with the sufferers to feel sympathy with them. This identification 
is particularly important for King’s purpose of garnering Northern support: he must make 
the struggle against Southern segregation relatable to Northern whites. To achieve this 
end, King appeals to the foundational American beliefs of the Declaration of 
Independence. After claiming that “One day the South will recognize its real heroes” and 
describing the suffering of the protestors—facing “jeering and hostiles mobs,” “agonizing 
loneliness,” they are “oppressed, battered”—King concludes: 
One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of God 
sat down at lunch counters, they were in reality standing up for what is 
best in the American dream and for the most sacred values in our Judeo-
Christian heritage, thereby bringing our nation back to those great wells of 




formulation of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. 
(¶36) 
In casting the protest movement as a struggle to protect fundamental American 
beliefs, King is providing the means for linking the Civil Rights protestors with American 
ideals and American heroes, thereby allowing for broader sympathy.112 At the same time, 
King also speaks to the justness of the movement and to the heroic character of its 
members (including himself). Part of what makes this final argument so powerful is that 
it brings all forms of appeal (logos, ethos, pathos) together in a single enthymeme. 
Furthermore, the argument leaves several premises unstated, allowing the reader to fill in 
what is implicit. Through this participation, the audience is more apt to think and feel 
along with King, and so they are more likely to be persuaded of his argument. Earlier in 
the argument, King used conventional enthymemes, spelling out the premises and 
conclusions in a logical, easy to follow form. By contrast, in the final argument, one has 
to complete the implicit thought structure. To understand the persuasive power of the 
argument, one could map out the argument syllogistically: the implied major premise 
comes from the common opinion that those who stand up for American beliefs and values 
                                                 
112 In his famous “I Have a Dream” speech (1963), King also casts the Civil Rights movement in 
light of the Declaration of Independence, using an extended metaphor to describe the Declaration 
as a “promissory note.” King echoes earlier Civil Rights leaders in appealing to the ideals of the 
American founding. Probably the most thorough and powerful example of a civil rights speech 
appealing to founding ideals is Frederick Douglass’s “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July” 
(1852), in which Douglass shames Americans for failing to understand and live by the principles 




are heroes; the minor premise is that the protestors are standing up for those beliefs and 
values; and so the conclusion is that the protestors are heroes. One could similarly map 
out how the syllogistic character of the pathos appeal leading to sympathy (“I feel 
sympathy for those like me who suffer undeservedly…”) and how the ethos appeal leads 
to trust and respect (“I trust those who are virtuous…”). It is unnecessary to do so in 
writing, however, and, as Aristotle notes, it is often better not to spell everything out in 
one’s enthymemes, but rather to rely on what is implicit to allow for the audience to 
come to an understanding on their own (1410b23).113  
These examples should suffice to clarify the meaning of Aristotle’s rhetorical 
concepts and how they apply to actual speeches. In particular, the examples demonstrate 
what enthymemes are, how they can embody and unite multiple forms of rhetorical 
appeal, and how they help explain the persuasive power of speech. In the next chapter I 
will turn to focus on this last issue of the persuasive power of speech. First, however, I 
will complete the overview of the Rhetoric, explaining the structure of the work. 
V. The Structure of the Rhetoric 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric consists of three books. As discussed, the first two chapters of 
Book I offer a dual introduction to the whole work. Chapter three introduces three 
general categories of rhetorical speech: deliberative (to exhort or dissuade), judicial (to 
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attack or defend), and ceremonial (epideictic: to praise or blame) rhetoric. The rest of 
Book I is an elaboration of these three categories, explaining the general end towards 
which a speaker appeals in each case (the advantageous, the just, and the noble), and the 
opinions commonly held regarding these three ends. In surveying these common 
opinions, Aristotle is offering the materials for constructing arguments on these subjects, 
and so the rest of Book I consists of a survey of “particular topics” relevant to rational 
argument (the logos pistis). In the first part of Book II, Aristotle explores the other two 
artful pisteis (emotional and character appeal), discussing first the emotions (2.2-11) and 
then different character types (2.12-17). As with Book I, these chapters offer the 
materials (opinions, premises, topics) for understanding emotional and character appeals. 
In the latter part of Book II (2.18-2.26), Aristotle discusses enthymemes more generally, 
focusing on “common topics” (forms of argument) as well as identifying false 
enthymemes. Finally, in Book III Aristotle focuses on how speech is delivered, first 
considering wording (λέξις, 3.1-12) and then arrangement (τάξις, 3.13-19). 
When one sees the full nature of the enthymeme—namely, that enthymemes can 
also include emotional and character appeals—a clear structure emerges wherein the 
Rhetoric consists of an exploration of the enthymeme and its role in persuasion: Aristotle 
first explores the materials (particular topics) that can be used for enthymemes of logos 




(common topics) of the enthymeme more generally (2.18-2.26).114 Aristotle even 
suggests such a structure in several key transitional passages throughout the work—
though again, biographical scholars dismiss these passages as editorial additions meant to 
give the semblance of a structure.115 The biographical reading is based on the narrow 
view of the enthymeme as a solely logical argument. However, when the full character of 
the enthymeme is appreciated, the coherent structure of the work can identified, which in 
turn undermines the biographical reading’s view of the Rhetoric.  
Finally, if one accepts the statements made in transitional stages, Book III also 
has a clear place in the work. At the end of Book II, Aristotle says that Books I and II 
address the “thought” (διάνοια) of rhetoric, and it seems that he has in mind the 
underlying thought structure of persuasion, which I have argued should be understood in 
terms of the enthymeme. Book III is more practical, looking more specifically at how the 
“thought” of rhetoric is expressed and delivered. This is a natural expansion on the earlier 
                                                 
114 For more on the enthymeme as the basis of the Rhetoric’s structure, see Grimaldi (1972) pp. 
28-52, and Arnhart (1982), pp. 51-53. 
115 For example, Aristotle at several points offers brief reviews, saying that he has described the 
topics from which one can derive premises or opinions for creating enthymemes for deliberative, 
judicial, or ceremonial speeches, and he then says he will do the same for emotional and character 
appeal (1377b18, 1378a27, 1391b25). Similarly, in a review in 2.22, Aristotle says that he has 
described the topics or “elements of enthymemes” on which one can draw for making speeches 
(1396b20-21), and he also says that he has “taken up in the same way” the topics concerning the 
passions and character types (1396b28-31). Rejections of these passages can be found in Kennedy 




discussion, and it further adds to the understanding of how rhetoric and persuasion work. 
One can thus see a coherent structure for the whole of the Rhetoric.   
 
With this overview of the Rhetoric and its concepts in mind, let me return to the 
issues with which I opened this chapter. I noted at the beginning that rhetoric is often 
understood in a pejorative sense. Rhetoric is seen as dishonest and manipulative, and it is 
often asked why speakers resort to rhetoric rather than plainly stating the truth of a 
matter. While Aristotle criticizes previous rhetoricians for putting too much emphasis on 
emotional appeals and stylistic arrangement, he nevertheless defends rhetoric as a 
necessary art. The reason for this defense is that rational demonstration by itself is not 
sufficient to persuade audiences. Throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle explores how 
persuasion works, and at the foundation of this study is the idea of the enthymeme as a 
cognitive-affective rhetorical device that brings about persuasion by speaking to the 
whole soul rather than merely a logical “part” of the soul. The enthymeme is thus the 
central concept of the Rhetoric and the whole work is structured as an exploration of 
enthymemic persuasion.  
Having considered the structure of the work and the concepts Aristotle uses to 
explain rhetoric, particularly the enthymeme as the thought structure underlying 
rhetorical appeals, I am now in a better position to offer a second, more focused study of 
the Rhetoric. Specifically, I can turn now to discuss the psychology of persuasion and its 




CHAPTER 3: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 
In the previous two chapters I offered overviews of the major ideas and concepts 
in Aristotle’s study of psychology and rhetoric. Having discussed psychology and 
rhetoric separately, I will turn now to combine these subjects in order to address the 
psychology of persuasion. The key question for understanding the psychology of 
persuasion is: Why is rhetoric persuasive? How is it that people are persuaded through 
rhetorical speech? Recall that Aristotle’s major criticism of earlier rhetoricians is that 
they focused solely on the non-rational aspects of rhetoric, such as the manipulation of 
passions. This criticism is not simply an ethical one: while Aristotle begins the Rhetoric 
with a very high-minded critique, he soon grants the necessity of non-rational appeals. 
Rather, the larger problem is that previous rhetoricians overlooked the rational core of 
rhetoric, and in doing so, they failed to understand persuasion. As Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
demonstrates, a proper understanding of persuasion requires an appreciation of the 
underlying rationality of rhetoric—which means that understanding Aristotle’s teaching 
on the psychology of persuasion will in turn provide a more complete view of human 
rationality.  
In what follows, I offer an interpretation that focuses on the psychology of the 
Rhetoric. I begin by considering Aristotle’s account of the rational means of persuasion 
(logos) in Book I of the Rhetoric. It is here that we can see most clearly the rational core 
of persuasion, gaining a better understanding of how enthymemes work and how they 
ultimately appeal to implicit notions of the good. In section two, I turn to the other means 




central question in this second section concerns how rational speech can influence the 
seemingly irrational. Answering this question requires understanding how the emotions 
are not simply irrational; rather, they have a rational basis and an enthymemic character 
that can be appealed to by speech. Finally, in the third section I address rhetorical 
arrangement and delivery as explored in Book III. A major task for understanding 
rhetoric is seeing how an orator can encourage the audience to focus on one end over 
other alternatives. By drawing on the psychology of action, I identify an important 
analogy between Aristotle’s analysis of akrasia (loss of self-control) and his account of 
style. This is not to say that rhetoric overwhelms the mind, but just as Aristotle’s analysis 
of akrasia highlights how some ends become more vivid in a person’s mind, so too does 
his account of style show how some ends are made more active or present in the minds of 
the audience. To sum up: whereas the previous chapter was an overview of the technical 
concepts in the Rhetoric, what follows here is a psychological analysis of logos (Book I), 
pathos (Book II), and style (Book III).  
I.  Rational Appeal and Hierarchical Conceptions of the Good 
Returning, then, to the governing question of this chapter: Why is rhetoric 
persuasive? Many critical or subversive views of rhetoric focus on emotional 
manipulation and stylistic trickery. While these rhetorical devices are not irrelevant, they 
hardly account for the entirety of persuasion, as they ignore the rational propositions that 
are meant to sway an audience. Book I of the Rhetoric focuses on these latter types of 




Aristotle offers the reader an opportunity to understand the underlying rationality of 
rhetoric. When one subsequently turns to the other means of persuasion, one can identify 
the rational content of emotional appeals and stylistic delivery, thereby allowing one to 
appreciate better the rationality of rhetoric as a whole.  
Book I is thus concerned with the structure of rational rhetorical arguments. That 
said, it is a very difficult book to understand. Though there is a clear overarching 
structure, it is easy to lose sight of this order because each of these chapters also contains 
long, and sometimes tedious, listings of particular opinions. To see what Aristotle is 
doing in Book I, it is critical to understand the motives governing the different levels of 
his presentation. On the one hand, the general structure of the chapters is quite clear: after 
an initial introduction to rhetoric (1.1-2), Aristotle in 1.3 describes the three forms or 
occasions for rhetoric, and in the subsequent chapters he examines these individual 
forms: deliberative rhetoric (for advice or dissuasion, 1.4-1.8), ceremonial rhetoric (for 
praise or blame, 1.9), and judicial rhetoric (for prosecution or defense, 1.10-15). The 
internal structure of these three sections is also fairly clear as they follow a similar 
format: first, Aristotle discusses the overall end that is appealed to in the particular form 
of rhetoric (the advantageous, the noble/beautiful, and the just, respectively) and then he 
considers a wide array of opinions as to what constitutes these ends.116  
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When one shifts from this broad structural perspective, however, and focuses 
instead on the particular chapters, the multitude of specific opinions discussed in the 
course of Book I can be overwhelming. For example, in 1.7—which Kennedy (2007) 
introduces as “one of the most tortuous” chapters in the book (p. 65)—Aristotle offers a 
detailed account of the “greater good,” presenting fifty-five different ways in which 
something might be considered better than something else. The long series of lists makes 
it easy to lose sight of Aristotle’s overarching purpose, but it is important to keep in mind 
how these lists also contribute to the overall end of Book I. As other interpreters have 
noted, the long lists survey the opinions most relevant to political rhetoric. Sachs (2009) 
describes the purpose of Book I well in his introduction:  
Aristotle generalizes his discussion to take in all the occasions that call for 
rhetoric, and begins by exploring the opinions that form the basis of civic 
life. Book I of the Rhetoric is a survey of our shared perceptions of the 
advantageous, the just, and the beautiful, the goals for the sake of which 
we live in communities. (pp. 19-20)  
The key for appreciating the broad survey of opinions in Book I, then, is understanding 
that the survey offers insight into what different people may think about general political 
matters. These common opinions therefore cover the assumptions or premises that can be 
appealed to in rhetorical arguments. 
The fact that the opinions covered in Book I are common opinions (endoxa), must 




Aristotle’s other works. These conflicts might present another interpretive challenge, but 
upon consideration, since endoxa are the opinions respected by general audiences, it 
should not be surprising that there are conflicts and contradictions within these opinions. 
In works like the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, Aristotle proceeds more 
dialectically, taking up and refining common views. In the Ethics, for example, he 
considers several definitions of happiness before correcting them to find a better 
definition (NE 1095b14-19, 1098a16-20, 1178a2-9). But in the Rhetoric, Aristotle warns 
in advance that he is not working through the particular opinions “with precision” or 
seeking “to define things in accordance with the truth” (1359b2-5); rather, he is 
attempting to survey the range of opinions that audiences tend to hold.117 Regarding 
happiness, for example, he simply lists four different definitions of happiness (virtuous 
activity, self-sufficiency, pleasure, and wealth) because these definitions encompass a 
wide variety of views on happiness (1360b14-18).118 Depending on his particular 
audience, an orator must be able to appeal to different ends, and the broad survey of 
                                                 
117 This is not to say that the dialectical effort in the Ethics or Politics leads to ultimate truths or 
certainty. Near the start of the Ethics, for example, Aristotle warns that human affairs are not 
open to the precision of mathematics (1094b19-27). Nevertheless, Aristotle is more critical of 
common opinions in these other works and he refines the opinions to a greater degree of precision 
than he does in the Rhetoric. On the contrast between the precision of the Rhetoric and the Ethics, 
see Sachs’s (2009) helpful introduction to the Rhetoric (p.19). 
118 Commentators such as Cope (1867) and McAdon (2006) point to this unrefined list of 
opinions regarding happiness as a sign that the Rhetoric is either an earlier work than the Ethics 
or that the two works were at least partially written by different authors. This claim ignores the 
different purposes of the texts, as Aristotle explains in each, and it further ignores that one of the 
opinions listed regarding happiness (virtuous activity) generally corresponds with the definition 
Aristotle reaches in the Ethics (“an activity of the soul … in accordance with the best and most 




opinions in Book I of the Rhetoric offers the resources for constructing or understanding 
different rhetorical arguments. 
While Aristotle does not offer in the Rhetoric a critical review of common 
opinions, this is not to say that the opinions are presented haphazardly. Rather, the 
chapters have a very clear manner of presentation whereby Aristotle points to the logical 
relationship between different opinions. Indeed, Aristotle often uses deductive language 
in his presentation, first positing a general category by saying, “Let X be …”, and then 
deriving more particular concepts from this definition, saying, “If X is this, then it is 
necessary that these points follow…”. Aristotle’s survey of opinions concerning 
happiness in 1.5 is illustrative of this general approach. After introducing “the 
advantageous” as the end appealed to in deliberative rhetoric, he identifies the happiness 
of the citizens as the common goal of different deliberative appeals. Having established 
the broadest end, Aristotle goes on to consider opinions about happiness in a syllogistic 
manner, first defining happiness in four ways (“Let happiness be…”), then deriving 
different constituent parts of happiness (“If happiness is this, it is necessary that the parts 
be this…”), and finally examining the constitutive elements of each of these parts (“Let 
us now in a similar way grasp what each of these is…”). The other chapters follow a 
similar format, with Aristotle first offering a general definition of the subject (such as the 
good in 1.6, the noble in 1.9) and then cataloguing a wide range of opinions related to the 




Though it can make for somewhat tedious reading, there is a reason behind 
Aristotle’s procedure. By organizing the chapters in this deductive manner, Aristotle 
highlights the implicit logic underlying common opinions, showing how, in case after 
case, particular opinions rely upon more general concepts. As Arnhart (1981) notes in his 
commentary:  
This is not to say that men are generally aware of the logical character of 
their common opinions as presented here in the Rhetoric. But one might 
say that common opinions possess an implicit logic that becomes evident 
only when Aristotle presents them in a refined and orderly manner. (p.65) 
This implicit logic is what serves as the basis for rhetorical or enthymemic reasoning. 
Rhetorical appeals rarely spell out all of the premises of an argument. Instead, they rely 
on what is generally understood or what is implicitly assumed by the audience. The key 
for understanding a persuasive appeal is grasping this full logic—meaning the explicit 
and implicit premises of an argument, as well as the ultimate end or most general 
assumption of a proposition. While one need not explicitly appeal to these other ends, it 
is necessary to understand the implicit assumptions regarding them if one is to understand 
the full persuasive force of an appeal. Aristotle draws out this point through his extensive 
and systematic survey of common opinions. 
Sachs’s and Arnhart’s comments regarding the scope and logical character of the 
surveyed opinions are invaluable aids for understanding the purpose of Book I of the 




character of this presentation. Indeed, to the extent that any part of the Rhetoric is 
appreciated as relevant to psychology, readers focus on Book II and its analysis of the 
passions. To understand and appreciate the psychology at work in Book I, however, it is 
necessary to recall that Aristotle identifies the ultimate end of choice as an idea of the 
good, a claim that he reiterates at several points in the Rhetoric.119 It is true that Book I 
presents a broad survey of opinions on the advantageous, noble, and just, and that it 
further identifies the logical structure of beliefs within these opinions—but to go one step 
further, it is necessary to see that Aristotle also draws out how all of these particular 
opinions relate back to ever broader opinions regarding what is good.  
It is this connection to a view of the good that provides the persuasive force of 
rational appeals. That is, rational appeals ultimately have recourse to some broader 
conception of what is good. Echoing Arnhart’s comment on the implicit logic of common 
opinions, this is not to say that people explicitly think of their actions in abstract terms of 
“the good.” Choices are made for the sake of immediate ends; these immediate ends, 
however, point back to broader or higher ends, and ultimately back to a more 
fundamental belief or set of beliefs regarding what is good. Recall that in the psychology 
of choice, Aristotle uses the practical syllogism to describe the thought structure of 
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which is chosen for its own sake, that for the sake of which we choose something else, and that 
for which all things possessing perception or intelligence aim” (1362a21-24); “Since the good 
was what all aim towards…” (1365a1); “no one wishes for something except when he believes it 




actions, drawing out the connection of immediate ends to an ultimate goal. The concept 
of the enthymeme (or rhetorical syllogism) has a similar role in describing the implicit 
thought structure of a rhetorical appeal. Specifically, the enthymeme presents a quasi-
logical argument appealing to premises that ultimately lead back to some notion of what 
is good. 
The Rhetoric thus shares an important connection with Aristotle’s works that 
examine human psychology. What distinguishes the Rhetoric from these other works is 
that the Rhetoric offers an extended presentation of the logic underlying common 
opinions, thereby demonstrating how even the most prosaic practical opinions ultimately 
draw upon an idea of the good. This can be seen most clearly in Aristotle’s discussion of 
deliberative rhetoric. By contrast, the discussions of ceremonial and judicial rhetoric 
highlight some of the deepest conflicts that often exist in people’s implicit assumptions 
about the good. I will now take each of these up—the hierarchical conception of the good 
that underlies deliberative rhetoric, and the more deeply conflictual picture of the good 
that typically informs ceremonial and judicial rhetoric—before turning to consider the 
psychology at work in Books II and III of the Rhetoric. 
i. Appealing to a Hierarchy of Goods 
Of the three forms of rational persuasion, deliberative rhetoric most clearly 
involves an appeal to a higher or more general good. The explicit “end” (1358b22) or 
“target” (1362a18) of deliberative rhetoric is “the advantageous,” which Aristotle 




higher goods that are chosen for their own sake. Aristotle does not immediately discuss 
the intrinsic goods, but their role becomes clear in subsequent chapters. In 1.4, he focuses 
on the most practical concerns for deliberative rhetoric—namely the general subjects of 
political deliberation (finance, war and peace, defense, trade, and legislation) as well as 
what one specifically needs to know when speaking about these subjects. For example, if 
one is to advise the city on finances, one should first know about the city’s sources of 
income and expenses. However, these subjects of deliberation are not the ultimate ends to 
which one appeals. Regarding financial matters, for instance, one does not argue that 
finance should be pursued for its own sake. Rather, there is an underlying assumption that 
finance is beneficial for the sake of other ends. Aristotle suggests the necessity of 
considering these other ends at the conclusion of 1.4, saying, “Let us speak in turn about 
the things on the basis of which one ought to give exhortations or warnings concerning 
these and other things” (1360b1-3, emphasis added). 
The general end to which Aristotle turns in 1.5 is happiness, “the target of nearly 
everyone in private and everyone in common” (1360b4-5).120 In 1.6, he also describes 
happiness as the foremost human good, saying that “happiness … is chosen for its own 
sake, it is self-sufficient, and we choose the other things for the sake of it” (1362b10-12). 
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As mentioned above, Aristotle offers several definitions to capture different views of 
happiness:  
Let happiness be good activity (εὐπραξία) combined with virtue; or self-
sufficient living; or pleasant life along with safety; or an abundance of 
possessions and bodies121 along with the ability to guard and use these; for 
everyone pretty much agrees that happiness is one or more of these things. 
(1360b14-18)  
Aristotle thus presents a range of views on happiness, but, put generally, the idea of 
happiness is a notion of what is most worth acting for or what makes life most complete. 
This notion serves as the ultimate end or highest good that is appealed to by deliberative 
rhetoric. As Aristotle puts it, “all exhortations and warnings are concerned with this 
[happiness] and with the things that contribute to and oppose it” (1360b9-11). The 
challenge for understanding deliberative rhetoric, then, is seeing how particular appeals 
aim at a notion of happiness.  
Generally, a rhetorical appeal to happiness will not be explicit or readily apparent. 
A financial debate, for example, will probably consist only of competing propositions 
concerning the best means of increasing revenue. Such a means might be increasing 
taxes, reducing expenditures, or taking loans. There is plenty of room to debate which of 
                                                 




these different means will be most effective, but there will be no need to discuss higher 
concerns—at least, that is, as long as the audience already accepts that the financial issue 
is the end requiring action. In most cases, however, there will be different groups in the 
audience with different opinions as to which end should be pursued. To persuade these 
other groups, it is necessary to consider their implicit beliefs, ascending within these to 
reach a common ground, appealing to a broader end that is held by the various parties. 
For instance, there might be a clash about whether to focus on finance or defense 
measures. In this case, one would have to persuade one of the groups in light of a broader 
end. If those focusing on the financial end have a materialistic conception of happiness 
(“an abundance of possessions”), one would have to advocate for defense in light of 
material ends: “we must be able to guard and protect our possessions if we are to enjoy 
them.” Alternatively, if those focusing on defense have a more moral conception of 
happiness (“good activity combined with virtue”), one would need to appeal to their 
sense of responsibility: “if we are to carry out our duty of protecting our community, our 
family, our friends, we must have the financial resources to do so.” If a common ground 
is reached, there will still be room for debating the best means (e.g., how to best protect 
the community: finance or defense?), but the important point is that the debate would 
now be under the explicit purview of higher ends that would otherwise have been left 
implicit. 
For appeals to higher ends to be effective, they must actually reflect the 
audience’s broader concerns. Aristotle’s survey of opinions about happiness and other 




opinions is only general, of course, and a rhetorician needs to know the specific habits 
and traditions of his audience to understand what they value and respect. In particular, 
Aristotle emphasizes in 1.8 that one must account for the audience’s political regime and 
understand how it influences their opinions. For example, he notes that the end of 
oligarchies is wealth, and so, when addressing an oligarchic council, one would 
emphasize ends related to securing wealth; similarly, in addressing a democratic 
assembly, one would emphasize ends related to protecting liberty (see 1366a2-16). In the 
Rhetoric, however, Aristotle only describes this regime influence in the most general 
terms, directing the reader instead to the Politics for a more precise account (1366a21). 
This serves as a reminder that, for all practical purposes, rhetoric as a mere technical skill 
is limited: along with knowledge of persuasive speech, one also requires substantive 
knowledge about the particular audience and the subject of deliberation if one wishes to 
create persuasive speech.122  
A formal understanding of rhetoric is sufficient, however, for understanding the 
structure of persuasive appeals and for identifying the rationality of rhetoric. Regarding 
the enthymemic form of rational persuasion, the explicit appeal focuses only on an 
                                                 
122 On the formal limits of rhetoric, see 1358a21-26. After distinguishing common topics 
(applicable to all areas of discourse) and specific topics (applicable only to a particular subject), 
Aristotle warns: “The former [the common topics] will not make one knowledgeable about any 
class of things, for these topics are not concerned with any underlying subject. But regarding the 
latter [the particular topics], the better one is at selecting premises, [the more] he will be creating, 
without noticing it, a knowledge different than rhetoric and dialectic. For if he happens upon first 
principles (ἀρχαῖς), his knowledge will no longer be of dialectic or rhetoric; rather, it will be 




immediate end (though one might need to appeal explicitly to a broader end in cases of 
dispute)—but the power of the appeal ultimately relies on the audience’s implicit 
assumptions as to what is good and what leads to happiness. An appeal to security, for 
example, should be understood in terms of the full hierarchy of goods of which security is 
a part. Following this example, one could draw out the relationship of these ends, from 
most general to most particular:  
Happiness as virtuous activity: Protecting the community: Security: 
Financial wherewithal: Increased revenue: Raised taxes 
While these ends are not related to each other in a strictly logical sense, there is 
nevertheless a loose, deductive-inferential relationship in the sense that one can appeal to 
one end as a means to a higher end. An enthymeme reflects this chain of different ends, 
appealing to the implicit ends that motivate action. 
One can thus conceptualize the hierarchical order of different ends, but it must be 
granted that such a hierarchy is a simplification and abstraction in the sense that the 
audience will not have such a single-minded view or such a clear ordering of their 
opinions. There will be a multitude of potential ends at different levels of generality, and 
the audience will also have complex notions of happiness that may include many 
particular goods. At times these ends will be consistent and complement each other, 
contributing to an overall sense of what is good, but there will also be occasions where 
there are disparate or conflicting ends reflecting the audience’s conflicting opinions and 




these ends present a problem, but also an opportunity. That is, whereas dialectic requires 
agreement and the resolution of contradictions, rhetoric can allow contradictions to 
remain in place, appealing to certain ends over others. That said, before addressing how a 
rhetorician can encourage the audience to focus on particular ends, it is important to 
consider first the conflict that can exist in views of the good. For this, it is helpful to turn 
to the discussion of ceremonial and judicial rhetoric. Because these forms of rhetoric 
appeal to ends other than “the advantageous,” they highlight the potential for the broadest 
and most intransigent conflicts between ends.  
ii. Appealing to Conflicting Goods 
Because the end of deliberative rhetoric is “the advantageous” (namely, that 
which is good because it leads to another good), it is fairly clear that it is necessary to 
look for a higher or more general good beyond the immediate appeal. By contrast, 
ceremonial and judicial rhetoric appeal to “the noble” and “the just,” respectively, and 
there does not seem to be any appeal to a higher good because these ends are treated as 
intrinsic goods, those that are good in themselves. To understand the potential conflict 
between these different ends, it is necessary to look more closely at the ends themselves 
and how they relate to the implicit views of the good involved in deliberative rhetoric. I 
should note that it might be objected that the three forms of rhetoric are entirely different 
in purpose and so their ends cannot be compared or come into conflict within the scope of 
rhetorical appeals. However, there is some overlap. For instance, Aristotle includes the 
virtues in his discussion of goods to which one might appeal in deliberative rhetoric (1.6). 




the noble and virtuous are not only used for praising past action, but can be the basis for 
proposing future action in deliberative rhetoric (1367b37-68a9). 
 Before considering the relationship between the different ends and different 
forms of rhetoric, it must be kept in mind that these are all forms of rational appeal 
(logos). All three forms—deliberative, ceremonial, and judicial rhetoric—rely on appeals 
that have a similar logical thought structure. This can be seen in the Rhetoric’s syllogistic 
manner of presentation discussed earlier. In the chapter on ceremonial rhetoric, for 
instance, Aristotle surveys opinions relevant to praising people or actions, but he presents 
these opinions in a logical order. First, he offers a general definition of the noble (“That 
which is praised on account of being chosen for itself, or that which, being good, is 
pleasant because it is good”) (1366a33-34); he next argues that, based on this view, it is 
“necessary” (ἀνάγκη) that virtue is noble, “for it is praised as being good” (1366a35-36); 
Aristotle then describes the individual virtues more specifically; and finally, he lists the 
particular signs that indicate that someone is acting virtuously (and thus nobly). It should 
also be kept in mind that the logical relationship here is not one of strict syllogisms or 
necessary truths. For instance, Aristotle adopts a conventional understanding of virtue, 
defining it as the power of providing goods and benefitting others.123 Based on this 
definition (“if in fact virtue is this…”), he says that the greatest virtues are “necessarily” 
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protecting good things, and the power of conferring many great benefits, indeed all [sorts of 
benefits] in connection with all things” (1366a36-b1). This is similar to a conventional view of 




those that are most useful to others (1366b3-4), and he focuses on acts of selflessness as 
the most praiseworthy behavior. These opinions could be dialectically challenged—and, 
just as Aristotle challenges several conceptions of happiness in the Ethics, he also 
challenges there these opinions about virtue. By contrast, Aristotle is less critical in the 
Rhetoric, but this allows him to demonstrate how a rhetorician can reason within the 
scope of common opinion.  
The discussion of judicial rhetoric also surveys the quasi-logical opinions relevant 
to defense and prosecution speeches. Injustice is first defined as willingly doing harm 
contrary to the law (1368b6-7); Aristotle next distinguishes willing from unwilling action 
and addresses the motives of injustice (1.10-11); and he then focuses on circumstantial 
signs that an action was done willingly (1.12).124 For the purpose of comparing the ends 
of the different forms of rhetoric, however, it is better to focus on Aristotle’s discussion 
of ceremonial rhetoric and its end, the noble. In part this is because the discussion of 
judicial rhetoric is much lengthier and addresses many more technical details specific to 
court cases. But more importantly, Aristotle suggests that justice tends to be thought of as 
either relating to the more general idea of the noble or the advantageous. For instance, 
when Aristotle addresses opinions regarding the individual virtues, he discusses justice in 
light of the noble (1362b12). By contrast, when addressing opinions regarding the 
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distinguishing types of law as conventional or more universal (1.13), discussing degrees of 




advantageous, Aristotle describes justice in terms of a communal advantage (1362b28). 
The point of conflict, then, is between the noble and the advantageous, and so it is 
necessary to look more closely at views of the noble. 
However, when one looks closely at the opinions of the noble presented in Book 
I, one also finds two conflicting views. On the one hand, Aristotle presents opinions that 
treat nobility and the virtues as entirely selfless ends: the greatest virtues are those that 
are most useful to others (1366b3-4); the noblest deeds are those wherein one acts for 
one’s country or simply for the sake of what is good, in disregard of one’s own self-
interest (1366b36-37a1); and, if there is any reward, it should be honor rather than 
material benefits (1366b35), the greatest honor being glory that lasts even after death 
(1367a1-3, a25-27). Within this selfless view, the noble is essentially equated with the 
good: the noble is praised as that which is choiceworthy for itself (echoing the definition 
of the good at 1362a22) and Aristotle also says that the noble is pleasant because of its 
goodness (1366a33-34). By contrast, in Aristotle’s survey of opinions regarding 
happiness, the noble and the virtues are treated as beneficial goods that contribute as a 
means to the greater good of one’s own happiness (1360b23, 62b12-14). In this case, the 
virtues are described as good because they produce other goods and make the virtuous 
person well-off (1362b2-4).125 Aristotle thus draws out two conflicting ideas regarding 
the noble, and in doing so, he points to a common conflict that exists in people’s 
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understanding: they often think of moral action as selfless and pure, but at the same time 
they want such actions to be beneficial to the moral individual. The fundamental problem 
here is that the ideas of selflessness and self-benefit contradict each other—most notably 
in instances of personal sacrifice that leads to death. There is thus an intransigent and 
perhaps irresolvable tension in common opinions regarding the noble and its relation to 
the good. 
Aristotle only very obliquely points to this common conflict in moral opinion, but 
his presentation highlights a major difficulty for rhetoric. Not only will there be 
disagreements between different members of an audience, but the audience members 
themselves might have contradictory views within their own opinions. In cases where the 
audience’s opinions can be ordered hierarchically, an orator can seek common ground by 
appealing to more generally held implicit beliefs. However, when the audience members 
themselves hold contradicting beliefs, there are limitations as to how far rhetoric can 
work towards a resolution of these tensions. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Aristotle compares rhetoric to dialectic. The latter art also begins with respected opinions 
(endoxa), but it challenges these opinions in an effort to root out false opinion and find 
sound, non-contradicting premises. Rhetoric, by contrast, works within the confines of 
respected opinions, appealing to premises the audience accepts. There is room in rhetoric 
for challenging the immediate beliefs of the audience, reminding them of their deeper 
commitments and beliefs, but correcting deep-seated contradictions within these beliefs is 




much more challenging form of reasoning that is unlikely to be followed by any general 
audience.126 
I will return to discuss these and other limits of rhetoric in the final chapter, but 
for the moment I will focus on the alternatives that remain for rhetorical persuasion. 
While rhetoric might not be able to resolve contradictory views, rhetoric can encourage 
the audience to focus on one end over other competing ends. In addition to a rational 
appeal to the opinions discussed in Book I, this can also be done by means of emotional 
appeals and artful delivery. While these rhetorical devices are distinguished from rational 
appeal, they are not strictly irrational; rather, they too involve a form of rhetorical 
reasoning and in turning to them, we continue to move towards a fuller picture of human 
rationality and its role in persuasion. 
II. The Rational Basis of Emotional Appeals 
Aristotle opens Book II of the Rhetoric by noting again the limits of rational 
appeal. He says it is not enough merely to present arguments or demonstrations in a 
rhetorical appeal; one must consider one’s own self-presentation and also the disposition 
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he only subtly points out the conflicts in moral views. For example, in her investigation of Book 
V of the Ethics, Collins (2004) explains how Aristotle’s discussion of the individual virtues 
reveals underlying tensions.  The overall problem is that virtue is supposed to be pursued as an 
end-in-itself, but it must also look to other, potentially conflicting ends. Collins focuses on the 
tensions within justice: the just man looks towards individual perfection (justice in particular 
presents itself as the highest virtue), but he must also be oriented towards the overall good of the 




of the audience. Character appeal is a matter of presenting oneself as a person of 
“prudence, virtue, and goodwill” so as to engender trust in the audience (1377a8). Such 
an appeal largely relies on reflecting the audience’s concerns and honoring what the 
audience respects. More important for present purposes is Aristotle’s discussion of 
emotional appeal. As Aristotle notes, a person’s disposition will have a great effect on his 
perception and interpretation of events—for example, “things…do not appear the same to 
those who are angry as to those who remain calm, but appear either altogether different or 
different in magnitude” (1377b31-78a1)—so a speaker may need to influence the 
audience’s disposition, making people more favorable to his argument and more 
receptive to his proposals. Corresponding with its important role, more than half of Book 
II addresses emotional appeal, first with an analysis of important emotions (2.2-11) and 
then with a consideration of typical character types and their emotional predispositions 
(2.12-17). 
While emotional appeal is formally distinguished from rational appeal, this is not 
to say that emotional appeal is irrational or that it involves an appeal to irrational parts of 
the soul. This was a mistake made by previous rhetoricians, who focused almost 
exclusively on emotional appeal and its capacity to control audiences.127 If the emotions 
were simply irrational, the capacity to influence the emotions through speech would be 
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very mysterious—so much so that this is the reason that rhetoricians such as Gorgias and 
Thrasymachus could liken emotional appeals to incantations and enchantments.128 
However, an orator does not have such an immediate access to the emotions; rather, the 
whole notion of an emotional appeal is that a speaker evokes emotions by means of 
speech alone. The difficulty is seeing how speech (logos) intersects with the seemingly 
irrational (alogos). Aristotle’s analysis of the emotions provides an answer to this 
question by correcting the false dichotomy made between emotions and rationality. 
Indeed, the most important aspect of Aristotle’s analysis of the emotions is that he 
identifies in each case the rational component of the emotions. This, in turn, allows for an 
understanding of how emotional appeals are actually a form of persuasion, wherein a 
speaker appeals to the judgment of the audience. Aristotle’s analysis of the emotions and 
emotional appeal thus provides a more complete account of rhetorical reasoning and the 
role of rationality in the psychology of persuasion. 
Aristotle’s account of the emotions focuses on fourteen different emotions, which 
are linked in pairs.129 In this analysis, he identifies the different desires, sensations, and 
thoughts that are at work in a given emotion. The analysis of anger is illustrative of how 
Aristotle identifies the different components. He first defines anger as “a desire for 
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129 These pairs are: anger (2.2) and calmness (2.3); (friendly) love and hate (2.4); fear and 
confidence (2.5); shame and shamelessness (2.6); graciousness (χάρις) and unkindliness (2.7); 
pity (2.8) and indignation (2.9); and envy (2.10) and emulation (2.11). I will offer a relatively 
brief analysis of the overall pattern of these chapters. For an extensive analysis of each of these 




revenge, accompanied by pain, on account of (διά) an apparent belittling of oneself or 
one’s own, the belittling being unjustified” (1378a30-33).130 Aristotle continues, adding 
that “a certain feeling of pleasure follows every feeling of anger from the hope of getting 
revenge; for it is pleasant to imagine one will attain the things one longs for” (1378b1-3). 
Aristotle probably puts so much emphasis on belittling because honor and status are very 
important concerns for most people, but he later expands on his definition, noting that 
people become angry at any frustrated desire: “That is why people who are sick, poor, in 
love (ἐρῶντες), in thirst, and in general in the grip of unfulfilled desire, are prone to anger 
and easily aroused, especially against those who belittle their present distress” (1379a16-
19). 
The most important thing to notice in this analysis is the rational aspect of the 
emotional response: a particular thought, belief, or judgment is an essential cause of the 
emotion. With anger, there is a perception of a slight and a judgment that it is 
undeserved. Other emotions similarly have an essential rational component. For instance, 
pity is pain at what is deemed the undeserved suffering by someone with whom one 
identifies (l385bl5-20). The feeling of (friendly) love is similarly based on an identified 
kinship (1381a1-20) and it involves “wishing for someone the things which we think 
good” (1380b35-40). Even an emotion as primal as fear is based on the judgment that a 
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emphasizes that Aristotle uses διά (“on account of”) rather than μετά (“with”), signifying a causal 




harm is likely and imminent; in particular, Aristotle emphasizes the role of imagination in 
fear, as people anticipate future suffering, death, and destruction (1382a28-35). To be 
sure, in each emotion there is an essential bodily component at work as well, but the 
emotion cannot be reduced to the physiological response.131 This is to say that emotions 
are not simply wholly irrational forces; rather, thought is also at work in the emotions.  
Along with the thoughts, beliefs, and judgments that play a causal role in the 
emotions, it should be noted that their ends (i.e. the final cause) are also not simply 
irrational: the ends listed in Aristotle’s discussion include such concerns as honor, health, 
friends, loves, and pleasures—all of which are types of goods discussed in Book I 
regarding rational appeal. In the Book I discussion, these ends are treated as the objects 
of rational desire (wishing for what is good; 1369a3-4). The emotions are similar to the 
desires in focusing on particular ends, but the emotions have a more complicated 
character: whereas desire, in Aristotle’s analysis, entails a “reaching out” (ὄρεξις) for a 
good, the emotions are distinguished because they each involve more complex responses 
towards something that relates to the desired end. For example, anger aims at destroying 
                                                 
131 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle does not say much about the bodily or material basis of the emotions, 
though when he discusses emotional predispositions, he briefly mentions a physiological basis, 
saying that elderly people are prone to fearfulness and young people are more prone to anger 
because “[the former] are chilled while the latter are heated” (1389b31). This corresponds to 
Aristotle’s discussion in On the Soul, where he says, for example, that anger is not only a craving 
for revenge but also “a boiling of the blood and heat around the heart” (403a30-b1). In that 
context, Aristotle identifies the perceived slight and the craving for revenge as the formal causes 




what unjustifiably thwarts a desire, fear seeks to flee threats to one’s good, and 
friendliness aims at joining or helping those who support or share a view of what is good.  
In highlighting the rational desires, intentional ends, judgments, and beliefs 
involved in the emotions, Aristotle thus reveals the rational aspect of the emotions. This 
is an important point for understanding rhetoric because it is this rational element that 
makes the emotions open to being influenced by speech. It must be granted that not all 
aspects of emotional appeal by speech are aimed at opinions or premises. As Aristotle 
describes in Book III, much of persuasion depends on style and delivery; for an 
emotional appeal, in particular, the volume, rhythm, and harmony of the voice are 
important factors as they should reflect the emotion in order to evoke it in the audience 
(3.7).132 In this context, Aristotle notes that sophistic speakers often evoke emotions by 
falsely imitating emotional reactions. Nevertheless, even in these cases of emotional 
appeal, it is necessary to see that the audience is still exercising judgment: namely, they 
are inferring that the emotional display is indicative of the circumstances that have so 
moved the speaker. Aristotle describes the inference as follows: 
the soul makes a logical error (παραλογίζεταί), as though the speaker 
were telling the truth, because people feel that way in such circumstances, 
and so they suppose the facts to be so, even if they are not as the speaker 
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says. The listener always sympathizes with the passionate speaker, even if 
there is nothing to what he says. This is the reason that many [speakers] 
bring down (καταπλήττουσι) their listeners by making confused noise. 
(1408a20-25, my emphasis).133 
It is important, then, to mimic the emotion when making an emotional appeal, but 
the content of the appeal is equally important because it is what actually shapes and gives 
direction to an emotion. That is, one must appeal to the particular thoughts or beliefs 
involved in specific emotions. To evoke anger, for example, a speaker reminds the 
audience of their concerns, be it for honor or some other desire, and he shows how these 
concerns have been thwarted by particular events or people. In order to shape the anger, 
he focuses on the causal premises of the emotion: anger is a desire for revenge on account 
of a perceived belittling, so the speaker focuses on the belittling, highlighting the 
insolence (ὕβρις) of the dishonor (1378b30) and describing the insult as voluntary and 
unjustified. Conversely, to calm the audience, the speaker might argue that the harm was 
unintentional or justified (correcting the judgment that leads to anger) or he might point 
out that the guilty party has already been suitably punished, so vengeance is unnecessary. 
Another example is pity: to encourage pity, the speaker should emphasize the ways that 
the sufferer is similar to the audience (so they could imagine themselves in the sufferer’s 
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place) and he should stress that the suffering is undeserved. To encourage a sense of 
gratitude, the speaker should remind the listeners of the good things they have received 
and emphasize the sacrifice this required from the benefactor. 
To see more clearly how rhetoric appeals to the causal opinions of emotions, it is 
helpful to consider an actual speech. In his history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides 
recounts many masterful speeches, and his presentation of the Mytilenian debate in 
particular exemplifies how a speaker appeals to the premises of anger. The debate centers 
on the fate of Mytilene, an island-state that was subject to the Athenian Empire but left 
relatively free, being allowed to maintain its own laws and contribute troops to the 
Athenians. After the Mytilenians rebelled, Cleon gave a speech advocating the wholesale 
slaughter of their men and enslavement of their women and children. The speech is a 
masterwork of demagogic anger and outrage, and Cleon’s appeals nicely reflect 
Aristotle’s discussion of anger. For instance, Cleon claims that the Mytilenians “have 
done you greater injustice than any other single city” (3.39.1), he repeatedly points to 
their hubris and ingratitude (3.39.2-4), and he stresses the deliberate nature of their crime: 
“Their offense was not involuntary, but of malice and deliberate, and mercy is only for 
unwilling offenders” (3.40.1). Cleon’s palpable rage is infectious, but it is important to 
note that he is not simply shouting incoherently. Rather, he appeals to the premises of 
anger in order to enrage the audience and convince them to act against the Mytilenians. 
Returning to Aristotle’s analysis of emotional appeal, one might thus say that the 




and beliefs that are causal elements of the emotions. What is especially significant is that 
Aristotle refers to these thoughts and beliefs as the “premises” (προτάσεις; 1378a27) of 
an emotion. In doing so, he makes clear that emotional and rational appeal overlap 
because they both rely on enthymemes or quasi-syllogistic arguments. In practice, the 
speaker will not syllogistically spell out all of these premises; rather, he uses enthymemes 
and so he draws on the implicit understandings and propensities of the audience, 
explicitly appealing to premises only to the extent necessary to evoke an emotional 
response. As an example of the enthymemic character of emotional appeals, recall the 
discussion in the previous chapter of the Gettysburg Address. In Lincoln’s speech, he 
evokes feelings of love and gratitude for the dead by reminding the audience members of 
their shared commitments to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the 
sacrifice by the fallen to preserve those ideals. These are appeals to what Aristotle 
identifies as the premises of the love and gratitude: we feel attachment with “those to 
whom the same things are good” (1381a8) and for “those who have given [us] great 
benefit” (1381a11-12), and we feel gratitude for “service done for someone in need with 
nothing in return” (1385a17-19).  
Up to this point I have stressed the rational character of emotional appeals and the 
similarity between emotional and rational appeals, but the more obvious point should not 
be overlooked that emotional appeals can have a broader effect on rational judgment. 
When Aristotle introduces the emotions for analysis, he says that they have the capacity 
to turn people’s judgments one way or another: “Emotions are the things through which, 




This capacity means that emotional appeals might run counter to the purpose of rational 
appeals by distracting or misleading judgment. It is this sort of abuse that Aristotle 
criticizes at the start of the Rhetoric, saying that emotional appeals are extraneous to 
speech and that it is inappropriate to lead the audience astray (1354a15-31). Nevertheless, 
as previously discussed, Aristotle relaxes this criticism in subsequent chapters and he 
grants that emotional appeals may be necessary to support rational argumentation. At the 
very least, a speaker may need to use emotional appeals to counteract a hostile 
disposition of the audience, whether it is preexisting or if it has been spurred by another 
speaker. In this regard, Diodotus’s speech in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War (3.42-3.48) 
is a good example of the need to defuse an audience’s anger before presenting one’s own 
argument. In the Mytilenian debate described above, Cleon clearly uses emotional 
appeals to enrage the audience. Diodotus’s counter-speech does not exactly follow the 
format Aristotle discusses of an appeal to calmness—meaning that he does not argue that 
no harm was done or that it was unintentional—but he argues against acting for the sake 
of revenge, warning that following Cleon’s proposal and destroying the Mytilenians will 
do far more harm to the Athenians than good. 
Emotional appeals may therefore be required for remedial purposes, but there are 
also other ways that they may assist rational arguments. Specifically, an emotional appeal 
might be used to add weight to an argument that would not be sufficiently appreciated 
otherwise. If, for example, the speaker is making a proposal for security, it might not be 
enough to argue that establishing a proper defense is advantageous, as there may be other, 




emotional appeal may be required to focus the audience on the concern they are 
overlooking. Again, Aristotle describes fear as a pain based on a judgment that a harm is 
likely and imminent. Accordingly, to evoke fear, the speaker might concentrate on the 
potential harm, describing it vividly and emphasizing its imminence in order to make the 
concern more pressing.134 Additionally, to dissuade the audience from ignoring a threat, 
the speaker might appeal to their shame. In his analysis of shame (2.6), Aristotle 
describes shame as the pain caused by acts that seem disgraceful to a person and to those 
for whom he cares (1383b12-18). In particular, Aristotle describes sight as an important 
factor in shame: he notes that people seek to hide their faces when ashamed as if to avoid 
being seen (1385a10-13), and he quotes a proverb, “Shame is in the eyes.”135 To evoke 
shame, then, the speaker should do more than argue that a course of action is 
disadvantageous or harmful; he should describe the disgrace, calling it a betrayal of the 
community’s ideals, and he should especially describe what the act will look like to 
others. 
An example of a speech that masterfully uses emotional appeals to fear and shame 
in support of a broader argument is Demosthenes’s Third Philippic. In this speech 
                                                 
134 In a chapter of the Politics on preserving regimes (5.8), Aristotle says that the rulers may need 
to evoke fear to ensure that the citizens are vigilant and guard over the regime. To do so, he 
explains, the ruler must stress the imminence of the threat in order to “make the far away near” 
(Politics, 1308a26-30). 
135 Aristotle generally uses the word αἰσχύνη for shame in 2.6, but the proverb quoted uses an 
alternative, more ceremonial word, αἰδῶ, which may include a sense of reverence or awe. The full 
sentence is: “Things that happen in front of people’s eyes and in plain sight cause more shame 




(delivered in 341 BC), Demosthenes advises the Athenians to prepare for the inevitable 
war against Philip of Macedon; the Athenians had ignored the Macedonian threat for 
years, accepting Philip’s pretexts and claims of peacefulness while he gradually expanded 
and encroached on Athenian territory. To draw their attention to the reality of the threat, 
Demosthenes seeks to evoke fear in the audience: he emphasizes the urgency of the 
danger by pointing to Philip’s conquests over surrounding states (“attacking and 
enslaving their cities,” §22), describing the fate of the citizens (“they are slaves, whipped 
and butchered”; §66), and warning that it is nearly too late to stop this threat.136 To evoke 
shame, he attacks what he identifies as the disgraceful behavior by the idle Athenians: the 
“indolence and indifference” of ignoring the threat (§5) and the “foolishness and 
cowardice” of hoping that Philip will be peaceful (§67). Further, he describes how the 
Athenians appear to others: to Philip, they are simple-minded fools who are easily duped; 
to the rest of Greece, they are small-minded and greedy (“All Hellenes see and hear these 
[threats]…but we look on while the man becomes greater, each one thinking to profit 
during this time when another is destroyed,” §28-29); and, most importantly, to the 
ancestors who fought off past foreign invaders, the Athenians are betraying their legacy: 
What then is the cause of these things [Philip’s insolent acts]? For it was 
not without reason and just cause that the Hellenes were once so ready to 
defend freedom and now to be slaves. There was something then, there 
                                                 




was, O Men of Athens, something in the minds of the people that is not 
there now, something that defeated the wealth of Persia and kept Hellas 
free. (§36) 
If you think the people of Chalcis are going to save Hellas, or the 
Megarians, while you run away from events, you are not thinking rightly; 
for it is enough for them if each can save themselves. You must do this. 
To you your ancestors bequeathed this honor, acquired through many 
dangers. (§74) 
Demosthenes’s speech illustrates well how emotional appeals can be used in support of a 
broader persuasive effort. These emotional appeals also demonstrate Aristotle’s claim 
that there is a rational basis to the emotions and emotional appeals. Demosthenes appeals 
to the judgment of the audience and the emotional response requires an agreement with 
the premises of the appeal, namely that there is a threat and that Athenian idleness in the 
face of that threat does appear shameful. 
The notion of using emotional appeals in support of rational argument offers some 
insight on the question that closed the previous section: How can a speaker focus an 
audience on one end over other competing ends? As described, emotional appeals can 
give weight to one consideration over another, which means that such appeals could shift 
the balance between two considerations. To use a different metaphor based on the 
examples above, the emotional appeal might make one consideration seem more 




the audience. Emotional appeals offer one way of focusing the audience on an end, but 
this is also a broader function of rhetorical speech. To consider this issue more fully, it is 
necessary to turn to the final book of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle discusses the 
arrangement and delivery of speeches.  
III. Style and Delivery: Giving an Argument Activity and Prominence 
As with Books I and II, Aristotle opens Book III with a short, idealized account of 
rhetoric, saying that that the “just thing” would be “to contend one’s case by means of the 
facts themselves” and not worry about extraneous matters such as style or ornamentation 
(1404a5-6). He quickly grants, however, that this is not possible. At first Aristotle says 
that this is because of the flawed character of general audiences, who are unable to follow 
and appreciate rational arguments and so are in need of assistance. As Aristotle goes on, 
however, he admits that any form of teaching or demonstration must have some concern 
with presentation—it is not enough for a speaker to have the correct thoughts if nobody 
can understand his meaning. In short order, then, Aristotle corrects idealistic concerns 
about rhetorical style. In the remainder of the book, he offers a guide as to how proper 
presentation can be a powerful support for rational argument.  
Book III explores wording (λέξις, 3.1-12) and arrangement (τάξις, 3.13-19) in 
great technical detail, covering such topics as grammatical correctness (2.5), appropriate 
rhythmic patterns (2.8), the purpose of the different parts of a speech (e.g. introduction, 
narrative, proof; 2.14-17), and even when jokes or irony may be used (2.18). The general 




importantly, a speech and its message should be clear. As Aristotle says at the beginning 
of the investigation, the primary “virtue of wording” is clarity (1404b1-2). At the same 
time, however, a speech should not be too clear as to be tedious or commonplace. The 
second point, then, is that a speech should incorporate a degree of the strange, foreign, or 
out of place (ξένος; 1404b8-13). This is so as to intrigue the audience and invite their 
curiosity. As Aristotle frequently says in Book III, there is a natural pleasure that comes 
from wonder and learning, particularly when the learning occurs quickly without much 
struggle. Regarding appropriate wording, for example, he says, “to learn easily is 
naturally pleasant for everyone, and words signify something, so those words that make 
us learn are pleasurable” (1410b10-11).137 Along with the pleasure that comes from 
learning, another key aspect of inviting the audience to think is that they need to complete 
the argument themselves; through such an activity, they are apt to make the ideas their 
own and thereby be persuaded more readily. To facilitate quick learning, good rhetoric 
should be clear enough to be readily understood, but foreign enough that it requires the 
listeners’ participation in completing the arguments. As a point of contrast, Aristotle 
points to sophists who go too far, using overly strange, grandiloquent speeches to 
obfuscate matters and distract the audience from the actual argument (see 3.2). 
There are many points worth considering in Book III, but in regards to the 
psychology of persuasion, the most important is what Aristotle says concerning how an 
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orator can focus the audience by making an idea active and bringing it to life. Aristotle 
most clearly describes this capacity in his discussion of the metaphor, which he identifies 
as the rhetorical device that best encompasses the goals of rhetorical style: “the metaphor, 
most of all, has in it something clear, pleasant, and foreign” (1405a8-9). Throughout his 
discussion of the metaphor, Aristotle describes its capacity to make certain thoughts more 
vivid and imminent, saying repeatedly that the metaphor has the power to put an idea 
“before the eyes” (πρὸ ὀμμάτων; 1411b22-35). He also frequently says that a metaphor 
can give a statement “activity” or “energy” (ἐνέργεια; see 1411b22-1412a10). An 
example of metaphor that Aristotle gives is from Pericles’ funeral oration, where he 
amplifies the significance of the loss by saying, “the youth who perished in the war 
disappeared from the city as if someone had stolen spring from the year” (1411a2-4).138 
While Aristotle mostly uses such phrases to describe the power of metaphors, the 
point applies more generally to the category of what he calls elegant (ἀστεῖος) speech. 
For instance, he says that when predicting the future, one should speak in the present 
tense to put an idea “before the eyes” of the audience (1410b34). He also says that along 
with metaphor, an artful contrast of points (antithesis) can give a statement “energy” 
(1410b36, 1412b33). More generally, aspects of this ‘energizing’ capacity can be seen in 
various rhetorical techniques Aristotle discusses, such as amplification, repetition, 
evocative figures of speech, as well as emotional appeal—these techniques have the 
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capacity to make certain considerations more vivid and have more prominence in the 
listener’s mind. One can see this in the Demosthenes speech discussed above. Along with 
the emotional appeals, Demosthenes uses exaggeration (enslaved cities) as well as vivid 
imagery (“they are slaves, whipped and butchered”), and the claim that all of Greece is 
watching Athens is an almost direct application of putting an idea “before the eyes.” All 
of these rhetorical devices strengthen Demosthenes’s argument, making the Macedonian 
threat all the more imminent to the audience and thus encouraging them to accept the 
proposal to prepare for war. 
Aristotle thus claims that the artful use of rhetorical techniques can make certain 
ideas and considerations more prominent in the listeners’ minds. To understand how this 
works and its broader applicability to Aristotelian psychology, it is helpful to consider a 
very interesting similarity between Aristotle’s account of elegant speech, on one hand, 
and akrasia, on the other. To clarify the comparison, it is necessary to recall a few points 
from my analysis of akrasia in Chapter 1 above. The common sense understanding of 
akrasia is that a person knows something is bad, but he is nevertheless overwhelmed by 
desire and acts against his better judgment. The problem with this understanding is that it 
is overly dualistic, ignoring the interconnection of thought and desire. In the case of 
akrasia, it is more accurate to say that there are two competing notions of what is good 
interconnected with two competing desires (e.g. for pleasure, on one hand, and for health 
or noble restraint, on the other). In his analysis, Aristotle treats this conflict as a case of 
two competing practical syllogisms. In the abstract, these alternatives are held in balance 




and desires). At the moment of akratic choice, however, Aristotle notes that a particular 
desire is present—and significantly, he says that this makes the premise of the choice 
“active” (ἐνεργεῖ; NE 1147a33). The immediate presence of the desire thus makes the 
opinion that a particular pleasure is good more prominent in the person’s mind and he 
acts on that opinion. As a point of further clarification, recall that Aristotle says in On the 
Soul that when a person acts for the sake of immediate desire, he is choosing the good 
that seems more real: “what is immediately pleasant appears to be both simply pleasant 
and simply good on account of not looking to the future” (S 433b8-10, my emphasis). 
This “simply good” alternative is in contrast to an abstract or distant good such as the 
idea that health or the noble is good—the person can recite the words of an argument 
supporting these claims, but he does not fully believe that they are good (see NE 
1147b10-12). The important point here is that a desire makes one conception of the good 
more prominent—and it does so, Aristotle says, by making the premise of one line of 
thought more “active.” 
To apply this notion back to the Rhetoric, it is necessary to draw on the entire 
psychology of persuasion presented so far in this chapter. As discussed in section one, the 
enthymeme is analogous to the practical syllogism: whereas the practical syllogism 
captures the thought structure of an action, the enthymeme represents the thought 
structure of a rhetorical appeal. Similarly, just as the practical syllogism draws out the 
implicit view of the good that a person acts upon, the implicit premises of the enthymeme 
represent the end a speaker ultimately appeals to in an argument. As further discussed in 




enthymemic character wherein the premises represent the judgments and beliefs that are 
essential components of the emotion. The question regarding enthymemes and rhetorical 
appeals was: How does a speaker focus the audience on one end over others when there 
are multiple competing goods that might be of concern?  
In answer to this question, Aristotle’s analysis of style and delivery suggests that, 
as in the competing choices of akrasia, rhetorical appeals make the premises of certain 
ideas more “active.” Through the use of vivid images, artful description, emotional 
appeals, well-timed repetition, dwelling on a subject, and other such techniques, rhetoric 
can make certain ends clearer, more pressing, or simply seem more real—all different 
ways of saying that persuasion influences choice by highlighting particular premises, 
giving them a special prominence in the minds of the audience. Walker (2000) describes 
this process well, calling these rhetorical devices “techniques of emphasis that lend 
psychological prominence and memorability—or what Aristotle calls energeia—to 
particular sets of ‘premises’ while shifting others into the background or margins of 
attention” (p.85).139 Through such rhetorical techniques, a speaker can thus encourage an 
audience to choose one end over other competing possibilities. 
                                                 
139 Walker also points to the similarity between Aristotle’s discussion of rhetorical energeia and 
what Chaim Perelman refers to as “techniques of presence” in The New Rhetoric (1969). I should 
note that Walker believes that this interpretation of the Rhetoric is in some ways at odds with 
Aristotle’s other works and he claims that such an account of persuasion is “not quite 
‘Aristotelian’ … [and] quite probably at odds with what Aristotle himself preferred” (p.76). By 
contrast, my interpretation of Aristotle’s psychological works points to the compatibility of this 




One further similarity between akrasia and artful appeal is worth considering. In 
akrasia, it is not simply the case that the individual has immoderate thoughts and desires 
that he acts on; he also has a broader view of what is good for him, but he fails to 
appreciate the truth of this long term good. The self-controlled individual, by contrast, 
has a clearer view of his good and does not act against it for the sake of immediate 
gratification. Through the use of artful rhetoric, a speaker may try to draw the audience 
members’ attention to concerns they only partially appreciate. In the Demosthenes 
speech, for example, he is not introducing entirely new concepts or concerns to the 
audience; there is surely some awareness and concern regarding the Macedonian threat, 
but it is vague and distant, eclipsed by the more pressing concerns of daily business. 
Demosthenes uses his rhetorical powers to draw the audience’s attention to the threat, 
amplifying what fear they feel and appealing to their shame and sense of civic pride in 
order to give weight to the more distant concern that they do not clearly see. This general 
need for rhetoric to focus the audience on certain ends is suggested early on in the 
Rhetoric when Aristotle comments on the nature of audiences, saying that rhetoric is 
aimed at “the kinds of listeners who are not capable of seeing many things together or of 
reasoning from a distant starting point” (1357a3-4). General audiences tend to be 
shortsighted, focusing on what is immediately attainable or desirable; rhetoric can shift 
the audience’s focus by making distant or abstract ends more immediate and more readily 
understood. It is in this way that rhetoric can help guide and improve the decisions made 
by the audience. I will discuss this potential of rhetoric more in the next chapter, but first 




IV. The Role of (Limited) Rationality in Rhetoric 
Throughout his account of persuasion, Aristotle stresses the role of rationality in 
rhetoric. This does not, however, serve as a vindication of what one might call the 
objective rationality of rhetoric. That is, claiming that rhetoric must engage the rationality 
of the audience does not mean that rhetoric only leads people to act in light of the truth or 
some highest objective good. To draw again on the analogy from akrasia: I focused on 
akrasia in Chapter 1 in order to demonstrate the role of rationality in choice, even in 
those instances that seem most irrational. I argued that thought is not truly 
“overwhelmed” by desire; rather, thought is present throughout choice as a person acts on 
a conception of the good. However, even if thought is present, this does not mean the 
person is acting in an objectively rational way and choosing what is actually the best end. 
Rather, he is confused, acting according to inconsistent thoughts and desires. By 
highlighting the role of thought in choice, the analysis of akrasia helps identify the way 
in which the person is confused. A similar point can be made about rhetoric. I have tried 
to clarify the broad role of rationality within rhetoric: rational appeals draw on implicit 
beliefs regarding what is good, emotional appeals are directed at the causal premises of 
emotions, and artful style is an attempt to direct the audience’s attention and engage their 
judgment. Rationality is present, but this does not mean that rhetoric cannot be used for 
ill intent. A speaker can lie to the audience, misdirect their attention, and take advantage 
of their poor judgment. The important point in regards to identifying the underlying 
rationality of rhetoric is that it is a necessary step for explaining how rhetoric works and 




The key to understanding rhetoric is seeing that its persuasive power is not 
mysterious; rhetoric does not somehow tap into entirely irrational forces and take control 
of the audience. Rather, to persuade an audience, one must appeal to their judgment and 
engage them in a form of reasoning. This rhetorical reasoning is flawed, and rhetoric is a 
limited art, but it nevertheless has the potential to aid in political guidance, helping the 
audience come to conclusions that they would not reach by themselves. Assessing the 
power and limits of rhetoric is only possible when one correctly identifies the character 
and scope of rationality in rhetoric. 
Having discussed the Rhetoric now at some length, I will turn in the next chapter 
to conclude by drawing together the lessons of Aristotelian psychology and the 
psychology of persuasion. I will discuss what this psychology reveals regarding the 
character of human rationality, the possibilities and limits of rhetoric, and how all of this 





CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
In the final chapter of the Rhetoric (3.19), Aristotle offers advice on conclusions. 
He says that a speaker should demonstrate his own truthfulness and the falsity of his 
opponents, amplify or understate the importance of his case (perhaps by showing where it 
may lead), move the audience to an emotional reaction, and remind the audience of what 
has been said, showing them the speech delivered what it promised. Lacking a warped 
(1354a24) or corrupt (1404a8) audience, I will forego emotional appeal, but the other 
suggestions offer a helpful structure for proceeding. 
The purpose of this study has been to explore how rhetorical persuasion works 
and what this reveals about human rationality. In particular, I wanted to consider how 
rhetoric can engage rationality in such a way as to avoid as much as possible the twin 
vices of pandering and manipulation; it is in this way that rhetoric can best be defended 
as a legitimate part of political guidance. Having discussed Aristotle’s psychology of 
choice and the Rhetoric in some detail, I will in this chapter draw together my 
interpretation of the psychology of persuasion. Additionally, I sought to demonstrate the 
relevance of Aristotle’s thought for contemporary theories of political psychology, so I 
will contrast Aristotelian political psychology with the flawed assumptions of bounded 
rationality theory and its application to politics. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion 
of Aristotle’s broader defense of rhetoric, which includes the political and philosophical 




I. Limited (But Not Bounded) Rationality 
Regarding the theory of bounded rationality, recall that its focus is the limits of 
human rationality. People have limitations in terms of awareness, attention, and the 
capacity to process information. To cope with these limits, they rely on mental shortcuts 
(“heuristics”) when interpreting the world and deciding how to act. Overreliance on these 
shortcuts leaves people prone to systematic errors in their decisions (“cognitive biases”). 
In order to influence people, one can target these errors, shaping circumstances to have an 
appropriate “choice architecture” so as to trigger desired responses. At the core of this 
mechanistic view of choice is the idea that rationality is solely instrumental, meaning that 
reason is only used for the calculation of means to desired ends. Herbert Simon, who 
pioneered the theory of bounded rationality, sums up this conception of reason as 
follows: 
Reason, taken by itself, is instrumental. It can’t select our final goals, nor 
can it mediate for us in pure conflicts over what final goal to pursue—we 
have to settle these issues in some other way. All reason can do is help us 
reach agreed-on goals more efficiently (1983, p. 106). 
According to this view, calculation can be shaped and directed by desires and emotions, 
but thought itself has no influence on the ends of action. Indeed, reason is incapable of 
even justifying ends; they are, as Simon puts it, only arbitrary commitments set down by 




Before turning to an Aristotelian response to this narrow conception of human 
rationality, I should note that there are actually several points of potential agreement 
between Aristotle and bounded rationality theorists. First, Aristotle would agree with the 
most basic notion of rational choice. That is, if one ignores the specific claims regarding 
the character of reasoning, Aristotle agrees that rationality plays an essential role in all 
choice: people have reasons for why they act and choice has an intentional character, 
aiming at particular ends. He would thus agree with Simon’s claim that “people almost 
always have reasons for what they do but seldom the ‘best’ reasons” (1995, p. 47). 
Regarding the notion that we seldom act for the ‘best’ reasons, Aristotle would also agree 
with the basic correction bounded rationality theory made to the earlier rational choice 
theory: human reason is limited, we have limited awareness of the world, and we often 
make errors in our decisions. A major argument of bounded rationality is that because of 
this limited awareness, people can only attend to a few features of their environment, 
which means that they will have a selective, even skewed perspective in their 
understanding. In this regard, bounded rationality theorists would probably be interested 
in Aristotle’s thoughts on the active role of imagination in perception. As Aristotle 
describes it, we are not neutral observers passively absorbing everything in our 
environment; rather, perception is the result of an active interpretation of sensory 
information.140 In turn, Aristotle would probably be interested in the empirical studies of 
                                                 
140 See On the Soul 425a14-429a9 and Nussbaum (1985), pp. 221-269, for a discussion of the 




cognitive heuristics and biases. Aristotle discusses flawed patterns of reasoning in a 
chapter of the Rhetoric (2.24), as well as in the whole of the Sophistical Refutations, and 
so he would probably be intrigued by the catalogue of errors surveyed by modern 
psychology. With that said, he would draw different conclusions from these observations, 
as he does not adhere to a merely instrumental view of reason. 
Even regarding instrumental reasoning, however, there is not complete 
disagreement. Instrumental reason has an important place in Aristotle’s psychology of 
choice, as choice does largely proceed by way of determining means to desired ends. 
However, thought is not limited to calculation; it also plays a crucial role in shaping our 
ends and desires. On this point, Aristotle is simply more consistent than the bounded 
rationality theorists. That is, the latter group correctly claims that perception is not 
immediate: there is complex mental activity underlying perception whereby an individual 
interprets sensory data. Yet bounded rationality theorists do not apply this insight to the 
desires themselves. Instead, desires are treated as brute facts or raw sensations that are 
fully formed and somehow able to posit coherent ends and preferences. Aristotle rejects 
this notion. At the root of desire, there may be a sensation of need, but this requires 
interpretation to take form as a coherent need and desire for something. Even at the most 
basic level, thought plays a role in shaping desire. This is what I referred to as the 
constitutive role of thought in desire. More broadly, when it comes to making choices, 
even if the choice is largely a matter of calculating means to ends, there is room for 
clarifying what those ends are, what it is that we are seeking, and generally why we act 




An important step for understanding the choices we make is looking beyond 
immediate ends. Choice is intentional; we act for the sake of certain ends, but these ends 
point beyond themselves, revealing that they are actually means to higher or broader 
ends. Aristotle’s analysis suggests that when one draws out the reasoning of a choice—
the determining of means, to immediate ends, to ever higher ends—one will find that the 
reasoning ultimately leads to an idea of the good and happiness. Interestingly, Simon 
acknowledged this point early in his career, but he quickly dismissed its importance. It is 
worth quoting him at length on this issue: 
Since most imperatives are not ends-in-themselves but intermediate ends, 
the question of their appropriateness to the more final ends at which they 
are aimed remains a factual question […] A municipal department may 
take as its objective the providing of recreation to the city’s inhabitants. 
This aim may then be further analyzed as a means towards “building 
healthier bodies,” “using leisure time constructively,” “preventing juvenile 
delinquency,” and a host of others, until the chain of means and ends is 
traced into a vague realm labeled “the good life.” At this point the means-
ends connections become so conjectural (e.g. the relation between 
recreation and character), and the content of the values so ill defined (e.g. 
“happiness”), that the analysis becomes valueless for administrative 




Simon is right that for the immediate purpose of predicting behavior in an 
institutional context, one need not consider ultimate or final ends: the administrator is 
given a fixed end (e.g. providing recreation) and he must determine what policies will 
best attain that objective. At any other level of analysis, however, one must ask about the 
broader ends. For example, one might ask about the source of the administrative 
objective, as a decision was made by a higher authority (such as the mayor) that certain 
resources should be allocated for providing recreation, resources that could have been 
otherwise directed towards infrastructure, public safety, or education. Such a decision is 
made by reference to a view of the broader good of the citizens.141 Similarly, if one looks 
at the source of other policies or laws, including the highest laws encoded in a 
constitution, one will find a view of what is good for the citizens, whether that is 
understood in terms of individual liberty, social justice, or the strictures of sacred texts. 
Alternatively, one might ask about the individual administrator. Simon’s claim 
that it is unnecessary to consider the broader ends applies only if the individual has 
already chosen to act as a loyal administrator and carry out given policies. I discussed a 
similar case in Chapter 1 regarding Aristotle’s example of a doctor’s actions. In the 
Ethics, he says, “a doctor does not deliberate whether he will cure someone […] nor does 
                                                 
141 If one adheres to the rational choice inspired assumption that politicians are “single-minded 
seekers of re-election” (Mayhew, 1974), then the concern with the citizens’ good is indirect. In 
this model, the politician creating the policy is immediately concerned with his own good 
(staying in office), but this still requires considering what policies the citizens will believe serve 




anyone else deliberate about ends, but having set down the end, they consider in what 
way and by what means it would be the case” (1112b11-16, my emphasis). As I 
explained, this instrumental reasoning applies only when the ends have already been set 
and the doctor is acting qua doctor.142 In other circumstances, the doctor might ask 
whether he should apply his art and heal the patient. Furthermore, he had to make an 
earlier decision to become a doctor in the first place. In making such a choice, the 
individual must ask whether this is the best profession for him to pursue, or whether some 
other way of life would be better, such as the administrator’s, the political figure’s, or 
something else altogether. To answer these questions, he would have to consider his 
alternatives in light of a broader view of the good.  
Simon is in a way correct when he says that the idea of the good or happiness is 
vague and conjectural: it is difficult to gain clarity on such issues. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative to ask about the ultimate ends that people pursue. For one thing, it is 
necessary if we are to understand the motivation underlying a choice. As Simon grants, 
“most imperatives are not ends-in-themselves but intermediate ends.” However, these 
intermediate ends do not answer the question of why the person is choosing to act this 
way. To understand choice, it is necessary to look to the broader ends that a person seeks 
to achieve through his actions. As Storing puts it in his critique of Simon’s work, “Simon 
                                                 




seems to suggest that we can talk about ‘more final goals’ and yet ‘more final goals’ 
indefinitely, without ever reaching the question of final goals.”143 
Because theories of bounded rationality ignore final ends, they have a difficult 
time explaining action in light of conflicting ends, a difficulty that is particularly evident 
in regards to puzzling instances of irrational behavior such as the akratic who seems to 
act against his rational calculation.144 A common approach in bounded rationality is to 
resort to a theory of multiple selves wherein different selves have different ends; in the 
case of akrasia, a myopic self acts for an immediate end over the preferences of a more 
farsighted self.145 Such an approach yields some useful practical guidance for avoiding 
the loss of self-control, such as using pre-commitment strategies that guarantee tangible 
costs to counteract temptation.146 However, this multiple selves solution does not explain 
why the person actually loses control to a different self—instead, the theory simply 
categorizes people as having either strong or weak “temporal preferences.”147 The 
problem with bounded rationality focusing only on intermediate ends is that it does not 
                                                 
143 Storing (1967), p. 72. In this context, Storing quotes another scholar (Waldo) who complains, 
“In reply to any question concerning [values], the logical positivist points to an escalator that 
ascends and ascends but never arrives anywhere.” 
144 For a review of the difficulties of akrasia for behavioral economic theories, see Callahan 
(2008). 
145 See, for instance, Elster (2000) and Schelling (2006). 
146 See Thaler & Sunstein (2009) pp. 40-52 and their reliance on Elster’s (1984) self-binding 
metaphor of “Ulysses and the Sirens.” 





allow ends to be compared, and thus it is impossible to determine why one end is 
preferred to another. By contrast, when one follows Aristotle’s guidance and considers 
final ends, one can identify the uncertainties and confusions that are at work in akrasia. 
Specifically, it is not enough to say that some people have a preference for long term 
well-being and others for immediate gratification; in the case of loss of self-control, the 
person is confused as to what is actually good and he acts on what is immediate and 
tangible rather than a distant good that seems abstract and uncertain. 
Another reason for looking to the broader ends of action is that when making a 
choice, we must weigh different immediate ends against each other. If there is to be any 
consistency in longer-term pursuits, it is necessary to rank and order one’s ends. This 
weighing and ordering can only be done in light of a higher standard by which we can 
judge the more immediate ends. Attaining a clear ordering of ends is obviously difficult. 
Because of our limited rationality, we have a limited understanding of our world and of 
our own good. Within this limited understanding, we may often have conflicting and 
even contradictory opinions. Similarly, we are apt to have conflicting and contradictory 
desires. However, it is possible to identify these as conflicts and contradictions. Gaining 
such clarity is a necessary step for attempting to resolve or balance conflicts. Further, by 
identifying contradictions, we can examine the confusions and try to root out the 
contradictory views. Within the confines of limited rationality, there is room for gaining a 
degree of clarity and consistency, and thus improved rationality. However, the theory of 
bounded rationality rules out such improvement in advance because it restricts rationality 




calculation, but given its narrow picture of human rationality, its broader use in 
understanding and guiding human life is limited. By contrast, Aristotle’s analysis of 
choice takes place within a broader philosophical context, including the study of ethics 
and politics, and he is thus able to teach us how to look to higher ends and gain clarity 
regarding the most pressing human questions. 
Clarifying the character of human rationality thus points to what can be gained by 
studying Aristotle’s philosophic works. In the current study, however, I focused more 
specifically on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the psychology of persuasion. Here too Aristotle 
offers a valuable corrective to bounded rationality and its understanding of politics. More 
broadly, however, Aristotle’s teaching offers an understanding of how rhetoric works, the 
place of rationality in rhetoric, and the potential rhetoric has for political guidance.  
II. Engaging Rationality and Refining Opinion through Rhetoric  
When bounded rationality is applied as a guide for influencing the public’s 
choices, it adopts a model of “choice architecture” or the “engineering of choice.” The 
idea is that by structuring the context of a choice, such as the manner in which different 
alternatives are presented, one can target characteristic errors in reasoning so as to trigger 
desired responses. I discussed several strategies regarding rhetoric and public opinion in 
the introductory chapter: specifically, agenda-setting, priming, and framing. These effects 
are explained in terms of particular cognitive biases (such as the “availability heuristic”), 




shaping their awareness of a situation and thereby conditioning them to respond in a 
desired way.  
While Aristotle does not discuss “priming” the audience before a speech, he is 
certainly aware that it is important to present one’s case in a favorable light. For instance, 
one of his more humorous examples is of pirates referring to themselves as “procurement 
agents” (1405a26). More generally, he is also aware of the ways that a speaker might 
need to direct the audience’s attention and focus towards certain alternatives over others. 
As discussed regarding rhetorical style, Aristotle says that a speaker can put ideas “before 
the eyes” of the audience, making these ideas more vivid and imminent. He also says that 
a speaker can bring ideas to life by giving them activity or energy (ἐνέργεια). In making 
certain ideas more vivid or active, the speaker might thereby shift the balance between 
conflicting ends. All of this is to say that Aristotle’s analysis of rhetoric is open to the 
strategies described by bounded rationality—indeed, putting an idea “before the eyes” 
captures well the notion of framing alternatives in order to direct attention. Nevertheless, 
Aristotle presents these rhetorical techniques in a different light. 
Most notably, he does not liken the speaker to an engineer who controls people 
like machines (or a sorcerer who casts a spell on them, as the sophists put it). Rather, 
Aristotle describes rhetoric as appealing to and engaging the rationality of the audience. 
The distinction is clearest in regards to emotional appeals. Bounded rationality models 
explain the effect of an emotional appeal in terms of an “affect heuristic”: rather than 




listeners are motivated by and decide based on an aroused emotional state.148 Aristotle’s 
analysis of emotional appeals suggests a partial agreement with this bounded rationality 
claim—emotional appeals will make an argument more active and draw more attention—
but Aristotle goes further by explaining how the emotion is evoked. Specifically, he 
draws out the role of rationality in the emotions and emotional appeals. As Aristotle 
describes it, a speaker must appeal to the causal “premises” of an emotion. In the analysis 
of fear (2.5), for example, he identifies the premise as a threat that is likely and imminent. 
To evoke fear, a speaker must therefore present the idea that there is a probable, 
imminent danger. The audience has to assess such an appeal; if they accept the claim, 
they will believe that there is a threat, they will be afraid, and they will be more willing to 
act. A similar argument can be made regarding other elements of what Aristotle calls 
“elegant speech” (3.10-11). Regarding the metaphor, for instance, Aristotle praises it for 
being foreign enough to intrigue while still being clear enough for “quick learning,” 
wherein two ideas are linked through a certain similarity. For the metaphor to have an 
effect, however, the audience must judge and accept its applicability. The point to stress 
regarding emotional appeals and other rhetorical devices is that the audience members are 
not objects that are controlled by the speaker; persuasion is not a passive experience 
                                                 
148 See, for example, Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson’s (2002) discussion of the “Heuristic-
Systematic Model” as it is used in persuasion, and Averbeck et al’s (2011) application of this 




wherein the audience is simply acted upon by external forces. Rather, persuasion requires 
participation and judgment by the audience.  
Because of his better understanding of choice and human rationality, Aristotle 
offers a more complete picture than bounded rationality of how rhetoric works. With that 
said, it is necessary to clarify the manner in which rhetoric engages rationality and how 
this relates to Aristotle’s broader defense of rhetoric as a political art. I do not mean that 
rhetoric connects the audience to an objective rationality or truth. If that were the case, 
there would be little risk in the misuse of rhetoric: the rationally engaged audience would 
judge the soundness of an argument, and seeing matters as they actually are, they would 
identify lies and misrepresentations. Truth, then, would always have an edge over untruth 
in rhetoric, and one might accordingly defend rhetoric by saying that it is naturally allied 
with truth. This is Arnhart’s (1981) interpretation of Aristotle’s defense of rhetoric. For 
example, in the introduction to his commentary, he writes: 
although the rhetorical art in itself is a morally and epistemologically 
neutral instrument, rhetoric tends to serve the true and the just. […] Since 
speakers who display good character are more persuasive, the noble 
rhetorician has an advantage over the sophist, who must attempt to hide 
his bad character. […] With respect to the subject matter, it is generally 
the case that the true and the just are naturally more easily argued and 
more persuasive; and the opinions of the audience generally reflect this 




The major reason that Arnhart links rhetoric with truth is that, while rhetoric must work 
within the scope of common opinions (endoxa), common opinions usually reflect a 
degree of truth. As he puts it, “whatever has become widely accepted among men is 
likely to contain some element of truth” (p. 25, cf. 183). Given this element of truth, 
Arnhart argues that rhetoric is stronger than sophistic speech: 
the actions of the sophist substantiate the veracity of common opinions, 
for his fallacious inferences consist not of reasoning from the common 
opinions of men, but rather of reasoning from what only appear to be 
common opinions or of reasoning to conclusions that appear to follow 
from common opinions when in fact they do not. While the rhetorician 
relies upon the commonsense understanding of men, the sophist runs 
contrary to it (p. 183). 
I quote Arnhart at length on this issue because I agree with much of his 
commentary on the Rhetoric. In particular, he is very perceptive on the full character of 
the enthymeme and is importance within the Rhetoric. Nevertheless, I think he is overly 
credulous regarding the degree and strength of the truth in common opinion. It is correct 
that in the introduction to the Rhetoric Aristotle says, “things that are true and things that 
are just are by nature stronger than their opposites” (1355a21-22). But this is in the 
opening where he suggests that it should be enough to present one’s case without relying 
on “extraneous” matters such as emotional appeals and artful arrangement. As I argued in 




corresponds with Aristotle’s advice on introductions for defensive rhetoric (3.14). 
Aristotle uses the introduction to establish his character as one solely concerned with 
presenting truth, but as the work progresses, he relaxes this stringent position. 
Subsequently, he grants that, due to the character of general audiences and their inability 
to appreciate rational argument by itself, it is necessary to use the other aspects of 
rhetoric including emotional appeal and stylistic delivery. 
Arnhart is also correct in saying that common opinions usually contain “some 
element of truth.” The potential insight of common opinions is the reason they serve as 
the starting point for dialectical investigation. What must also be noted, however, is that 
common opinions usually contain errors and flaws. Furthermore, the people who adhere 
to common opinions do not themselves distinguish the truth from the errors in their 
opinions—to them, the entire opinion seems true. As Aristotle describes in the Topics, a 
rigorous effort of dialectic is required to identify errors and refine opinion. Most audience 
members will not have undertaken such an effort, nor would they even be capable of 
following advanced dialectical argument. Given the limits of the audience, it is difficult 
to believe that they will appreciate the truth when it is presented to them. Instead, they 
will expect arguments to accord with their flawed general opinions. For this reason, I do 
not think Aristotle rests his defense of rhetoric on the rational capacity of audiences to 
discern truth.  
Rather, Aristotle has a more qualified defense of rhetoric. In many ways, it is 




mentioned, rhetoric had acquired a bad name in Greece due to its misuse by sophists who 
advertised they could teach people how to “make the weaker speech stronger.” In the 
sophistic use of rhetoric, the speaker manipulates the audience, using emotional appeals 
and other stylistic devices to misdirect or impair their judgment. He might also simply 
pander to the audience members, encouraging them to act on immediate, ill-thought out 
opinions. In part, Aristotle provides a study of rhetoric in order to teach readers how to 
counteract sophistic uses of rhetoric (as he notes early on in the work at 1355a29-b2), but 
this is not the only beneficial use of rhetoric. In particular, rhetoric may also be required 
to support rational deliberation. Even if the common opinions of the audience are flawed, 
a rhetorician must rely on these opinions in order to present his case in a manner that the 
audience can follow. Similarly, a speaker might use rhetorical devices to guide the 
listeners’ attention, putting ideas clearly “before their eyes” so that they can appreciate 
concerns that might otherwise seem distant or difficult to understand. While rhetoric can 
be used to mislead an audience, it can also be used to aid their reasoning and guide them 
to conclusions that they would not be able to reach by themselves. One can thus defend 
rhetoric by arguing that it is a neutral art that can be put to a beneficial use. Beyond that, 
one cannot give a more absolute defense—instead, one must judge particular cases and 
instances of rhetorical speech, considering how rhetoric is used and what end the 
audience is guided towards. 
To be sure, this is a limited defense of rhetoric, but it corresponds to the limits of 
rhetoric itself. Within the Rhetoric, Aristotle does not directly discuss the limitations of 




limited by the particular audience. Because rhetoric is not simply a matter of presenting 
truth, the rhetorician must work within the common opinions that the audience accepts. 
Certain societies will have better opinions to draw on than others, and even if there are 
salutary opinions in the cultural tradition, the audience must know them well enough to 
follow an argument that appeals to these opinions. More broadly, the audience must be 
willing to listen to speech and attend to arguments. As Polemarchus playfully warns 
Socrates in Plato’s Republic, “Do you have the power to persuade if we do not listen?” 
(327e). The limits imposed by the audience suggest that the power of rhetoric is 
dependent on the resources available in a political society, both the character of the 
people and the quality of the opinions they hold. Another limit of rhetoric is that there is 
no guidance within the art itself as to how rhetoric should be used, what opinions are 
worth appealing to, or where the audience should be guided. Rhetoric requires guidance 
if it is to be used beneficially.  
Rhetoric is a limited art, but to the extent that Aristotle offers a broader defense of 
rhetoric, it is in his guidance on how rhetoric can be used to refine common opinion. For 
the most part, this is not the role of rhetoric. Common opinions are instilled by general 
experience and early moral education; subsequently they may be modified through 
further education and investigation. Rhetoric, however, is not education and it cannot 
have the rigor of dialectic, so it is limited in its capacity to appeal outside of common 
opinion. Instead, rhetoric must largely work within commonly accepted notions, 
appealing to premises that the audience already accepts. To the extent that the public can 




be a degree to which a speaker can challenge public opinion and simply present new 
alternatives. Otherwise, the speaker will have to justify policies and ideas in light of 
premises already accepted by common opinion. For example, in Chapter 2, I discussed 
American speeches that appeal to the “self-evident truths” of the Declaration of 
Independence. In the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln appealed to the founding ideals not 
only to praise the sacrifice of the fallen, but also to rally the nation by making clear that 
the civil war was not just a war between the states as many saw it; rather, he presented 
the war as a struggle to defend the fundamental idea of the Declaration (“the proposition 
that all men are created equal”) and thereby determine whether a government committed 
to that idea “can long endure.” Similarly, civil rights leaders such as Frederick Douglass 
and Martin Luther King Jr. appealed to the Declaration in order to justify the abolition 
and anti-segregation movements in terms of the American revolutionary commitment to 
freedom and equality.  
It is important to note that while rhetoric is largely limited to common opinion, 
this limitation is also what provides it with its unique power or opportunity for 
leadership. By working within common opinions and within the limited capacities of the 
audience, a speaker can lead the listeners from their initial views and he can attain 
broader agreement than by using rational argument alone. Furthermore, by relying on 




this point, albeit somewhat elliptically, when discussing the rhetorical use of maxims 
(which are short, weighty-sounding generalizations).149 He says, 
Maxims have one great benefit in speeches, which comes from the 
crudeness [or, vulgarity: φορτικότητα] of the audience members, since 
they are delighted when someone speaking in universal terms hits upon 
opinions that they themselves hold for a particular case. … For a maxim is 
a universal declaration, as was said, and people are delighted when 
something they already happen to assume about a particular case is stated 
universally. (1395b1-7) 
There are different ways of understanding the “crudeness” of the listeners and their 
“delight.” Most immediately, the passage suggests that there is a degree of flattery at 
work: the audience members are pleased because their opinions are being affirmed by the 
speaker. Indeed, one might say more generally that there is a degree of flattery involved 
with the rhetorical reliance on common opinions, because such reliance suggests that the 
opinions are a sufficient basis for deliberation. Again, however, it is important to consider 
how the opinions are used and what end the audience is guided towards. On this note, it is 
important to recognize the inductive language that Aristotle uses in the quoted passage: 
                                                 
149 An example of a rhetorical maxim that Aristotle gives is, “The saying ‘nothing too much’ does 
not please me, for one cannot hate evils too much” (1395a32-33). This form of maxim was used 
by Barry Goldwater in his 1964 Republican convention speech: “Extremism in defense of liberty 




he suggests that the speaker expands on the listeners’ thought, extending their particular 
views into a more general observation. That is, whereas the audience had only grasped 
particulars, the speaker is able to go further, drawing these observations into a more 
universal claim.150 The “delight” in this case would be the pleasure of “quick learning” 
that Aristotle often refers to (e.g. 1371a31, 1410b10), a pleasure that is felt as the 
listeners are able to understand a point that builds on their own experience. There might 
still be a degree of flattery if the audience members think they are responsible for the 
insight—but the important point regarding rhetoric is that the speaker is able to select 
certain views and extend the reasoning of the audience, applying their opinions in new 
ways. To relate this point regarding the extension of common opinion back to the theory 
of bounded rationality, it is not enough to say that political rhetoric involves framing 
issues in particular ways or directing the audience’s attention to certain points over 
others. The speaker can also look to implicit assumptions and draw out the potential 
implications of common opinions, appealing to the audience members’ judgment in order 
to extend their reasoning.  
                                                 
150 In his lectures on the Rhetoric, Leo Strauss (1964) comments on this passage: “[The orator] 
expresses universally what they sense particularly in the case at hand. They could not express it 
universally and they get it then from him. … The crudity of the hearers is crucial. They cannot 
express generally what they think or feel in the particular case. And therefore this is where the 
orator comes in: He can say what they only sense” (Lecture X.15-16, 1:14:00 ff.). Arnhart (1981) 
makes a similar point: “Even the person unable to generalize from his particular experiences is 
pleased by the generalizations of a rhetorician; such a person delights to have what he only 




One can most readily see this capacity to extend common opinion in speeches that 
invoke fundamental political commitments. In the American examples above, one can 
say at the very least that Lincoln and the civil rights leaders sought to remind audiences 
of the original meaning of the Declaration and thereby correct subsequent corruption of 
that meaning. One could go further, however, and say that in these instances, the speaker 
highlights certain elements while minimizing dissonant aspects of the historical founding. 
The effect of such a selective focus is to reinforce and even expand on certain opinions 
over others. In this regard, it is worth noting that Wills (1992) identifies the Gettysburg 
Address as a “new founding” (p. 39) and an effort of “correcting the Constitution itself 
without overthrowing it” (p. 147):  
[Lincoln] altered the document from within, by appeal from its letter to the 
spirit, subtly changing the recalcitrant stuff of that legal compromise, 
bringing it to its own indictment. By implicitly doing this, he performed 
one of the most daring acts of open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by 
the unsuspecting. … The crowd departed with a new thing in its 
ideological luggage, that new constitution Lincoln had substituted for the 
one they brought there with them. (p. 38) 
In other nations where democratic institutions are more recent developments, leaders 
might seek to bolster liberalism by linking it with ideas already respected in the cultural 
tradition. For example, in his studies of constitutionalism in India and Israel, Jacobsohn 




and continuance” of the tolerance found in Hinduism (2009, p. 207) and “consonant with 
the vision of the prophets of Israel” (1993, p. 69). The rhetorical effort in such cases is 
not only to justify new ideals by a selective appeal to the old, but also to adapt traditional 
ideals to a new context. There is thus some room to challenge the audience by appealing 
to and seeking to refine fundamental opinions, though the rhetorician will be limited by 
the opinions that can be found within the political society.  
 One might also see rhetorical refinement of common opinion in certain forms of 
philosophical writing. On this point, recall that Aristotle opens the Rhetoric by calling 
rhetoric the counterpart or antistrophe of dialectic. Antistrophe is a dramatic term 
regarding the chorus in a Greek play: in the strophe, the chorus dances in one direction 
while delivering its message, and in the antistrophe, the chorus returns across the stage, 
following the same metric pattern. To apply the metaphor: whereas dialectic moves away 
from public views, refining flawed opinions, rhetoric can be used to return to the public 
and introduce the discoveries of dialectic. I argued in Chapter 2 that this opening 
statement is part of an idealistic account of rhetoric that Aristotle subsequently qualifies. 
However, to see how rhetoric could serve as an antistrophe, one might look to the 
rhetorical character of Aristotle’s own writing.  
This rhetorical character is most clearly highlighted in a series of methodological 
remarks Aristotle makes early on in the Nicomachean Ethics. First, he notes the lack of 
precision he will use, saying that when speaking on the good, noble, and just things, “one 




suggests that his discussion will be closer to a persuasive account offered by a “skilled 
rhetorician” than a demonstration by a mathematician (1094b26-27). Secondly, Aristotle 
indicates that the primary audience will be mature, morally serious gentlemen who have 
been “brought up nobly by means of convention concerning the noble things, just things, 
and political things generally” (1095b4-5). Moreover, he says that he will be working 
within the accepted beliefs of these men: the starting point or first principle for his 
discussion will be what they find manifestly evident such that there will be no need to 
explain “the why” concerning these principles (1095b7). Aristotle’s use of this limited 
standard can be seen throughout his discussion of the virtues as he continually focuses on 
what is commonly praised and blamed.151 
None of these comments on the limited precision of the Ethics or its primary 
intended audience are meant to deny the philosophic importance of the work. On the 
contrary, the Ethics, along with the Politics, offers what Aristotle calls a “philosophic 
inquiry concerning human things” (1181b15). There is a deeper teaching available for 
readers who demand more precision, ask questions regarding “the why,” and pursue the 
puzzles Aristotle embeds in his discussion. In its immediate presentation, however, the 
Ethics is a dialectical inquiry that is contained within rhetorical limits, meaning that while 
Aristotle examines, clarifies, and expands upon conventional moral opinions, he 
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ultimately upholds and reinforces refined versions of those opinions.152 In light of this 
philosophic rhetoric, one might say that while the Rhetoric offers a general teaching 
concerning how rhetoric works, Aristotle offers his highest defense of rhetoric in his 
other works where he shows how rhetoric can best be paired with philosophy. 
Exploring the potential and limits of philosophic rhetoric would require a much 
more extensive study of Aristotle’s other works and the rhetoric he uses therein. 
Similarly, a study of the role of rhetoric in the highest forms of political guidance would 
also need to take place in a larger examination of politics, including considerations of 
education and law. This is to say that to grasp Aristotle’s full teaching on rhetoric, one 
would have to go beyond the Rhetoric itself, relating the lessons of the Rhetoric to the 
broader political teaching found in the Aristotelian corpus. In terms of the current study, 
however, my focus was on the Rhetoric itself and the psychology of persuasion. My goals 
were to explore Aristotle’s teaching on the character of human rationality, examine the 
place of rationality in rhetoric so as to defend the use of rhetoric, and demonstrate the 
enduring relevance of Aristotle’s thought to political science. Having done so, I will 
apply Aristotle’s final words in the Rhetoric. He says that after showing that one’s 
promises have been kept, a speaker should conclude with simple, direct words: 
                                                 
152 Pangle (2013) characterizes Aristotle’s “didactic rhetoric” as having a “winnowing effect,” 
wherein some few readers are lead to “clarified and rigorously consistent thinking,” while other 





εἴρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε. 
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